Merge branch 'goodkey' of github.com:letsencrypt/boulder into goodkey
Conflicts: ca/certificate-authority.go core/good_key.go core/good_key_test.go
This commit is contained in:
commit
cb00816e48
|
@ -182,9 +182,16 @@ func (ca *CertificateAuthorityImpl) RevokeCertificate(serial string) (err error)
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// IssueCertificate attempts to convert a CSR into a signed Certificate, while
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// enforcing all policies.
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func (ca *CertificateAuthorityImpl) IssueCertificate(csr x509.CertificateRequest) (core.Certificate, error) {
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func (ca *CertificateAuthorityImpl) IssueCertificate(csr x509.CertificateRequest) (cert core.Certificate, err error) {
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emptyCert := core.Certificate{}
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var err error
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key, ok := csr.PublicKey.(crypto.PublicKey)
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if !ok {
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return emptyCert, fmt.Errorf("Invalid public key in CSR.")
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}
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if !core.GoodKey(key) {
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return emptyCert, fmt.Errorf("Invalid public key in CSR.")
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}
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// XXX Take in authorizations and verify that union covers CSR?
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// Pull hostnames from CSR
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hostNames := csr.DNSNames // DNSNames + CN from CSR
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@ -194,7 +201,7 @@ func (ca *CertificateAuthorityImpl) IssueCertificate(csr x509.CertificateRequest
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} else if len(hostNames) > 0 {
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commonName = hostNames[0]
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} else {
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err = errors.New("Cannot issue a certificate without a hostname.")
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err = fmt.Errorf("Cannot issue a certificate without a hostname.")
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ca.log.WarningErr(err)
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return emptyCert, err
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}
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@ -205,14 +212,14 @@ func (ca *CertificateAuthorityImpl) IssueCertificate(csr x509.CertificateRequest
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identifier := core.AcmeIdentifier{Type: core.IdentifierDNS, Value: commonName}
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if err = ca.PA.WillingToIssue(identifier); err != nil {
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err = errors.New("Policy forbids issuing for name " + commonName)
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err = fmt.Errorf("Policy forbids issuing for name %s", commonName)
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ca.log.AuditErr(err)
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return emptyCert, err
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}
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for _, name := range hostNames {
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identifier = core.AcmeIdentifier{Type: core.IdentifierDNS, Value: name}
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if err = ca.PA.WillingToIssue(identifier); err != nil {
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err = errors.New("Policy forbids issuing for name " + name)
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err = fmt.Errorf("Policy forbids issuing for name %s", name)
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ca.log.AuditErr(err)
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return emptyCert, err
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}
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@ -265,7 +272,7 @@ func (ca *CertificateAuthorityImpl) IssueCertificate(csr x509.CertificateRequest
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}
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certDER := block.Bytes
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cert := core.Certificate{
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cert = core.Certificate{
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DER: certDER,
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Status: core.StatusValid,
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}
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@ -281,5 +288,5 @@ func (ca *CertificateAuthorityImpl) IssueCertificate(csr x509.CertificateRequest
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}
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ca.DB.Commit()
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return cert, nil
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return cert, err
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}
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|
|
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@ -427,6 +427,14 @@ func TestIssueCertificate(t *testing.T) {
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test.Assert(t, certStatus.Status == core.OCSPStatusGood, "Certificate status was not good")
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test.Assert(t, certStatus.SubscriberApproved == false, "Subscriber shouldn't have approved cert yet.")
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}
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}
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func TestRejectNoName(t *testing.T) {
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cadb, storageAuthority, caConfig := setup(t)
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ca, err := NewCertificateAuthorityImpl(cadb, caConfig)
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test.AssertNotError(t, err, "Failed to create CA")
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ca.SA = storageAuthority
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// Test that the CA rejects CSRs with no names
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csrDER, _ := hex.DecodeString(NO_NAME_CSR_HEX)
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@ -436,3 +444,19 @@ func TestIssueCertificate(t *testing.T) {
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t.Errorf("CA improperly agreed to create a certificate with no name")
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}
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}
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func TestShortKey(t *testing.T) {
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cadb, storageAuthority, caConfig := setup(t)
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ca, err := NewCertificateAuthorityImpl(cadb, caConfig)
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ca.SA = storageAuthority
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csrDER, err := ioutil.ReadFile("shortkey-csr.der")
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if err != nil {
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t.Errorf("Failed to read shortkey-csr.der")
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}
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csr, _ := x509.ParseCertificateRequest(csrDER)
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_, err = ca.IssueCertificate(*csr)
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if err == nil {
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t.Errorf("CA improperly created a certificate with short key.")
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}
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}
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|
|
Binary file not shown.
|
@ -11,12 +11,19 @@ import (
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"crypto/rsa"
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"fmt"
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"reflect"
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"math/big"
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blog "github.com/letsencrypt/boulder/log"
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)
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// To generate, run: primes 2 752 | tr '\n' ,
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var smallPrimes = []int64{
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2,3,5,7,11,13,17,19,23,29,31,37,41,43,47,53,59,61,67,71,73,79,83,89,97,101,103,107,109,113,127,131,137,139,149,151,157,163,167,173,179,181,191,193,197,199,211,223,227,229,233,239,241,251,257,263,269,271,277,281,283,293,307,311,313,317,331,337,347,349,353,359,367,373,379,383,389,397,401,409,419,421,431,433,439,443,449,457,461,463,467,479,487,491,499,503,509,521,523,541,547,557,563,569,571,577,587,593,599,601,607,613,617,619,631,641,643,647,653,659,661,673,677,683,691,701,709,719,727,733,739,743,751,
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}
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// GoodKey returns true iff the key is acceptable for both TLS use and account
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// key use (our requirements are the same for either one), according to basic
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// strength and algorithm checking.
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// TODO: Support JsonWebKeys once go-jose migration is done.
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func GoodKey(key crypto.PublicKey) bool {
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log := blog.GetAuditLogger()
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switch t := key.(type) {
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|
@ -64,8 +71,16 @@ func GoodKeyRSA(key rsa.PublicKey) bool {
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log.Debug(fmt.Sprintf("Key exponent is too small: %d", key.E))
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return false
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}
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// TODO: The modulus SHOULD also have the following
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// characteristics: an odd number, not the power of a prime,
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// and have no factors smaller than 752.
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// The modulus SHOULD also have the following characteristics: an odd
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// number, not the power of a prime, and have no factors smaller than 752.
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// TODO: We don't yet check for "power of a prime."
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for _, prime := range smallPrimes {
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var result big.Int
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result.Mod(modulus, big.NewInt(prime))
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if result.Sign() == 0 {
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log.Debug(fmt.Sprintf("Key divisible by small prime: %d", prime))
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return false
|
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}
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}
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return true
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}
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|
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,370 @@
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// Copyright 2014 ISRG. All rights reserved
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// This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
|
||||
// License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
|
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// file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/.
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|
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package core
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|
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import (
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"crypto/x509"
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"encoding/hex"
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"encoding/json"
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jose "github.com/letsencrypt/boulder/Godeps/_workspace/src/github.com/square/go-jose"
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"time"
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"strings"
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)
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type IdentifierType string
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type AcmeStatus string
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type OCSPStatus string
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type Buffer []byte
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const (
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StatusUnknown = AcmeStatus("unknown") // Unknown status; the default
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StatusPending = AcmeStatus("pending") // In process; client has next action
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StatusProcessing = AcmeStatus("processing") // In process; server has next action
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StatusValid = AcmeStatus("valid") // Validation succeeded
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StatusInvalid = AcmeStatus("invalid") // Validation failed
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StatusRevoked = AcmeStatus("revoked") // Object no longer valid
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)
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const (
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OCSPStatusGood = OCSPStatus("good")
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OCSPStatusRevoked = OCSPStatus("revoked")
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)
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const (
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ChallengeTypeSimpleHTTPS = "simpleHttps"
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ChallengeTypeDVSNI = "dvsni"
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ChallengeTypeDNS = "dns"
|
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ChallengeTypeRecoveryToken = "recoveryToken"
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)
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|
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const (
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IdentifierDNS = IdentifierType("dns")
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)
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// An AcmeIdentifier encodes an identifier that can
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// be validated by ACME. The protocol allows for different
|
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// types of identifier to be supported (DNS names, IP
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// addresses, etc.), but currently we only support
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// domain names.
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type AcmeIdentifier struct {
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Type IdentifierType `json:"type"` // The type of identifier being encoded
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Value string `json:"value"` // The identifier itself
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}
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|
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// An ACME certificate request is just a CSR together with
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// URIs pointing to authorizations that should collectively
|
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// authorize the certificate being requsted.
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//
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// This type is never marshaled, since we only ever receive
|
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// it from the client. So it carries some additional information
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// that is useful internally. (We rely on Go's case-insensitive
|
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// JSON unmarshal to properly unmarshal client requests.)
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type CertificateRequest struct {
|
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CSR *x509.CertificateRequest // The CSR
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Authorizations []AcmeURL // Links to Authorization over the account key
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}
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type rawCertificateRequest struct {
|
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CSR []byte `json:"csr"` // The encoded CSR
|
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Authorizations []AcmeURL `json:"authorizations"` // Authorizations
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}
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func (cr *CertificateRequest) UnmarshalJSON(data []byte) error {
|
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var raw rawCertificateRequest
|
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if err := json.Unmarshal(data, &raw); err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
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|
||||
csr, err := x509.ParseCertificateRequest(raw.CSR)
|
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if err != nil {
|
||||
return err
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}
|
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|
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cr.CSR = csr
|
||||
cr.Authorizations = raw.Authorizations
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return nil
|
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}
|
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|
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func (cr CertificateRequest) MarshalJSON() ([]byte, error) {
|
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return json.Marshal(rawCertificateRequest{
|
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CSR: cr.CSR.Raw,
|
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Authorizations: cr.Authorizations,
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Registration objects represent non-public metadata attached
|
||||
// to account keys.
|
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type Registration struct {
|
||||
// Unique identifier
|
||||
ID string `json:"-" db:"id"`
|
||||
|
||||
// Account key to which the details are attached
|
||||
Key jose.JsonWebKey `json:"key" db:"key"`
|
||||
|
||||
// Recovery Token is used to prove connection to an earlier transaction
|
||||
RecoveryToken string `json:"recoveryToken" db:"recoveryToken"`
|
||||
|
||||
// Contact URIs
|
||||
Contact []AcmeURL `json:"contact,omitempty" db:"contact"`
|
||||
|
||||
// Agreement with terms of service
|
||||
Agreement string `json:"agreement,omitempty" db:"agreement"`
|
||||
|
||||
//
|
||||
Thumbprint string `db:"thumbprint"`
|
||||
|
||||
LockCol int64
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (r *Registration) MergeUpdate(input Registration) {
|
||||
if len(input.Contact) > 0 {
|
||||
r.Contact = input.Contact
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// TODO: Test to make sure this has the proper value
|
||||
if len(input.Agreement) > 0 {
|
||||
r.Agreement = input.Agreement
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Rather than define individual types for different types of
|
||||
// challenge, we just throw all the elements into one bucket,
|
||||
// together with the common metadata elements.
|
||||
type Challenge struct {
|
||||
// The type of challenge
|
||||
Type string `json:"type"`
|
||||
|
||||
// The status of this challenge
|
||||
Status AcmeStatus `json:"status,omitempty"`
|
||||
|
||||
// If successful, the time at which this challenge
|
||||
// was completed by the server.
|
||||
Validated *time.Time `json:"validated,omitempty"`
|
||||
|
||||
// A URI to which a response can be POSTed
|
||||
URI AcmeURL `json:"uri"`
|
||||
|
||||
// Used by simpleHTTPS, recoveryToken, and dns challenges
|
||||
Token string `json:"token,omitempty"`
|
||||
|
||||
// Used by simpleHTTPS challenges
|
||||
Path string `json:"path,omitempty"`
|
||||
|
||||
// Used by dvsni challenges
|
||||
R string `json:"r,omitempty"`
|
||||
S string `json:"s,omitempty"`
|
||||
Nonce string `json:"nonce,omitempty"`
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Check the sanity of a challenge object before issued to the client (completed = false)
|
||||
// and before validation (completed = true).
|
||||
func (ch Challenge) IsSane(completed bool) bool {
|
||||
if ch.Status != StatusPending {
|
||||
return false
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
switch ch.Type {
|
||||
case ChallengeTypeSimpleHTTPS:
|
||||
// check extra fields aren't used
|
||||
if ch.R != "" || ch.S != "" || ch.Nonce != "" {
|
||||
return false
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if completed {
|
||||
// see if ch.Path starts with /.well-known/acme-challenge/
|
||||
if ch.Path == "" || !strings.HasPrefix(ch.Path, "/.well-known/acme-challenge/") {
|
||||
return false
|
||||
}
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
if ch.Path != "" {
|
||||
return false
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// check token is present, corrent length, and contains b64 encoded string
|
||||
if ch.Token == "" || len(ch.Token) != 43 {
|
||||
return false
|
||||
}
|
||||
if _, err := B64dec(ch.Token); err != nil {
|
||||
return false
|
||||
}
|
||||
case ChallengeTypeDVSNI:
|
||||
// check extra fields aren't used
|
||||
if ch.Path != "" || ch.Token != "" {
|
||||
return false
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if ch.Nonce == "" || len(ch.Nonce) != 32 {
|
||||
return false
|
||||
}
|
||||
if _, err := hex.DecodeString(ch.Nonce); err != nil {
|
||||
return false
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Check R & S are sane
|
||||
if ch.R == "" || len(ch.R) != 43 {
|
||||
return false
|
||||
}
|
||||
if _, err := B64dec(ch.R); err != nil {
|
||||
return false
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if completed {
|
||||
if ch.S == "" || len(ch.S) != 43 {
|
||||
return false
|
||||
}
|
||||
if _, err := B64dec(ch.S); err != nil {
|
||||
return false
|
||||
}
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
if ch.S != "" {
|
||||
return false
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
default:
|
||||
return false
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return true
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Merge a client-provide response to a challenge with the issued challenge
|
||||
// TODO: Remove return type from this method
|
||||
func (ch Challenge) MergeResponse(resp Challenge) Challenge {
|
||||
// Only override fields that are supposed to be client-provided
|
||||
if len(ch.Path) == 0 {
|
||||
ch.Path = resp.Path
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if len(ch.S) == 0 {
|
||||
ch.S = resp.S
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return ch
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// An ACME authorization object represents the authorization
|
||||
// of an account key holder to act on behalf of a domain. This
|
||||
// struct is intended to be used both internally and for JSON
|
||||
// marshaling on the wire. Any fields that should be suppressed
|
||||
// on the wire (e.g., ID) must be made empty before marshaling.
|
||||
type Authorization struct {
|
||||
// An identifier for this authorization, unique across
|
||||
// authorizations and certificates within this instance.
|
||||
ID string `json:"id,omitempty" db:"id"`
|
||||
|
||||
// The identifier for which authorization is being given
|
||||
Identifier AcmeIdentifier `json:"identifier,omitempty" db:"identifier"`
|
||||
|
||||
// The account key that is authorized for the identifier
|
||||
Key jose.JsonWebKey `json:"key,omitempty" db:"key"`
|
||||
|
||||
// The status of the validation of this authorization
|
||||
Status AcmeStatus `json:"status,omitempty" db:"status"`
|
||||
|
||||
// The date after which this authorization will be no
|
||||
// longer be considered valid
|
||||
Expires time.Time `json:"expires,omitempty" db:"expires"`
|
||||
|
||||
// An array of challenges objects used to validate the
|
||||
// applicant's control of the identifier. For authorizations
|
||||
// in process, these are challenges to be fulfilled; for
|
||||
// final authorizations, they describe the evidence that
|
||||
// the server used in support of granting the authorization.
|
||||
Challenges []Challenge `json:"challenges,omitempty" db:"challenges"`
|
||||
|
||||
// The server may suggest combinations of challenges if it
|
||||
// requires more than one challenge to be completed.
|
||||
Combinations [][]int `json:"combinations,omitempty" db:"combinations"`
|
||||
|
||||
// The client may provide contact URIs to allow the server
|
||||
// to push information to it.
|
||||
Contact []AcmeURL `json:"contact,omitempty" db:"contact"`
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Certificate objects are entirely internal to the server. The only
|
||||
// thing exposed on the wire is the certificate itself.
|
||||
type Certificate struct {
|
||||
// The encoded, signed certificate
|
||||
<<<<<<< HEAD
|
||||
DER []byte
|
||||
=======
|
||||
DER jose.JsonBuffer `db:"-"`
|
||||
>>>>>>> master
|
||||
|
||||
// The parsed version of DER. Useful for extracting things like serial number.
|
||||
ParsedCertificate *x509.Certificate `db:"-"`
|
||||
|
||||
// The revocation status of the certificate.
|
||||
// * "valid" - not revoked
|
||||
// * "revoked" - revoked
|
||||
Status AcmeStatus `db:"status"`
|
||||
|
||||
Serial string `db:"serial"`
|
||||
Digest string `db:"digest"`
|
||||
Content []byte `db:"content"`
|
||||
Issued time.Time `db:"issued"`
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// CertificateStatus structs are internal to the server. They represent the
|
||||
// latest data about the status of the certificate, required for OCSP updating
|
||||
// and for validating that the subscriber has accepted the certificate.
|
||||
type CertificateStatus struct {
|
||||
Serial string `db:"serial"`
|
||||
|
||||
// subscriberApproved: true iff the subscriber has posted back to the server
|
||||
// that they accept the certificate, otherwise 0.
|
||||
SubscriberApproved bool `db:"subscriberApproved"`
|
||||
|
||||
// status: 'good' or 'revoked'. Note that good, expired certificates remain
|
||||
// with status 'good' but don't necessarily get fresh OCSP responses.
|
||||
Status OCSPStatus `db:"status"`
|
||||
|
||||
// ocspLastUpdated: The date and time of the last time we generated an OCSP
|
||||
// response. If we have never generated one, this has the zero value of
|
||||
// time.Time, i.e. Jan 1 1970.
|
||||
OCSPLastUpdated time.Time `db:"ocspLastUpdated"`
|
||||
|
||||
// revokedDate: If status is 'revoked', this is the date and time it was
|
||||
// revoked. Otherwise it has the zero value of time.Time, i.e. Jan 1 1970.
|
||||
RevokedDate time.Time `db:"revokedDate"`
|
||||
|
||||
// revokedReason: If status is 'revoked', this is the reason code for the
|
||||
// revocation. Otherwise it is zero (which happens to be the reason
|
||||
// code for 'unspecified').
|
||||
RevokedReason int `db:"revokedReason"`
|
||||
|
||||
LockCol int64
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// A large table of OCSP responses. This contains all historical OCSP
|
||||
// responses we've signed, is append-only, and is likely to get quite
|
||||
// large. We'll probably want administratively truncate it at some point.
|
||||
type OcspResponse struct {
|
||||
ID int `db:"id"`
|
||||
|
||||
// serial: Same as certificate serial.
|
||||
Serial string `db:"serial"`
|
||||
|
||||
// createdAt: The date the response was signed.
|
||||
CreatedAt time.Time `db:"createdAt"`
|
||||
|
||||
// response: The encoded and signed CRL.
|
||||
Response []byte `db:"response"`
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// A large table of signed CRLs. This contains all historical CRLs
|
||||
// we've signed, is append-only, and is likely to get quite large.
|
||||
type Crl struct {
|
||||
// serial: Same as certificate serial.
|
||||
Serial string `db:"serial"`
|
||||
|
||||
// createdAt: The date the CRL was signed.
|
||||
CreatedAt time.Time `db:"createdAt"`
|
||||
|
||||
// crl: The encoded and signed CRL.
|
||||
Crl string `db:"crl"`
|
||||
}
|
|
@ -98,6 +98,11 @@ func Fingerprint256(data []byte) string {
|
|||
// URLs that automatically marshal/unmarshal to JSON strings
|
||||
type AcmeURL url.URL
|
||||
|
||||
func (u AcmeURL) String() string {
|
||||
url := url.URL(u)
|
||||
return url.String()
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (u AcmeURL) PathSegments() (segments []string) {
|
||||
segments = strings.Split(u.Path, "/")
|
||||
if len(segments) > 0 && len(segments[0]) == 0 {
|
||||
|
|
|
@ -47,9 +47,15 @@ func lastPathSegment(url core.AcmeURL) string {
|
|||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (ra *RegistrationAuthorityImpl) NewRegistration(init core.Registration, key jose.JsonWebKey) (reg core.Registration, err error) {
|
||||
// TODO: We should be able to just pass in a JsonWebKey. Blocked on migration
|
||||
// to go-jose.
|
||||
if !core.GoodKey(key.Rsa) {
|
||||
return core.Registration{}, fmt.Errorf("Invalid public key.")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
regID, err := ra.SA.NewRegistration()
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return
|
||||
return core.Registration{}, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
reg = core.Registration{
|
||||
|
@ -61,7 +67,7 @@ func (ra *RegistrationAuthorityImpl) NewRegistration(init core.Registration, key
|
|||
|
||||
// Store the authorization object, then return it
|
||||
err = ra.SA.UpdateRegistration(reg)
|
||||
return
|
||||
return reg, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (ra *RegistrationAuthorityImpl) NewAuthorization(request core.Authorization, key jose.JsonWebKey) (authz core.Authorization, err error) {
|
||||
|
|
|
@ -63,13 +63,21 @@ func (cadb *MockCADatabase) IncrementAndGetSerial() (int, error) {
|
|||
var (
|
||||
// These values we simulate from the client
|
||||
AccountKeyJSON = []byte(`{
|
||||
"kty": "EC",
|
||||
"crv": "P-521",
|
||||
"x": "AHKZLLOsCOzz5cY97ewNUajB957y-C-U88c3v13nmGZx6sYl_oJXu9A5RkTKqjqvjyekWF-7ytDyRXYgCF5cj0Kt",
|
||||
"y": "AdymlHvOiLxXkEhayXQnNCvDX4h9htZaCJN34kfmC6pV5OhQHiraVySsUdaQkAgDPrwQrJmbnX9cwlGfP-HqHZR1"
|
||||
}`)
|
||||
"e": "AQAB",
|
||||
"kty": "RSA",
|
||||
"n": "tSwgy3ORGvc7YJI9B2qqkelZRUC6F1S5NwXFvM4w5-M0TsxbFsH5UH6adigV0jzsDJ5imAechcSoOhAh9POceCbPN1sTNwLpNbOLiQQ7RD5mY_pSUHWXNmS9R4NZ3t2fQAzPeW7jOfF0LKuJRGkekx6tXP1uSnNibgpJULNc4208dgBaCHo3mvaE2HV2GmVl1yxwWX5QZZkGQGjNDZYnjFfa2DKVvFs0QbAk21ROm594kAxlRlMMrvqlf24Eq4ERO0ptzpZgm_3j_e4hGRD39gJS7kAzK-j2cacFQ5Qi2Y6wZI2p-FCq_wiYsfEAIkATPBiLKl_6d_Jfcvs_impcXQ"
|
||||
}`)
|
||||
|
||||
AccountKey = jose.JsonWebKey{}
|
||||
|
||||
ShortKeyJSON = []byte(`{
|
||||
"e": "AQAB",
|
||||
"kty": "RSA",
|
||||
"n": "tSwgy3ORGvc7YJI9B2qqkelZRUC6F1S5NwXFvM4w5-M0TsxbFsH5UH6adigV0jzsDJ5imAechcSoOhAh9POceCbPN1sTNwLpNbOLiQQ7RD5mY_"
|
||||
}`)
|
||||
|
||||
ShortKey = jose.JsonWebKey{}
|
||||
|
||||
AuthzRequest = core.Authorization{
|
||||
Identifier: core.AcmeIdentifier{
|
||||
Type: core.IdentifierDNS,
|
||||
|
@ -96,6 +104,9 @@ func initAuthorities(t *testing.T) (core.CertificateAuthority, *DummyValidationA
|
|||
err := json.Unmarshal(AccountKeyJSON, &AccountKey)
|
||||
test.AssertNotError(t, err, "Failed to unmarshall JWK")
|
||||
|
||||
err = json.Unmarshal(ShortKeyJSON, &ShortKey)
|
||||
test.AssertNotError(t, err, "Failed to unmarshall JWK")
|
||||
|
||||
sa, err := sa.NewSQLStorageAuthority("sqlite3", ":memory:")
|
||||
test.AssertNotError(t, err, "Failed to create SA")
|
||||
sa.InitTables()
|
||||
|
@ -131,6 +142,60 @@ func assertAuthzEqual(t *testing.T, a1, a2 core.Authorization) {
|
|||
// Not testing: Contact, Challenges
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestNewRegistration(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
_, _, sa, ra := initAuthorities(t)
|
||||
mailto, _ := url.Parse("mailto:foo@bar.com")
|
||||
input := core.Registration{
|
||||
Contact: []core.AcmeURL{core.AcmeURL(*mailto)},
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
result, err := ra.NewRegistration(input, AccountKey)
|
||||
test.AssertNotError(t, err, "Could not create new registration")
|
||||
|
||||
test.Assert(t, result.Key.Equals(AccountKey), "Key didn't match")
|
||||
test.Assert(t, len(result.Contact) == 1, "Wrong number of contacts")
|
||||
test.Assert(t, mailto.String() == result.Contact[0].String(),
|
||||
"Contact didn't match")
|
||||
test.Assert(t, result.Agreement == "", "Agreement didn't default empty")
|
||||
test.Assert(t, result.RecoveryToken != "", "Recovery token not filled")
|
||||
|
||||
reg, err := sa.GetRegistration(result.ID)
|
||||
test.AssertNotError(t, err, "Failed to retrieve registration")
|
||||
test.Assert(t, reg.Key.Equals(AccountKey), "Retrieved registration differed.")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestNewRegistrationNoFieldOverwrite(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
_, _, _, ra := initAuthorities(t)
|
||||
mailto, _ := url.Parse("mailto:foo@bar.com")
|
||||
input := core.Registration{
|
||||
ID: "hi",
|
||||
Key: ShortKey,
|
||||
RecoveryToken: "RecoverMe",
|
||||
Contact: []core.AcmeURL{core.AcmeURL(*mailto)},
|
||||
Agreement: "I agreed",
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
result, err := ra.NewRegistration(input, AccountKey)
|
||||
test.AssertNotError(t, err, "Could not create new registration")
|
||||
|
||||
test.Assert(t, result.ID != "hi", "ID shouldn't be overwritten")
|
||||
test.Assert(t, !result.Key.Equals(ShortKey), "Key shouldn't be overwritten")
|
||||
// TODO: Enable this test case once we validate terms agreement.
|
||||
// test.Assert(t, result.Agreement != "I agreed", "Agreement shouldn't be overwritten with invalid URL")
|
||||
test.Assert(t, result.RecoveryToken != "RecoverMe", "Recovery token shouldn't be overwritten")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestNewRegistrationBadKey(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
_, _, _, ra := initAuthorities(t)
|
||||
mailto, _ := url.Parse("mailto:foo@bar.com")
|
||||
input := core.Registration{
|
||||
Contact: []core.AcmeURL{core.AcmeURL(*mailto)},
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
_, err := ra.NewRegistration(input, ShortKey)
|
||||
test.AssertError(t, err, "Should have rejected authorization with short key")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestNewAuthorization(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
_, _, sa, ra := initAuthorities(t)
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
|
@ -314,7 +314,6 @@ function getReadyToValidate(err, resp, body) {
|
|||
var challenge = simpleHttps[0];
|
||||
var path = crypto.randomString(8) + ".txt";
|
||||
var challengePath = ".well-known/acme-challenge/" + path;
|
||||
fs.writeFileSync(challengePath, challenge.token);
|
||||
state.responseURL = challenge["uri"];
|
||||
state.path = path;
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
Loading…
Reference in New Issue