--- title: Encrypting Secret Data at Rest reviewers: - smarterclayton content_type: task min-kubernetes-server-version: 1.13 --- This page shows how to enable and configure encryption of secret data at rest. ## {{% heading "prerequisites" %}} * {{< include "task-tutorial-prereqs.md" >}} {{< version-check >}} * etcd v3.0 or later is required ## Configuration and determining whether encryption at rest is already enabled The `kube-apiserver` process accepts an argument `--encryption-provider-config` that controls how API data is encrypted in etcd. The configuration is provided as an API named [`EncryptionConfiguration`](/docs/reference/config-api/apiserver-encryption.v1/). An example configuration is provided below. {{< caution >}} **IMPORTANT:** For high-availability configurations (with two or more control plane nodes), the encryption configuration file must be the same! Otherwise, the `kube-apiserver` component cannot decrypt data stored in the etcd. {{< /caution >}} ## Understanding the encryption at rest configuration. ```yaml apiVersion: apiserver.config.k8s.io/v1 kind: EncryptionConfiguration resources: - resources: - secrets providers: - identity: {} - aesgcm: keys: - name: key1 secret: c2VjcmV0IGlzIHNlY3VyZQ== - name: key2 secret: dGhpcyBpcyBwYXNzd29yZA== - aescbc: keys: - name: key1 secret: c2VjcmV0IGlzIHNlY3VyZQ== - name: key2 secret: dGhpcyBpcyBwYXNzd29yZA== - secretbox: keys: - name: key1 secret: YWJjZGVmZ2hpamtsbW5vcHFyc3R1dnd4eXoxMjM0NTY= ``` Each `resources` array item is a separate config and contains a complete configuration. The `resources.resources` field is an array of Kubernetes resource names (`resource` or `resource.group`) that should be encrypted. The `providers` array is an ordered list of the possible encryption providers. Only one provider type may be specified per entry (`identity` or `aescbc` may be provided, but not both in the same item). The first provider in the list is used to encrypt resources written into the storage. When reading resources from storage, each provider that matches the stored data attempts in order to decrypt the data. If no provider can read the stored data due to a mismatch in format or secret key, an error is returned which prevents clients from accessing that resource. For more detailed information about the `EncryptionConfiguration` struct, please refer to the [encryption configuration API](/docs/reference/config-api/apiserver-encryption.v1/). {{< caution >}} If any resource is not readable via the encryption config (because keys were changed), the only recourse is to delete that key from the underlying etcd directly. Calls that attempt to read that resource will fail until it is deleted or a valid decryption key is provided. {{< /caution >}} ### Providers: {{< table caption="Providers for Kubernetes encryption at rest" >}} Name | Encryption | Strength | Speed | Key Length | Other Considerations -----|------------|----------|-------|------------|--------------------- `identity` | None | N/A | N/A | N/A | Resources written as-is without encryption. When set as the first provider, the resource will be decrypted as new values are written. `secretbox` | XSalsa20 and Poly1305 | Strong | Faster | 32-byte | A newer standard and may not be considered acceptable in environments that require high levels of review. `aesgcm` | AES-GCM with random nonce | Must be rotated every 200k writes | Fastest | 16, 24, or 32-byte | Is not recommended for use except when an automated key rotation scheme is implemented. `aescbc` | AES-CBC with [PKCS#7](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc2315) padding | Weak | Fast | 32-byte | Not recommended due to CBC's vulnerability to padding oracle attacks. `kms` | Uses envelope encryption scheme: Data is encrypted by data encryption keys (DEKs) using AES-CBC with [PKCS#7](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc2315) padding (prior to v1.25), using AES-GCM starting from v1.25, DEKs are encrypted by key encryption keys (KEKs) according to configuration in Key Management Service (KMS) | Strongest | Fast | 32-bytes | The recommended choice for using a third party tool for key management. Simplifies key rotation, with a new DEK generated for each encryption, and KEK rotation controlled by the user. [Configure the KMS provider](/docs/tasks/administer-cluster/kms-provider/) Each provider supports multiple keys - the keys are tried in order for decryption, and if the provider is the first provider, the first key is used for encryption. {{< caution >}} Storing the raw encryption key in the EncryptionConfig only moderately improves your security posture, compared to no encryption. Please use `kms` provider for additional security. {{< /caution >}} By default, the `identity` provider is used to protect Secrets in etcd, which provides no encryption. `EncryptionConfiguration` was introduced to encrypt Secrets locally, with a locally managed key. Encrypting Secrets with a locally managed key protects against an etcd compromise, but it fails to protect against a host compromise. Since the encryption keys are stored on the host in the EncryptionConfiguration YAML file, a skilled attacker can access that file and extract the encryption keys. Envelope encryption creates dependence on a separate key, not stored in Kubernetes. In this case, an attacker would need to compromise etcd, the `kubeapi-server`, and the third-party KMS provider to retrieve the plaintext values, providing a higher level of security than locally stored encryption keys. ## Encrypting your data Create a new encryption config file: ```yaml apiVersion: apiserver.config.k8s.io/v1 kind: EncryptionConfiguration resources: - resources: - secrets providers: - aescbc: keys: - name: key1 secret: - identity: {} ``` To create a new Secret, perform the following steps: 1. Generate a 32-byte random key and base64 encode it. If you're on Linux or macOS, run the following command: ```shell head -c 32 /dev/urandom | base64 ``` 1. Place that value in the `secret` field of the `EncryptionConfiguration` struct. 1. Set the `--encryption-provider-config` flag on the `kube-apiserver` to point to the location of the config file. You will need to mount the new encryption config file to the `kube-apiserver` static pod. Here is an example on how to do that: 1. Save the new encryption config file to `/etc/kubernetes/enc/enc.yaml` on the control-plane node. 1. Edit the manifest for the `kube-apiserver` static pod: `/etc/kubernetes/manifests/kube-apiserver.yaml` similarly to this: ```yaml apiVersion: v1 kind: Pod metadata: annotations: kubeadm.kubernetes.io/kube-apiserver.advertise-address.endpoint: 10.10.30.4:6443 creationTimestamp: null labels: component: kube-apiserver tier: control-plane name: kube-apiserver namespace: kube-system spec: containers: - command: - kube-apiserver ... - --encryption-provider-config=/etc/kubernetes/enc/enc.yaml # <-- add this line volumeMounts: ... - name: enc # <-- add this line mountPath: /etc/kubernetes/enc # <-- add this line readonly: true # <-- add this line ... volumes: ... - name: enc # <-- add this line hostPath: # <-- add this line path: /etc/kubernetes/enc # <-- add this line type: DirectoryOrCreate # <-- add this line ... ``` 1. Restart your API server. {{< caution >}} Your config file contains keys that can decrypt the contents in etcd, so you must properly restrict permissions on your control-plane nodes so only the user who runs the `kube-apiserver` can read it. {{< /caution >}} ## Verifying that data is encrypted Data is encrypted when written to etcd. After restarting your `kube-apiserver`, any newly created or updated Secret should be encrypted when stored. To check this, you can use the `etcdctl` command line program to retrieve the contents of your Secret. 1. Create a new Secret called `secret1` in the `default` namespace: ```shell kubectl create secret generic secret1 -n default --from-literal=mykey=mydata ``` 1. Using the `etcdctl` command line, read that Secret out of etcd: `ETCDCTL_API=3 etcdctl get /registry/secrets/default/secret1 [...] | hexdump -C` where `[...]` must be the additional arguments for connecting to the etcd server. For example: ```shell ETCDCTL_API=3 etcdctl \ --cacert=/etc/kubernetes/pki/etcd/ca.crt \ --cert=/etc/kubernetes/pki/etcd/server.crt \ --key=/etc/kubernetes/pki/etcd/server.key \ get /registry/secrets/default/secret1 | hexdump -C ``` The output is similar to this (abbreviated): ```hexdump 00000000 2f 72 65 67 69 73 74 72 79 2f 73 65 63 72 65 74 |/registry/secret| 00000010 73 2f 64 65 66 61 75 6c 74 2f 73 65 63 72 65 74 |s/default/secret| 00000020 31 0a 6b 38 73 3a 65 6e 63 3a 61 65 73 63 62 63 |1.k8s:enc:aescbc| 00000030 3a 76 31 3a 6b 65 79 31 3a c7 6c e7 d3 09 bc 06 |:v1:key1:.l.....| 00000040 25 51 91 e4 e0 6c e5 b1 4d 7a 8b 3d b9 c2 7c 6e |%Q...l..Mz.=..|n| 00000050 b4 79 df 05 28 ae 0d 8e 5f 35 13 2c c0 18 99 3e |.y..(..._5.,...>| [...] 00000110 23 3a 0d fc 28 ca 48 2d 6b 2d 46 cc 72 0b 70 4c |#:..(.H-k-F.r.pL| 00000120 a5 fc 35 43 12 4e 60 ef bf 6f fe cf df 0b ad 1f |..5C.N`..o......| 00000130 82 c4 88 53 02 da 3e 66 ff 0a |...S..>f..| 0000013a ``` 1. Verify the stored Secret is prefixed with `k8s:enc:aescbc:v1:` which indicates the `aescbc` provider has encrypted the resulting data. 1. Verify the Secret is correctly decrypted when retrieved via the API: ```shell kubectl get secret secret1 -n default -o yaml ``` The output should contain `mykey: bXlkYXRh`, with contents of `mydata` encoded, check [decoding a Secret](/docs/tasks/configmap-secret/managing-secret-using-kubectl/#decoding-secret) to completely decode the Secret. ## Ensure all Secrets are encrypted Since Secrets are encrypted on write, performing an update on a Secret will encrypt that content. ```shell kubectl get secrets --all-namespaces -o json | kubectl replace -f - ``` The command above reads all Secrets and then updates them to apply server side encryption. {{< note >}} If an error occurs due to a conflicting write, retry the command. For larger clusters, you may wish to subdivide the secrets by namespace or script an update. {{< /note >}} ## Rotating a decryption key Changing a Secret without incurring downtime requires a multi-step operation, especially in the presence of a highly-available deployment where multiple `kube-apiserver` processes are running. 1. Generate a new key and add it as the second key entry for the current provider on all servers 1. Restart all `kube-apiserver` processes to ensure each server can decrypt using the new key 1. Make the new key the first entry in the `keys` array so that it is used for encryption in the config 1. Restart all `kube-apiserver` processes to ensure each server now encrypts using the new key 1. Run `kubectl get secrets --all-namespaces -o json | kubectl replace -f -` to encrypt all existing Secrets with the new key 1. Remove the old decryption key from the config after you have backed up etcd with the new key in use and updated all Secrets When running a single `kube-apiserver` instance, step 2 may be skipped. ## Decrypting all data To disable encryption at rest, place the `identity` provider as the first entry in the config and restart all `kube-apiserver` processes. ```yaml apiVersion: apiserver.config.k8s.io/v1 kind: EncryptionConfiguration resources: - resources: - secrets providers: - identity: {} - aescbc: keys: - name: key1 secret: ``` Then run the following command to force decrypt all Secrets: ```shell kubectl get secrets --all-namespaces -o json | kubectl replace -f - ``` ## {{% heading "whatsnext" %}} * Learn more about the [EncryptionConfiguration configuration API (v1)](/docs/reference/config-api/apiserver-encryption.v1/).