Answered additional RFP questions.
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@ -113,4 +113,6 @@ The audit should result in the following artifacts, which will be made public af
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| 13| What does the working group refer to with formal threat model? Would STRIDE be a formal threat model in that sense?| A formal threat model should include a comprehensive dataflow diagram which shows data moving between different trust levels and assesses threats to that data using a system like STRIDE as the data moves between each process/component. Many good examples are present in Threat Modeling: Designing for Security by Adam Shostack. |
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| 14| Does Kubernetes uses any GoLang non-standard signing libraries? | An initial investigation has not uncovered any, however with a code base as large as Kubernetes, it is possible. |
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| 15| Does Kubernetes implement any cryptographic primitives on its own, i.e. primitives which are not part of the standard libraries? | An initial investigation has not uncovered any, however with a code base as large as Kubernetes, it is possible. |
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| 16| Presuming that live testing is part of the project, how does the working group see the "audited reference architecture" being defined? Is there a representative deployment, or a document describing a "default installation" that you foresee the engagement team using to inform the buildout of a test environment?| The purpose of the reference architecture is to define and document the configuration against which live testing was preformed. It should be generated collaboratively with the working group at the beginning of the project. We will want it to represent at least a common configuration, as in practice Kubernetes itself has no default configuration. It should take the form of a document detailing the set-up and configuration steps the vendor took to create their environment, ensuring an easily repeatable reference implementation. |
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| 17| The RFP describes ""networking and multi-tenancy isolation"" as one of the focus areas. <br/><br/>Can you describe for us what these terms mean to you? Can you also help us understand how you define a soft non-hostile co-tenant? Is a _hostile_ co-tenant also in scope?| By networking we mean vulnerabilities related to communication within and to/from the cluster: container to container, pod to pod, pod to service, and external to internal communications as described in [the networking documentation](https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/cluster-administration/networking/). <br/><br/>The concept of soft multi-tenancy is that you have a single cluster being shared by applications or groups within the same company or organization, with less intended restrictions of a hard multi-tenant platform like a PaaS that hosts multiple distinct and potentially hostile competing customers on a single cluster which requires stricter security assumptions. These definitions may vary by group and use case, but the idea is that you can have a cluster with multiple groups with their own namespaces, isolated by networking/storage/RBAC roles."|
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| 18| In the Artifacts section, you describe a Formal Threat Model as one of the outputs of the engagement. Can you expound on what this means to you? Are there any representative public examples you could point us to?| Please refer to question 13.|
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