fix description for ptrace in seccomp.md

The existing description leads the reader to believe that dropping CAP_SYS_PTRACE already blocks all ptraces. That is not true, it only blocks ptracing arbitrary processes. Ptracing child processes is still allowed.
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Jan Kanis 2020-05-22 13:36:45 +02:00 committed by GitHub
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@ -93,7 +93,7 @@ the reason each syscall is blocked rather than white-listed.
| `pivot_root` | Deny `pivot_root`, should be privileged operation. |
| `process_vm_readv` | Restrict process inspection capabilities, already blocked by dropping `CAP_SYS_PTRACE`. |
| `process_vm_writev` | Restrict process inspection capabilities, already blocked by dropping `CAP_SYS_PTRACE`. |
| `ptrace` | Tracing/profiling syscall, which could leak a lot of information on the host. Already blocked by dropping `CAP_SYS_PTRACE`. Blocked in Linux kernel versions before 4.8 to avoid seccomp bypass. |
| `ptrace` | Tracing/profiling syscall. Blocked in Linux kernel versions before 4.8 to avoid seccomp bypass. Tracing/profiling arbitrary processes is already blocked by dropping `CAP_SYS_PTRACE`, because it could leak a lot of information on the host. |
| `query_module` | Deny manipulation and functions on kernel modules. Obsolete. |
| `quotactl` | Quota syscall which could let containers disable their own resource limits or process accounting. Also gated by `CAP_SYS_ADMIN`. |
| `reboot` | Don't let containers reboot the host. Also gated by `CAP_SYS_BOOT`. |