Rename Product Security Team to Committee

This commit is contained in:
Joel Smith 2019-02-26 16:06:19 -07:00
parent a4474adb2d
commit 2f922a12b1
7 changed files with 9 additions and 9 deletions

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@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ Subproject Owner Role. (this different from a SIG or Organization Member).
### Security Contact
- Security Contact
- *MUST* be a contact point for the Product Security Team to reach out to for
- *MUST* be a contact point for the Product Security Committee to reach out to for
triaging and handling of incoming issues
- *MUST* accept the [Embargo Policy]
- Defined in `SECURITY_CONTACTS` files, this is only relevant to the root file in

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@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ vulnerability reports in these areas, they are not (currently) eligible to recei
- Linux privilege escalations<br>
_Please report these through security@kernel.org_
- Attacks against containers from the host they are running on
- Attacks relying on insecure configurations (subject to the [Product Security Team][]'s opinion),
- Attacks relying on insecure configurations (subject to the [Product Security Committee][]'s opinion),
such as clusters not utilizing mutual authentication or encryption between Kubernetes components.
- Attacks relying on or against deprecated components (e.g. gitrepo volumes)
- Vulnerabilities in etcd<br>
@ -74,6 +74,6 @@ vulnerability reports in these areas, they are not (currently) eligible to recei
- Vulnerabilities specific to a hosted Kubernetes setup<br>
_Please report these through the associated provider_
[Product Security Team]: https://github.com/kubernetes/sig-release/blob/master/security-release-process-documentation/security-release-process.md#product-security-team-pst
[Product Security Committee]: https://git.k8s.io/security/security-release-process.md#product-security-committee-psc
[CoreOS's disclosure process]: https://coreos.com/security/disclosure/
[CoreDNS's disclosure process]: https://github.com/coredns/coredns#security

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@ -582,7 +582,7 @@ q2Xz68mF3_LggEY/edit?ts=5a68cdbc
* Tim Allclair (@tallclair, Google) nominated as replacement
* Long-term contributor to k8s auth/security
* Helped drive pod security policy and audit features
* Member of kubernetes product security team
* Member of kubernetes product security committee
* Brings container/node security expertise
* Unanimous support from other leads (Jordan Liggitt, Red Hat; Eric Chiang, CoreOS)
* Feedback on the change welcome (either public or private)

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@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ Link to SIG section in [sigs.yaml]
- Protection of volume data, container ephemeral data, and other non-API data (prefer: sig-storage
and sig-node)
- Container isolation (prefer: sig-node and sig-networking)
- Bug bounty (prefer: product security team)
- Bug bounty (prefer: product security committee)
- Resource quota (prefer: sig-scheduling)
- Resource availability / DOS protection (prefer: sig-apimachinery, sig-network, sig-node)

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@ -109,7 +109,7 @@ roles. We do not have the Tech Lead role, and have a honorary Emeritus Chair rol
related events, such as KubeCon.
- Security Contacts
- Are a contact point for the Product Security Team to reach out to for
- Are a contact point for the Product Security Committee to reach out to for
triaging and handling of incoming issues.
- Must be a maintainer.
- Must accept and adhere to the Kubernetes [Embargo

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@ -98,7 +98,7 @@ time.
must be staffed / owned by at least 3 volunteers
- We aspire to follow the same 1/3 maximal representation rules used by the
Steering Committee, Product Security Team, and other groups that have
Steering Committee, Product Security Committee, and other groups that have
project-wide impact
- However, while we are bootstrapping, we consider it acceptable for maximal
representation concerns to be violated, since this will often be necessary
@ -106,7 +106,7 @@ time.
- Our plan would be to rectify this when choosing new members or rotating
old members such that we eventually meet maximal representation criteria
- We plan to follow the model set forth by the Product Security Team for
- We plan to follow the model set forth by the Product Security Committee for
suitable vetting new subproject owners
- Subproject owners must provide additional contact details within the WG, and

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@ -79,7 +79,7 @@ There is yet another set of developers of Kubernetes internals who are
those involved in meta-topics:
* SIG Release: production of supported release artifacts
* SIG Testing: how we can most effectively test Kubernetes
* Product Security Team (PST): security vulnerability handling
* Product Security Committee (PSC): security vulnerability handling
* SIG Architecture: maintains and evolves the design principles of Kubernetes, and provides a consistent body of expertise necessary to ensure architectural consistency over time. Also defines conformance testing.
* Steering Committee: scope includes deciding how and when official releases of Kubernetes artifacts are made and what they include