In the process of writing
https://github.com/letsencrypt/boulder/pull/7533 I discovered that the
method for detecting pkcs11.Error errors is broken: it attempts to
unwrap the returned error into a pointer-to-a-pointer type, which
doesn't work because only `pkcs11.Error` implements the Error interface,
while `*pkcs11.Error` does not.
Add a test which shows that the current noteSignError implementation is
broken. Then fix noteSignError and the two locations which duplicate
that code by removing the extra layer of indirection. And since the same
code exists in three locations, refactor how the caImpl, ocspImpl, and
crlImpl share metrics so that it only has to exist in one place.
A minimal reproduction case of this type of breakage can be seen here:
https://go.dev/play/p/qCLDQ1SFiWu
Add the "signatureCount" and "signErrorCount" metrics, which are already
incremented by the certificateAuthorityImpl and ocspImpl after all
signing operations, to the crlImpl.
Note that in the process of writing this PR I discovered that the method
for determining whether to increment the signErrorCount metric is
broken. Rather than diverge the crlImpl's version of that code from the
identical code in the other two files, I have duplicated the broken code
and will fix it in all three places in a follow-up.
Fixes https://github.com/letsencrypt/boulder/issues/7532
Replaced our embeds of foopb.UnimplementedFooServer with
foopb.UnsafeFooServer. Per the grpc-go docs this reduces the "forwards
compatibility" of our implementations, but that is only a concern for
codebases that are implementing gRPC interfaces maintained by third
parties, and which want to be able to update those third-party
dependencies without updating their own implementations in lockstep.
Because we update our protos and our implementations simultaneously, we
can remove this safety net to replace runtime type checking with
compile-time type checking.
However, that replacement is not enough, because we never pass our
implementation objects to a function which asserts that they match a
specific interface. So this PR also replaces our reflect-based unittests
with idiomatic interface assertions. I do not view this as a perfect
solution, as it relies on people implementing new gRPC servers to add
this line, but it is no worse than the status quo which relied on people
adding the "TestImplementation" test.
Fixes https://github.com/letsencrypt/boulder/issues/7497
Update the version of protoc-gen-go-grpc that we use to generate Go gRPC
code from our proto files, and update the versions of other gRPC tools
and libraries that we use to match. Turn on the new
`use_generic_streams` code generation flag to change how
protoc-gen-go-grpc generates implementations of our streaming methods,
from creating a wholly independent implementation for every stream to
using shared generic implementations.
Take advantage of this code-sharing to remove our SA "wrapper" methods,
now that they have truly the same signature as the SARO methods which
they wrap. Also remove all references to the old-style stream names
(e.g. foopb.FooService_BarMethodClient) and replace them with the new
underlying generic names, for the sake of consistency. Finally, also
remove a few custom stream test mocks, replacing them with the generic
mocks.ServerStreamClient.
Note that this PR does not change the names in //mocks/sa.go, to avoid
conflicts with work happening in the pursuit of
https://github.com/letsencrypt/boulder/issues/7476. Note also that this
PR updates the version of protoc-gen-go-grpc that we use to a specific
commit. This is because, although a new release of grpc-go itself has
been cut, the codegen binary is a separate Go module with its own
releases, and it hasn't had a new release cut yet. Tracking for that is
in https://github.com/grpc/grpc-go/issues/7030.
Remove the CA's global "crldpBase" config item, and the code which used
it to produce a IDP URI in our CRLs if it was configured.
This config item has been replaced by per-issuer crlURLBase configs
instead, because we have switched our CRL URL format from
"commonURL/issuerID/shard.crl" to "issuerURL/shard.crl" in anticipation
of including these URLs directly in our end-entity certs.
IN-10046 tracked the corresponding change in prod
Partial revert of https://github.com/letsencrypt/boulder/pull/7434
The purpose of this loop is to chunk the CRL into thousand-byte pieces.
To that end, it iterated across the bytes of the CRL in steps of size
1000. When this loop was replaced with a range loop, that step size was
not preserved.
Our tests do not usually produce any CRLs that exceed 1k bytes, so the
test CRLs fit within a single chunk, and this bug was not detected.
A search of the diff in the previous change does not show any other
instances where a step size other than 1 was being used.
Move the CRL issuance logic -- building an x509.RevocationList template,
populating it with correctly-built extensions, linting it, and actually
signing it -- out of the //ca package and into the //issuance package.
This means that the CA's CRL code no longer needs to be able to reach
inside the issuance package to access its issuers and certificates (and
those fields will be able to be made private after the same is done for
OCSP issuance).
Additionally, improve the configuration of CRL issuance, create
additional checks on CRL's ThisUpdate and NextUpdate fields, and make it
possible for a CRL to contain two IssuingDistributionPoint URIs so that
we can migrate to shorter addresses.
IN-10045 tracks the corresponding production changes.
Fixes https://github.com/letsencrypt/boulder/issues/7159
Part of https://github.com/letsencrypt/boulder/issues/7296
Part of https://github.com/letsencrypt/boulder/issues/7294
Part of https://github.com/letsencrypt/boulder/issues/7094
Part of https://github.com/letsencrypt/boulder/issues/7100
Remove the Profile field from issuance.Issuer, to reflect the fact that
profiles are in fact independent pieces of configuration which can be
shared across (and are configured independently of) multiple issuers.
Move the IssuerURL, OCSPUrl, and CRLURL fields from issuance.Profile to
issuance.Issuer, since they reflect fundamental attributes of the
issuer, rather than attributes of a particular profile. This also
reflects the location at which those values are configured, in
issuance.IssuerConfig.
All other changes are fallout from the above: adding a Profile argument
to various methods in the issuance and linting packages, adding a
profile field to the caImpl struct, etc. This change paves the way for
two future changes: moving OCSP and CRL creation into the issuance
package, and supporting multiple simultaneous profiles that the CA can
select between.
Part of https://github.com/letsencrypt/boulder/issues/7159
Part of https://github.com/letsencrypt/boulder/issues/6316
Part of https://github.com/letsencrypt/boulder/issues/6966
Rename "IssuerNameID" to just "NameID". Similarly rename the standalone
functions which compute it to better describe their function. Add a
.NameID() directly to issuance.Issuer, so that callers in other packages
don't have to directly access the .Cert member of an Issuer. Finally,
rearrange the code in issuance.go to be sensibly grouped as concerning
NameIDs, Certificates, or Issuers, rather than all mixed up between the
three.
Fixes https://github.com/letsencrypt/boulder/issues/5152
This is a cleanup PR finishing the migration from int64 timestamps to
protobuf `*timestamppb.Timestamps` by removing all usage of the old
int64 fields. In the previous PR
https://github.com/letsencrypt/boulder/pull/7121 all fields were
switched to read from the protobuf timestamppb fields.
Adds a new case to `core.IsAnyNilOrZero` to check various properties of
a `*timestamppb.Timestamp` reducing the visual complexity for receivers.
Fixes https://github.com/letsencrypt/boulder/issues/7060
Delete our forked version of the x509 library, and update all call-sites
to use the version that we upstreamed and got released in go1.21. This
requires making a few changes to calling code:
- replace crl_x509.RevokedCertificate with x509.RevocationListEntry
- replace RevocationList.RevokedCertificates with
RevocationList.RevokedCertificateEntries
- make RevocationListEntry.ReasonCode a non-pointer integer
Our lints cannot yet be updated to use the new types and fields, because
those improvements have not yet been adopted by the zcrypto/x509 package
used by the linting framework.
Fixes https://github.com/letsencrypt/boulder/issues/6741
Remove the GenerateOCSP and GenerateCRL methods from the
CertificateAuthority gRPC service. These methods are no longer called by
any clients; all clients use their respective OCSPGenerator and
CRLGenerator gRPC services instead.
In addition, remove the CRLGeneratorServer field from the caImpl, as it
no longer needs it to serve as a backing implementation for the
GenerateCRL pass-through method. Unfortunately, we can't remove the
OCSPGeneratorServer field until after ROCSPStage7 is complete, and the
CA is no longer generating an OCSP response during initial certificate
issuance.
Part of #6448
Add three new boolean config keys to the CA's config json:
- DisableCertService
- DisableOCSPService
- DisableCRLService
Setting any one of these flags to True and restarting the CA causes the
corresponding gRPC service (CertificateAuthority, OCSPGenerator, or
CRLGenerator, respectively) to not be started. The implementation is not
instantiated, the port is not opened, and no requests will be listened
for. All clients will receive failures to connect.
Also, create two temporary "dummy" implementations of the CRL and OCSP
services (and an interface for the fake OCSP service to meet), These are
necessary because the CertificateAuthority gRPC service currently
contains wrapper methods which replicate the methods of the OCSP and CRL
services, and which pass through calls to underlying implementation
objects. These objects must be replaced with fake objects which always
return an error when the service is disabled.
Fixes#6452
Add the Issuing Distribution Point extension to all of our end-entity
CRLs. The extension contains the Distribution Point, the URL from
which this CRL is meant to be downloaded. Because our CRLs are
sharded, this URL prevents an on-path attacker from substituting a
different shard than the client expected in order to hide a revocation.
The extension also contains the OnlyContainsUserCerts boolean,
because our CRLs only contain end-entity certificates.
The Distribution Point url is constructed from a configurable base URI,
the issuer's NameID, the shard index, and the suffix ".crl". The base
URI must use the "http://" scheme and must not end with a slash.
openssl displays the IDP extension as:
```
X509v3 Issuing Distribution Point: critical
Full Name:
URI:http://c.boulder.test/66283756913588288/0.crl Only User Certificates
```
Fixes#6410
- Create new package `crl`
- Add a common unique CRL identifier `crl.id` with constructor `crl.Id()`
- Replace `shardIdx` with `crl.Id` in `storer` and `updater` errors
- Add a common type for the `CRLNumber` field `crl.number` with constructor
`crl.Number()`
- Replace `CRLNumber` construction in CA and CRL package with `crl.Number()`
Resolves#6261
Create a new crl-storer service, which receives CRL shards via gRPC and
uploads them to an S3 bucket. It ignores AWS SDK configuration in the
usual places, in favor of configuration from our standard JSON service
config files. It ensures that the CRLs it receives parse and are signed
by the appropriate issuer before uploading them.
Integrate crl-updater with the new service. It streams bytes to the
crl-storer as it receives them from the CA, without performing any
checking at the same time. This new functionality is disabled if the
crl-updater does not have a config stanza instructing it how to connect
to the crl-storer.
Finally, add a new test component, the s3-test-srv. This acts similarly
to the existing mail-test-srv: it receives requests, stores information
about them, and exposes that information for later querying by the
integration test. The integration test uses this to ensure that a
newly-revoked certificate does show up in the next generation of CRLs
produced.
Fixes#6162
Realized that "ShardID" is a bad name, because a real unique
identifier of a shard would include the issuer, crl number, and
shard number. Switching to "ShardIdx" makes it clearer that
shards within a full and complete CRL are identified by a
zero-indexed integer.
Add a closing bracket both when ending a line due to max log length
and when ending a line due to the end of the entry list. Change the
max log length check to a greater-than to prevent it from incorrectly
firing every time.
Add a collection of lints (structured similarly, but not identically,
to zlint's certificate lints) which check a variety of requirements
based on RFC 5280, the Baseline Requirements, and the Mozilla
Root Store Policy.
Add a method to lint CRLs to the existing linter package which
uses its fake issuer to sign the CRL, calls all of the above lints,
and returns all of their findings. Call this new method from within
the CA's new GenerateCRL method immediately before signing
the real CRL using the real issuer.
Fixes#6188
Create a new service named crl-updater. It is responsible for
maintaining the full set of CRLs we issue: one "full and complete" CRL
for each currently-active Issuer, split into a number of "shards" which
are essentially CRLs with arbitrary scopes.
The crl-updater is modeled after the ocsp-updater: it is a long-running
standalone service that wakes up periodically, does a large amount of
work in parallel, and then sleeps. The period at which it wakes to do
work is configurable. Unlike the ocsp-responder, it does all of its work
every time it wakes, so we expect to set the update frequency at 6-24
hours.
Maintaining CRL scopes is done statelessly. Every certificate belongs to
a specific "bucket", given its notAfter date. This mapping is generally
unchanging over the life of the certificate, so revoked certificate
entries will not be moving between shards upon every update. The only
exception is if we change the number of shards, in which case all of the
bucket boundaries will be recomputed. For more details, see the comment
on `getShardBoundaries`.
It uses the new SA.GetRevokedCerts method to collect all of the revoked
certificates whose notAfter timestamps fall within the boundaries of
each shard's time-bucket. It uses the new CA.GenerateCRL method to sign
the CRLs. In the future, it will send signed CRLs to the crl-storer to
be persisted outside our infrastructure.
Fixes#6163
Use the new //crl/x509 library in the CA, to make handling the
ReasonCode of each CRL entry significantly easier. This also
allows us to log the reason code along with each serial in the
CRL.
Also, make a couple tiny tweaks to the //crl/x509 package that
were discovered to be useful while writing this change. These
include moving it to a //crl/crl_x509 directory so that it doesn't
have to be aliased at import time.
Fixes#6199
Add a new CA gRPC method named `GenerateCRL`. In the
style of the existing `GenerateOCSP` method, this new endpoint
is implemented as a separate service, for which the CA binary
spins up an additional gRPC service.
This method uses gRPC streaming for both its input and output.
For input, the stream must contain exactly one metadata message
identifying the crl number, issuer, and timestamp, and then any
number of messages identifying a single certificate which should
be included in the CRL. For output, it simply streams chunks of
bytes.
Fixes#6161