API servers also have access to secret store, so there is no need to go through kops-controller.
This lets API server only depend on etcd from the CP nodes, which should make it easier to scale out API servers under pressure
We don't call klog.InitFlags yet, because that will cause a flag
redefinition error until we get everyone to stop using glog. That
will happen when we update to k8s 1.13.
a) The current implementation use's a static kubelet which doesn't not conform to the Node authorization mode (i.e. system:nodes:<nodename>)
b) As present the kubeconfig is static and reused across all the masters and nodes
The PR firstly introduces the ability for users to use bootstrap tokens and secondly when enabled ensure the kubelets for the masters as have unique usernames. Note, this PR does not attempt to address the distribution of the bootstrap tokens themselves, that's for cluster admins. One solution for this would be a daemonset on the masters running on hostNetwork and reuse dns-controller to annotated the pods and give as the DNS
Notes:
- the master node do not use bootstrap tokens, instead given they have access to the ca anyhow, we generate certificates for each.
- when bootstrap token is not enabled the behaviour will stay the same; i.e. a kubelet configuration brought down from the store.
- when bootstrap tokens are enabled, the Nodes sit in a timeout loop waiting for the configuration to appear (by third party).
- given the nodeup docker and manifests builders are executed before the kubelet builder, the assumption here is a unit file kicks of a custom container to bootstrap the rest.
- the current firewalls on between the master and nodes are fairly open so no need to open ports between the two
- much of the work was ported from @justinsb PR [here](https://github.com/kubernetes/kops/pull/4134/)
- we add a very presumptuous server and client certificates for use with an authorizer (node-bootstrap-internal.dns_zone)
I do have an additional PR which performs the entire thing. The process being a node_authorizer which runs on the master nodes via a daemonset, the service implements a series of authorizers (i.e. alwaysallow, aws, gce etc). For aws, the process is similar to how vault authorizes nodes [here](https://www.vaultproject.io/docs/auth/aws.html). Nodeup no then calls out to the node_authorizer on bootstrap and provisions the kubelet.
While the admin account is created on stock debian images, it isn't on
all of them. Check admin first, then check root, and don't treat it as
an error if neither is found - this is only a convenience.
The current implementation does not put any transport security on the etcd cluster. The PR provides and optional flag to enable TLS the etcd cluster
- cleaned up and fixed any formatting issues on the journey
- added two new certificates (server/client) for etcd peers and a client certificate for kubeapi and others perhaps (perhaps calico?)
- disabled the protokube service for nodes completely is not required; note this was first raised in https://github.com/kubernetes/kops/pull/3091, but figured it would be easier to place in here given the relation
- updated protokube codebase to reflect the changes, removing the master option as its no longer required
- added additional integretion tests for the protokube manifests;
- note, still need to add documentation, but opening the PR to get feedback
- one outstanding issue is the migration from http -> https for preexisting clusters, i'm gonna hit the coreos board to ask for the best options
* Detect CoreOS
* Move key manifests to code, to tolerate read-only mounts
* Misc refactorings so more code can be shared
* Change lots of ints to int32s in the models
* Run nodeup as a oneshot systemd service, rather than relying on
cloud-init behaviour which varies across distros
Ciprian Hacman
John Gardiner Myers
Ole Markus With
Justin Santa Barbara
Ciprian Hacman
Peter Rifel
ZouYu
Kashif Saadat
mikesplain
Jesse Haka
Rohith
Justin Santa Barbara
chrislovecnm
Jaipradeesh Janarthanan