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engine: add release-notes for 20.10.20
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
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@ -15,6 +15,53 @@ for Docker Engine.
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# Version 20.10
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## 20.10.20
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2022-10-18
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This release of Docker Engine contains partial mitigations for a Git vulnerability
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([CVE-2022-39253](https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2022-39253){:target="_blank" rel="noopener"}),
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and has updated handling of `image:tag@digest` image references.
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The Git vulnerability allows a maliciously crafted Git repository, when used as a
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build context, to copy arbitrary filesystem paths into resulting containers/images;
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this can occur in both the daemon, and in API clients, depending on the versions and
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tools in use.
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The mitigations available in this release and in other consumers of the daemon API
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are partial and only protect users who build a Git URL context (e.g. `git+protocol://`).
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As the vulnerability could still be exploited by manually run Git commands that interact
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with and check out submodules, users should immediately upgrade to a patched version of
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Git to protect against this vulernability. Further details are available from the GitHub
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blog (["Git security vulnerabilities announced"](https://github.blog/2022-10-18-git-security-vulnerabilities-announced/){:target="_blank" rel="noopener"}).
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### Client
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- Added a mitigation for [CVE-2022-39253](https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2022-39253){:target="_blank" rel="noopener"},
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when using the classic Builder with a Git URL as the build context.
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### Daemon
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- Updated handling of `image:tag@digest` references. When pulling an image using
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the `image:tag@digest` ("pull by digest"), image resolution happens through
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the content-addressable digest and the `image` and `tag` are not used. While
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this is expected, this could lead to confusing behavior, and could potentially
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be exploited through social engineering to run an image that is already present
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in the local image store. Docker now checks if the digest matches the repository
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name used to pull the image, and otherwise will produce an error.
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### Builder
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- Updated handling of `image:tag@digest` references. Refer to the "Daemon" section
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above for details.
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- Added a mitigation to the classic Builder and updated BuildKit to [v0.8.3-31-gc0149372](https://github.com/moby/buildkit/commit/c014937225cba29cfb1d5161fd134316c0e9bdaa){:target="_blank" rel="noopener"},
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for [CVE-2022-39253](https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2022-39253){:target="_blank" rel="noopener"}.
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### Packaging
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- Update Docker Compose to [v2.12.0](https://github.com/docker/compose/releases/tag/v2.12.0){:target="_blank" rel="noopener"}.
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## 20.10.19
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2022-10-14
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