a) The current implementation use's a static kubelet which doesn't not conform to the Node authorization mode (i.e. system:nodes:<nodename>)
b) As present the kubeconfig is static and reused across all the masters and nodes
The PR firstly introduces the ability for users to use bootstrap tokens and secondly when enabled ensure the kubelets for the masters as have unique usernames. Note, this PR does not attempt to address the distribution of the bootstrap tokens themselves, that's for cluster admins. One solution for this would be a daemonset on the masters running on hostNetwork and reuse dns-controller to annotated the pods and give as the DNS
Notes:
- the master node do not use bootstrap tokens, instead given they have access to the ca anyhow, we generate certificates for each.
- when bootstrap token is not enabled the behaviour will stay the same; i.e. a kubelet configuration brought down from the store.
- when bootstrap tokens are enabled, the Nodes sit in a timeout loop waiting for the configuration to appear (by third party).
- given the nodeup docker and manifests builders are executed before the kubelet builder, the assumption here is a unit file kicks of a custom container to bootstrap the rest.
- the current firewalls on between the master and nodes are fairly open so no need to open ports between the two
- much of the work was ported from @justinsb PR [here](https://github.com/kubernetes/kops/pull/4134/)
- we add a very presumptuous server and client certificates for use with an authorizer (node-bootstrap-internal.dns_zone)
I do have an additional PR which performs the entire thing. The process being a node_authorizer which runs on the master nodes via a daemonset, the service implements a series of authorizers (i.e. alwaysallow, aws, gce etc). For aws, the process is similar to how vault authorizes nodes [here](https://www.vaultproject.io/docs/auth/aws.html). Nodeup no then calls out to the node_authorizer on bootstrap and provisions the kubelet.
The etcd-manager will (ideally) take over etcd management. To provide a
nice migration path, and because we want etcd backups, we're creating a
standalone image that just backs up etcd in the etcd-manager format.
This isn't really ready for actual usage, but should be harmless because
it runs as a sidecar container.
The current implementation when Etcd TLS was added does not support using calico as the configuration and client certificates are not present. This PR updates the calico manifests and adds the distribution of the client certificate
File assets and the SHA files are uploaded to the new location. Files
when are users uses s3 are upload public read only. The copyfile task
uses only the existing SHA value.
This PR include major refactoring of the use of URLs. Strings are no
longer categnated, but converted into a URL struct and path.Join is
utlilized.
A new values.go file is included so that we can start refactoring more
code out of the "fi" package.
A
- removing the StorageType on the etcd cluster spec (sticking with the Version field only)
- changed the protokube flag back to -etcd-image
- users have to explicitly set the etcd version now; the latest version in gcr.io is 3.0.17
- reverted the ordering on the populate spec
The current implementation is running v2.2.1 which is two year old and end of life. This PR add the ability to use etcd and set the versions if required. Note at the moment the image is still using the gcr.io registry image. As note, much like TLS their presently is not 'automated' migration path from v2 to v3.
- the feature is gated behine the storageType of the etcd cluster, bot clusters events and main must use the same storage type
- the version for v2 is unchanged and pinned at v2.2.1 with v2 using v3.0.17
- @question: we shoudl consider allowing the use to override the images though I think this should be addresses more generically, than one offs here and then. I know chris is working on a asset registry??
- added the master option back the protokube, updating the nodeup model and protokube code
- removed any comments no related to the PR as suggested
- reverted the ordering of the mutex in the AWSVolumes in protokube
The current implementation does not put any transport security on the etcd cluster. The PR provides and optional flag to enable TLS the etcd cluster
- cleaned up and fixed any formatting issues on the journey
- added two new certificates (server/client) for etcd peers and a client certificate for kubeapi and others perhaps (perhaps calico?)
- disabled the protokube service for nodes completely is not required; note this was first raised in https://github.com/kubernetes/kops/pull/3091, but figured it would be easier to place in here given the relation
- updated protokube codebase to reflect the changes, removing the master option as its no longer required
- added additional integretion tests for the protokube manifests;
- note, still need to add documentation, but opening the PR to get feedback
- one outstanding issue is the migration from http -> https for preexisting clusters, i'm gonna hit the coreos board to ask for the best options
- fixed any of the vettting / formatting issues that i'm came across on the update
- removed the commented out lines from the componentconfig as it make its increasingly difficult to find what is supported, what is not and the difference between them.
- added SerializeImagePulls, RegisterSchedulable to kubelet (by default they are ignored)
- added FeatureGates to the kube-proxy
Out of interest can someone point me to where these multi-versioned componentconfig are being used?
k8s-ci-robot
Rohith
Justin Santa Barbara
liang
AdamDang
andrewsykim
Tim Hockin
Otto Yiu
chrislovecnm
Matt Schurenko
Derek VerLee
Hanfei Shen
Miao Luo
prashima
SandeepPissay