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updating topic with details from jlhawn
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@ -20,9 +20,35 @@ This is the current list of admission controllers used by Docker:
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- [PodSecurityPolicy](https://kubernetes.io/docs/reference/access-authn-authz/admission-controllers/#podsecuritypolicy)
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### Custom
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- UCPAuthorization
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- CheckImageSigning
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- UCPNodeSelector
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- **UCPAuthorization**
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This custom admission controller does several things:
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- Annotates Docker Compose-on-Kubernetes `Stack` resources with the identity
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of the user performing the request so that the Docker Compose-on-Kubernetes
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resource controller can manage `Stacks` with correct user authorization.
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- Detects when `ServiceAccount` resources are deleted so that they can be
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correctly removed from UCP's Node scheduling authorization backend.
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- Simplifies creation of `RoleBindings` and `ClusterRoleBindings` resources by
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automatically converting user, organization, and team Subject names into
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their corresponding unique identifiers.
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- Prevents users from deleting the builtin `cluster-admin` `ClusterRole` or
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`ClusterRoleBinding` resources.
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- Prevents under-privileged users from creating or updating `PersistintVolume`
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resources with host paths.
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- Works in conjunction with the builtin `PodSecurityPolicies` admission
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controller to prevent under-privileged users from creating `Pods` with
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privileged options.
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- **CheckImageSigning**
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Enforces UCP's Docker Content Trust policy which, if enabled, requires that all
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Pods use container images which have been digitally signed by trusted and
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authorized users which are members of one or more teams in UCP.
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- **UCPNodeSelector**
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Adds a `com.docker.ucp.orchestrator.kubernetes:*` toleration to pods in the
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kube-system namespace and removes `com.docker.ucp.orchestrator.kubernetes`
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tolerations from pods in other namespaces. This ensures that user workloads do
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not run on swarm-only nodes, which UCP taints with
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`com.docker.ucp.orchestrator.kubernetes:NoExecute`. It also adds a node
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affinity to prevent pods from running on manager nodes depending on UCP's
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settings.
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**Note:** you cannot enable or disable your own admission controllers. For more information about why, see [Supportability of custom kubernetes flags in universal control plane](https://success.docker.com/article/supportability-of-custom-kubernetes-flags-in-universal-control-plane)
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