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Merge pull request #705 from docker/docs-fix 

Docs fix
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Ying Li 2016-04-28 18:00:59 -07:00
parent 2166f84543 177711137f
commit c2219d664e
2 changed files with 34 additions and 365 deletions
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336
docs/images/metadata-sequence.svg
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docs/service_architecture.md
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@ -101,7 +101,7 @@ The Notary signer is responsible for:
The following diagram illustrates the interactions between the Notary client,
server, and signer:
![Notary Service Sequence Diagram](https://cdn.rawgit.com/docker/notary/09f81717080f53276e6881ece57cbbbf91b8e2a7/docs/images/metadata-sequence.svg)
![Notary Service Sequence Diagram](https://cdn.rawgit.com/docker/notary/27469f01fe244bdf70f34219616657b336724bc3/docs/images/metadata-sequence.svg)
1. Notary server optionally supports authentication from clients using
<a href="http://jwt.io/" target="_blank">JWT</a> tokens. This requires an authorization server that
@ -237,15 +237,16 @@ decrypted key depends on the type and combination of keys that were compromised
- **Decrypted Delegation Key, only**
| Keys compromised | Malicious Content | Rollback, Freeze, Mix and Match | Denial of Service |
|------------------|-------------------|---------------------------------|-------------------|
| Delegation key | no | no | no |
| Keys compromised | Malicious Content | Rollback, Freeze, Mix and Match | Denial of Service |
|------------------|-------------------|---------------------------------|-------------------|
| Delegation key | no | no | no |
- **Decrypted Delegation Key + Notary Service write-capable credentials**
| Keys compromised | Malicious Content | Rollback, Freeze, Mix and Match | Denial of Service |
|------------------|-------------------|---------------------------------|-------------------|
| Delegation key | limited, maybe* | limited, maybe* | limited, maybe* |
| Keys compromised | Malicious Content | Rollback, Freeze, Mix and Match | Denial of Service |
|------------------|-------------------|---------------------------------|-------------------|
| Delegation key | limited, maybe* | limited, maybe* | limited, maybe* |
*If the Notary Service holds the snapshot key and the attacker has Notary Service
write credentials, then they have effective access to the snapshot and timestamp
@ -261,18 +262,18 @@ decrypted key depends on the type and combination of keys that were compromised
- **Decrypted Delegation Key + Decrypted Snapshot Key, only**
| Keys compromised | Malicious Content | Rollback, Freeze, Mix and Match | Denial of Service |
|------------------|-------------------|---------------------------------|-------------------|
| Delegation key <br/> Snapshot key | no | no | no |
| Keys compromised | Malicious Content | Rollback, Freeze, Mix and Match | Denial of Service |
|------------------|-------------------|---------------------------------|-------------------|
| Delegation key <br/> Snapshot key | no | no | no |
The attacker does not have access to the timestamp key, which is always held by the Notary
Service, and will be unable to set up a malicious mirror.
- **Decrypted Delegation Key + Decrypted Snapshot Key + Notary Service write-capable credentials**
| Keys compromised | Malicious Content | Rollback, Freeze, Mix and Match | Denial of Service |
|------------------|-------------------|---------------------------------|-------------------|
| Delegation key <br/> Snapshot key | limited | limited | limited |
| Keys compromised | Malicious Content | Rollback, Freeze, Mix and Match | Denial of Service |
|------------------|-------------------|---------------------------------|-------------------|
| Delegation key <br/> Snapshot key | limited | limited | limited |
The Notary Service always holds the timestamp key. If the attacker has Notary Service
write credentials, then they have effective access to the timestamp key because the server
@ -288,15 +289,15 @@ decrypted key depends on the type and combination of keys that were compromised
- **Decrypted Targets Key, only**
| Keys compromised | Malicious Content | Rollback, Freeze, Mix and Match | Denial of Service |
|------------------|-------------------|---------------------------------|-------------------|
| Targets key | no | no | no |
| Keys compromised | Malicious Content | Rollback, Freeze, Mix and Match | Denial of Service |
|------------------|-------------------|---------------------------------|-------------------|
| Targets key | no | no | no |
- **Decrypted Targets Key + Notary Service write-capable credentials**
| Keys compromised | Malicious Content | Rollback, Freeze, Mix and Match | Denial of Service |
|------------------|-------------------|---------------------------------|-------------------|
| Targets key | maybe* | maybe* | limited, maybe* |
| Keys compromised | Malicious Content | Rollback, Freeze, Mix and Match | Denial of Service |
|------------------|-------------------|---------------------------------|-------------------|
| Targets key | maybe* | maybe* | limited, maybe* |
*If the Notary Service holds the snapshot key and the attacker has Notary Service
write credentials, then they have effective access to the snapshot and timestamp
@ -311,18 +312,18 @@ decrypted key depends on the type and combination of keys that were compromised
- **Decrypted Targets Key + Decrypted Snapshot Key, only**
| Keys compromised | Malicious Content | Rollback, Freeze, Mix and Match | Denial of Service |
|------------------|-------------------|---------------------------------|-------------------|
| Targets key <br/> Snapshot key | no | no | no |
| Keys compromised | Malicious Content | Rollback, Freeze, Mix and Match | Denial of Service |
|------------------|-------------------|---------------------------------|-------------------|
| Targets key <br/> Snapshot key | no | no | no |
The attacker does not have access to the timestamp key, which is always held by the Notary
Service, and will be unable to set up a malicious mirror.
- **Decrypted Targets Key + Decrypted Snapshot Key + Notary Service write-capable credentials**
| Keys compromised | Malicious Content | Rollback, Freeze, Mix and Match | Denial of Service |
|------------------|-------------------|---------------------------------|-------------------|
| Targets key <br/> Snapshot key | yes | yes | limited |
| Keys compromised | Malicious Content | Rollback, Freeze, Mix and Match | Denial of Service |
|------------------|-------------------|---------------------------------|-------------------|
| Targets key <br/> Snapshot key | yes | yes | limited |
The Notary Service always holds the timestamp key. If the attacker has Notary Service
write credentials, then they have effective access to the timestamp key because the server
@ -337,9 +338,9 @@ decrypted key depends on the type and combination of keys that were compromised
- **Decrypted Root Key + none or any combination of decrypted keys, only**
| Keys compromised | Malicious Content | Rollback, Freeze, Mix and Match | Denial of Service |
|------------------|-------------------|---------------------------------|-------------------|
| All keys | yes | yes | yes |
| Keys compromised | Malicious Content | Rollback, Freeze, Mix and Match | Denial of Service |
|------------------|-------------------|---------------------------------|-------------------|
| All keys | yes | yes | yes |
No other keys are needed, since the attacker can just any rotate or all of them to ones that they
generate. With these keys, they can set up a mirror to serve malicious data - any malicious data
@ -347,9 +348,9 @@ decrypted key depends on the type and combination of keys that were compromised
- **Decrypted Root Key + none or any combination of decrypted keys + Notary Service write-capable credentials**
| Keys compromised | Malicious Content | Rollback, Freeze, Mix and Match | Denial of Service |
|------------------|-------------------|---------------------------------|-------------------|
| All keys | yes | yes | yes |
| Keys compromised | Malicious Content | Rollback, Freeze, Mix and Match | Denial of Service |
|------------------|-------------------|---------------------------------|-------------------|
| All keys | yes | yes | yes |
*If the Notary Service holds the snapshot key and the attacker has Notary Service
write credentials, then they won't even have to rotate the snapshot and timestamp