mirror of https://github.com/docker/docs.git
Merge pull request #21651 from dvdksn/seccomp-freshness
seccomp freshness
This commit is contained in:
commit
54fcccd75e
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@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ exceptions:
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- AWS
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- BIOS
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- BPF
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- BSD
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- CI
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- CISA
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- CLI
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@ -73,6 +74,7 @@ exceptions:
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- NFS
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- NOTE
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- NTLM
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- NUMA
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- NVDA
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- OCI
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- OS
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@ -20,8 +20,8 @@ Couchbase
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Datadog
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Ddosify
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Debootstrap
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Dev Environments?
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Dev
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Dev Environments?
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Django
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Docker Build Cloud
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Docker Business
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@ -73,8 +73,8 @@ Nuxeo
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OAuth
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OTel
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Okta
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Paketo
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PKG
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Paketo
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Postgres
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PowerShell
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Python
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@ -98,8 +98,9 @@ WireMock
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Zscaler
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Zsh
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[Aa]utobuild
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[Bb]uildx
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[Aa]llowlist
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[Bb]uildpack(s)?
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[Bb]uildx
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[Cc]odenames?
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[Cc]ompose
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[Dd]istroless
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@ -134,6 +135,10 @@ Zsh
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[Ss]ysfs
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[Tt]oolchains?
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[Uu]narchived?
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[Uu]ngated
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[Uu]ntrusted
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[Uu]serland
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[Uu]serspace
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[Vv]irtiofs
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[Vv]irtualize
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[Ww]alkthrough
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@ -178,8 +183,5 @@ systemd
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tmpfs
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ufw
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umask
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ungated
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userland
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untrusted
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vSphere
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vpnkit
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@ -26,13 +26,13 @@ protective while providing wide application compatibility. The default Docker
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profile can be found
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[here](https://github.com/moby/moby/blob/master/profiles/seccomp/default.json).
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In effect, the profile is an allowlist which denies access to system calls by
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default, then allowlists specific system calls. The profile works by defining a
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In effect, the profile is an allowlist that denies access to system calls by
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default and then allows specific system calls. The profile works by defining a
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`defaultAction` of `SCMP_ACT_ERRNO` and overriding that action only for specific
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system calls. The effect of `SCMP_ACT_ERRNO` is to cause a `Permission Denied`
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error. Next, the profile defines a specific list of system calls which are fully
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allowed, because their `action` is overridden to be `SCMP_ACT_ALLOW`. Finally,
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some specific rules are for individual system calls such as `personality`, and others,
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some specific rules are for individual system calls such as `personality`, and others,
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to allow variants of those system calls with specific arguments.
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`seccomp` is instrumental for running Docker containers with least privilege. It
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@ -53,61 +53,61 @@ $ docker run --rm \
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Docker's default seccomp profile is an allowlist which specifies the calls that
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are allowed. The table below lists the significant (but not all) syscalls that
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are effectively blocked because they are not on the Allowlist. The table includes
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are effectively blocked because they are not on the allowlist. The table includes
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the reason each syscall is blocked rather than white-listed.
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| Syscall | Description |
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|---------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
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| `acct` | Accounting syscall which could let containers disable their own resource limits or process accounting. Also gated by `CAP_SYS_PACCT`. |
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| `add_key` | Prevent containers from using the kernel keyring, which is not namespaced. |
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| `bpf` | Deny loading potentially persistent bpf programs into kernel, already gated by `CAP_SYS_ADMIN`. |
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| `clock_adjtime` | Time/date is not namespaced. Also gated by `CAP_SYS_TIME`. |
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| `clock_settime` | Time/date is not namespaced. Also gated by `CAP_SYS_TIME`. |
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| `clone` | Deny cloning new namespaces. Also gated by `CAP_SYS_ADMIN` for CLONE_* flags, except `CLONE_NEWUSER`. |
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| `create_module` | Deny manipulation and functions on kernel modules. Obsolete. Also gated by `CAP_SYS_MODULE`. |
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| `delete_module` | Deny manipulation and functions on kernel modules. Also gated by `CAP_SYS_MODULE`. |
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| `finit_module` | Deny manipulation and functions on kernel modules. Also gated by `CAP_SYS_MODULE`. |
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| `get_kernel_syms` | Deny retrieval of exported kernel and module symbols. Obsolete. |
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| `get_mempolicy` | Syscall that modifies kernel memory and NUMA settings. Already gated by `CAP_SYS_NICE`. |
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| `init_module` | Deny manipulation and functions on kernel modules. Also gated by `CAP_SYS_MODULE`. |
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| `ioperm` | Prevent containers from modifying kernel I/O privilege levels. Already gated by `CAP_SYS_RAWIO`. |
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| `iopl` | Prevent containers from modifying kernel I/O privilege levels. Already gated by `CAP_SYS_RAWIO`. |
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| `kcmp` | Restrict process inspection capabilities, already blocked by dropping `CAP_SYS_PTRACE`. |
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| `kexec_file_load` | Sister syscall of `kexec_load` that does the same thing, slightly different arguments. Also gated by `CAP_SYS_BOOT`. |
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| `kexec_load` | Deny loading a new kernel for later execution. Also gated by `CAP_SYS_BOOT`. |
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| `keyctl` | Prevent containers from using the kernel keyring, which is not namespaced. |
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| `lookup_dcookie` | Tracing/profiling syscall, which could leak a lot of information on the host. Also gated by `CAP_SYS_ADMIN`. |
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| `mbind` | Syscall that modifies kernel memory and NUMA settings. Already gated by `CAP_SYS_NICE`. |
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| `mount` | Deny mounting, already gated by `CAP_SYS_ADMIN`. |
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| `move_pages` | Syscall that modifies kernel memory and NUMA settings. |
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| `nfsservctl` | Deny interaction with the kernel nfs daemon. Obsolete since Linux 3.1. |
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| `open_by_handle_at` | Cause of an old container breakout. Also gated by `CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH`. |
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| `perf_event_open` | Tracing/profiling syscall, which could leak a lot of information on the host. |
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| `personality` | Prevent container from enabling BSD emulation. Not inherently dangerous, but poorly tested, potential for a lot of kernel vulns. |
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| `pivot_root` | Deny `pivot_root`, should be privileged operation. |
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| `process_vm_readv` | Restrict process inspection capabilities, already blocked by dropping `CAP_SYS_PTRACE`. |
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| `process_vm_writev` | Restrict process inspection capabilities, already blocked by dropping `CAP_SYS_PTRACE`. |
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| Syscall | Description |
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| ------------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
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| `acct` | Accounting syscall which could let containers disable their own resource limits or process accounting. Also gated by `CAP_SYS_PACCT`. |
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| `add_key` | Prevent containers from using the kernel keyring, which is not namespaced. |
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| `bpf` | Deny loading potentially persistent BPF programs into kernel, already gated by `CAP_SYS_ADMIN`. |
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| `clock_adjtime` | Time/date is not namespaced. Also gated by `CAP_SYS_TIME`. |
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| `clock_settime` | Time/date is not namespaced. Also gated by `CAP_SYS_TIME`. |
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| `clone` | Deny cloning new namespaces. Also gated by `CAP_SYS_ADMIN` for CLONE\_\* flags, except `CLONE_NEWUSER`. |
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| `create_module` | Deny manipulation and functions on kernel modules. Obsolete. Also gated by `CAP_SYS_MODULE`. |
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| `delete_module` | Deny manipulation and functions on kernel modules. Also gated by `CAP_SYS_MODULE`. |
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| `finit_module` | Deny manipulation and functions on kernel modules. Also gated by `CAP_SYS_MODULE`. |
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| `get_kernel_syms` | Deny retrieval of exported kernel and module symbols. Obsolete. |
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| `get_mempolicy` | Syscall that modifies kernel memory and NUMA settings. Already gated by `CAP_SYS_NICE`. |
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| `init_module` | Deny manipulation and functions on kernel modules. Also gated by `CAP_SYS_MODULE`. |
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| `ioperm` | Prevent containers from modifying kernel I/O privilege levels. Already gated by `CAP_SYS_RAWIO`. |
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| `iopl` | Prevent containers from modifying kernel I/O privilege levels. Already gated by `CAP_SYS_RAWIO`. |
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| `kcmp` | Restrict process inspection capabilities, already blocked by dropping `CAP_SYS_PTRACE`. |
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| `kexec_file_load` | Sister syscall of `kexec_load` that does the same thing, slightly different arguments. Also gated by `CAP_SYS_BOOT`. |
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| `kexec_load` | Deny loading a new kernel for later execution. Also gated by `CAP_SYS_BOOT`. |
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| `keyctl` | Prevent containers from using the kernel keyring, which is not namespaced. |
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| `lookup_dcookie` | Tracing/profiling syscall, which could leak a lot of information on the host. Also gated by `CAP_SYS_ADMIN`. |
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| `mbind` | Syscall that modifies kernel memory and NUMA settings. Already gated by `CAP_SYS_NICE`. |
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| `mount` | Deny mounting, already gated by `CAP_SYS_ADMIN`. |
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| `move_pages` | Syscall that modifies kernel memory and NUMA settings. |
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| `nfsservctl` | Deny interaction with the kernel NFS daemon. Obsolete since Linux 3.1. |
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| `open_by_handle_at` | Cause of an old container breakout. Also gated by `CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH`. |
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| `perf_event_open` | Tracing/profiling syscall, which could leak a lot of information on the host. |
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| `personality` | Prevent container from enabling BSD emulation. Not inherently dangerous, but poorly tested, potential for a lot of kernel vulnerabilities. |
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| `pivot_root` | Deny `pivot_root`, should be privileged operation. |
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| `process_vm_readv` | Restrict process inspection capabilities, already blocked by dropping `CAP_SYS_PTRACE`. |
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| `process_vm_writev` | Restrict process inspection capabilities, already blocked by dropping `CAP_SYS_PTRACE`. |
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| `ptrace` | Tracing/profiling syscall. Blocked in Linux kernel versions before 4.8 to avoid seccomp bypass. Tracing/profiling arbitrary processes is already blocked by dropping `CAP_SYS_PTRACE`, because it could leak a lot of information on the host. |
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| `query_module` | Deny manipulation and functions on kernel modules. Obsolete. |
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| `quotactl` | Quota syscall which could let containers disable their own resource limits or process accounting. Also gated by `CAP_SYS_ADMIN`. |
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| `reboot` | Don't let containers reboot the host. Also gated by `CAP_SYS_BOOT`. |
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| `request_key` | Prevent containers from using the kernel keyring, which is not namespaced. |
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| `set_mempolicy` | Syscall that modifies kernel memory and NUMA settings. Already gated by `CAP_SYS_NICE`. |
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| `setns` | Deny associating a thread with a namespace. Also gated by `CAP_SYS_ADMIN`. |
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| `settimeofday` | Time/date is not namespaced. Also gated by `CAP_SYS_TIME`. |
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| `stime` | Time/date is not namespaced. Also gated by `CAP_SYS_TIME`. |
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| `swapon` | Deny start/stop swapping to file/device. Also gated by `CAP_SYS_ADMIN`. |
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| `swapoff` | Deny start/stop swapping to file/device. Also gated by `CAP_SYS_ADMIN`. |
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| `sysfs` | Obsolete syscall. |
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| `_sysctl` | Obsolete, replaced by /proc/sys. |
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| `umount` | Should be a privileged operation. Also gated by `CAP_SYS_ADMIN`. |
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| `umount2` | Should be a privileged operation. Also gated by `CAP_SYS_ADMIN`. |
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| `unshare` | Deny cloning new namespaces for processes. Also gated by `CAP_SYS_ADMIN`, with the exception of `unshare --user`. |
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| `uselib` | Older syscall related to shared libraries, unused for a long time. |
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| `userfaultfd` | Userspace page fault handling, largely needed for process migration. |
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| `ustat` | Obsolete syscall. |
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| `vm86` | In kernel x86 real mode virtual machine. Also gated by `CAP_SYS_ADMIN`. |
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| `vm86old` | In kernel x86 real mode virtual machine. Also gated by `CAP_SYS_ADMIN`. |
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| `query_module` | Deny manipulation and functions on kernel modules. Obsolete. |
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| `quotactl` | Quota syscall which could let containers disable their own resource limits or process accounting. Also gated by `CAP_SYS_ADMIN`. |
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| `reboot` | Don't let containers reboot the host. Also gated by `CAP_SYS_BOOT`. |
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| `request_key` | Prevent containers from using the kernel keyring, which is not namespaced. |
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| `set_mempolicy` | Syscall that modifies kernel memory and NUMA settings. Already gated by `CAP_SYS_NICE`. |
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| `setns` | Deny associating a thread with a namespace. Also gated by `CAP_SYS_ADMIN`. |
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| `settimeofday` | Time/date is not namespaced. Also gated by `CAP_SYS_TIME`. |
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| `stime` | Time/date is not namespaced. Also gated by `CAP_SYS_TIME`. |
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| `swapon` | Deny start/stop swapping to file/device. Also gated by `CAP_SYS_ADMIN`. |
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| `swapoff` | Deny start/stop swapping to file/device. Also gated by `CAP_SYS_ADMIN`. |
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| `sysfs` | Obsolete syscall. |
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| `_sysctl` | Obsolete, replaced by /proc/sys. |
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| `umount` | Should be a privileged operation. Also gated by `CAP_SYS_ADMIN`. |
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| `umount2` | Should be a privileged operation. Also gated by `CAP_SYS_ADMIN`. |
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| `unshare` | Deny cloning new namespaces for processes. Also gated by `CAP_SYS_ADMIN`, with the exception of `unshare --user`. |
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| `uselib` | Older syscall related to shared libraries, unused for a long time. |
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| `userfaultfd` | Userspace page fault handling, largely needed for process migration. |
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| `ustat` | Obsolete syscall. |
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| `vm86` | In kernel x86 real mode virtual machine. Also gated by `CAP_SYS_ADMIN`. |
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| `vm86old` | In kernel x86 real mode virtual machine. Also gated by `CAP_SYS_ADMIN`. |
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## Run without the default seccomp profile
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@ -115,6 +115,6 @@ You can pass `unconfined` to run a container without the default seccomp
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profile.
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```console
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$ docker run --rm -it --security-opt seccomp=unconfined debian:jessie \
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$ docker run --rm -it --security-opt seccomp=unconfined debian:latest \
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unshare --map-root-user --user sh -c whoami
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```
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