When the `features.PrecertificateRevocation` feature flag is enabled the WFE2
will allow revoking certificates for a submitted precertificate. The legacy WFE1
behaviour remains unchanged (as before (pre)certificates issued through the V1
API will be revocable with the V2 API).
Previously the WFE2 vetted the certificate from the revocation request by
looking up a final certificate by the serial number in the requested
certificate, and then doing a byte for byte comparison between the stored and
requested certificate.
Rather than adjust this logic to handle looking up and comparing stored
precertificates against requested precertificates (requiring new RPCs and an
additional round-trip) we choose to instead check the signature on the requested
certificate or precertificate and consider it valid for revocation if the
signature validates with one of the WFE2's known issuers. We trust the integrity
of our own signatures.
An integration test that performs a revocation of a precertificate (in this case
one that never had a final certificate issued due to SCT embedded errors) with
all of the available authentication mechanisms is included.
Resolves https://github.com/letsencrypt/boulder/issues/4414
This change adds two tables and two methods in the SA, to store precertificates
and serial numbers.
In the CA, when the feature flag is turned on, we generate a serial number, store it,
sign a precertificate and OCSP, store them, and then return the precertificate. Storing
the serial as an additional step before signing the certificate adds an extra layer of
insurance against duplicate serials, and also serves as a check on database availability.
Since an error storing the serial prevents going on to sign the precertificate, this decreases
the chance of signing something while the database is down.
Right now, neither table has read operations available in the SA.
To make this work, I needed to remove the check for duplicate certificateStatus entry
when inserting a final certificate and its OCSP response. I also needed to remove
an error that can occur when expiration-mailer processes a precertificate that lacks
a final certificate. That error would otherwise have prevented further processing of
expiration warnings.
Fixes#4412
This change builds on #4417, please review that first for ease of review.
For authzv1, this actually executes a SQL DELETE for the unused challenges
when an authorization is updated upon validation.
For authzv2, this doesn't perform a delete, but changes the authorizations that
are returned so they don't include unused challenges.
In order to test the flag for both authz storage models, I set the feature flag in
both config/ and config-next/.
Fixes#4352
This rolls forward #4326 after it was reverted in #4328.
Resolves https://github.com/letsencrypt/boulder/issues/4329
The older query didn't have a `LIMIT 1` so it was returning multiple results,
but gorp's `SelectOne` was okay with multiple results when the selection was
going into an `int64`. When I changed this to a `struct` in #4326, gorp started
producing errors.
For this bug to manifest, an account needs to create an order, then fail
validation, twice in a row for a given domain name, then create an order once
more for the same domain name - that third request will fail because there are
multiple orders in the orderFqdnSets table for that domain.
Note that the bug condition doesn't happen when an account does three successful
issuances in a row, because finalizing an order (that is, issuing a certificate
for it) deletes the row in orderFqdnSets. Failing an authorization does not
delete the row in orderFqdnSets. I believe this was an intentional design
decision because an authorization can participate in many orders, and those
orders can have many other authorizations, so computing the updated state of
all those orders would be expensive (remember, order state is not persisted in
the DB but is calculated dynamically based on the authorizations it contains).
This wasn't detected in integration tests because we don't have any tests that
fail validation for the same domain multiple times. I filed an issue for an
integration test that would have incidentally caught this:
https://github.com/letsencrypt/boulder/issues/4332. There's also a more specific
test case in #4331.
This reverts commit 9fa360769e.
This commit can cause "gorp: multiple rows returned for: ..." under certain situations.
See #4329 for details of followup.
When there are a lot of potential orders to reuse, the query could scan
unnecessary rows, sometimes leading to timeouts. The new query used
when the FasterGetOrderForNames feature flag is enabled uses the
available index more effectively and adds a LIMIT clause.
Add flag to explicitly disable orders containing authz2 authorizations. After looking at a handful of much more complex solutions this feels like the best option. With NewAuthorizationSchema disabled and DisableAuthz2Orders enabled any requests for orders that include authz2 authorizations will return a 404 (where previously they would return a 500).
Fixes#4263.
In November 2019 we will be removing support for legacy pre RFC-8555
unauthenticated GET requests for accessing ACME resources. A new
`MandatoryPOSTAsGET` feature flag is added to the WFE2 to allow
enforcing this change. Once this feature flag has been activated in Nov
we can remove both it and the WFE2 code supporting GET requests.
Right now we run a `SELECT COUNT` query on issuedNames to calculate this rate limit.
Unfortunately, counting large numbers of rows is very slow. This change introduces a
dedicated table for keeping track of that rate limit.
Instead of being keyed by FQDN, this new `certificatesPerName` table is keyed by
the same field as rate limits are calculated on: the base domain. Each row has a base
domain, a time (chunked by hour), and a count. This means calculating the rate limit
status for each domain reads at most 7 * 24 rows.
This should particularly speed up cases when a single domain has lots of subdomains.
Fixes#4152
Checking the "certificates per name" rate limit is moderately expensive, particularly
for domains that have lots of certificates on their subdomains. By checking the renewal
exemption first, we can save some database queries in a lot of cases.
Part of #4152
Precursor to #4116. Since some of our dependencies impose a minimum
version on these two packages higher than what we have in Godeps, we'll
have to bump them anyhow. Bumping them independently of the modules
update should keep things a little simpler.
In order to get protobuf tests to pass, I had to update protoc-gen-go in
boulder-tools. Now we download a prebuilt binary instead of using the
Ubuntu package, which is stuck on 3.0.0. This also meant I needed to
re-generate our pb.go files, since the new version generates somewhat
different output.
This happens to change the tag for pbutil, but it's not a substantive change - they just added a tagged version where there was none.
$ go test github.com/miekg/dns/...
ok github.com/miekg/dns 4.675s
ok github.com/miekg/dns/dnsutil 0.003s
ok github.com/golang/protobuf/descriptor (cached)
ok github.com/golang/protobuf/jsonpb (cached)
? github.com/golang/protobuf/jsonpb/jsonpb_test_proto [no test files]
ok github.com/golang/protobuf/proto (cached)
? github.com/golang/protobuf/proto/proto3_proto [no test files]
? github.com/golang/protobuf/proto/test_proto [no test files]
ok github.com/golang/protobuf/protoc-gen-go (cached)
? github.com/golang/protobuf/protoc-gen-go/descriptor [no test files]
ok github.com/golang/protobuf/protoc-gen-go/generator (cached)
ok github.com/golang/protobuf/protoc-gen-go/generator/internal/remap (cached)
? github.com/golang/protobuf/protoc-gen-go/grpc [no test files]
? github.com/golang/protobuf/protoc-gen-go/plugin [no test files]
ok github.com/golang/protobuf/ptypes (cached)
? github.com/golang/protobuf/ptypes/any [no test files]
? github.com/golang/protobuf/ptypes/duration [no test files]
? github.com/golang/protobuf/ptypes/empty [no test files]
? github.com/golang/protobuf/ptypes/struct [no test files]
? github.com/golang/protobuf/ptypes/timestamp [no test files]
? github.com/golang/protobuf/ptypes/wrappers [no test files]
* `EnforceMultiVA` to allow configuring multiple VAs but not changing the primary VA's result based on what the remote VAs return.
* `MultiVAFullResults` to allow collecting all of the remote VA results. When all results are collected a JSON log line with the differential between the primary/remote VAs is logged.
Resolves https://github.com/letsencrypt/boulder/issues/4066
* Remove the challenge whitelist
* Reduce the signature for ChallengesFor and ChallengeTypeEnabled
* Some unit tests in the VA were changed from testing TLS-SNI to testing the same behavior
in TLS-ALPN, when that behavior wasn't already tested. For instance timeouts during connect
are now tested.
Fixes#4109
We're only using the simplified HTTP-01 code from `va/http.go` now 🎉 The old unit tests that still seem relevant are left in place in `va/va_test.go` instead of being moved to `va/http_test.go` to signal that they're a bit crufty and could probably use a separate cleanup. For now I'm hesitant to remove test coverage so I updated them in-place without moving them to a new home.
Resolves https://github.com/letsencrypt/boulder/issues/4089
If an order for a given set of names will fail finalization because of certificate rate limits (certs per domain, certs per fqdn set) there isn't any point in allowing an order for those names to be created. We can stop a lot of requests earlier by enforcing the cert rate limits at new order time as well as finalization time. A new RA `EarlyOrderRateLimit` feature flag controls whether this is done or not.
Resolves#3975
The `renewal` field of the `issuedNames` table is indexed
to allow more efficient processing of rate limit decisions
w.r.t. renewals for the certificates per domain rate limit (see
https://github.com/letsencrypt/boulder/pull/3178). Before we can start
using this field in rate limit calculations we need to populate it
appropriately. A new `SetIssuedNamesRenewalBit` feature flag for the SA
controls whether we do so or not.
Resolves https://github.com/letsencrypt/boulder/issues/4008
Implements a feature that enables immediate revocation instead of marking a certificate revoked and waiting for the OCSP-Updater to generate the OCSP response. This means that as soon as the request returns from the WFE the revoked OCSP response should be available to the user. This feature requires that the RA be configured to use the standalone Akamai purger service.
Fixes#4031.
Adds a feature which gates creation of authorizations following the style required for the new schema (and which can be used for gating the reset of our new schema code later down the road).
There was an internal discussion about an issue this creates regarding a predictable ordering of challenges within a challenge due to sequential challenge IDs which will always be static for each challenge type. It was suggested we could add some kind of obfuscation to the challenge ID when presented to the user to prevent this. This hasn't been done in this PR as it would only be focused in the WFE and would be better suited as its own changeset.
Fixes#3981.
Staging and prod both deployed the PerformValidationRPC feature flag. All running WFE/WFE2 instances are using the more accurately named PerformValidation RPC and we can strip out the old UpdateAuthorization bits. The feature flag for PerformValidationRPC remains until we clean up the staging/prod configs.
Resolves#3947 and completes the last of #3930
Previously we mistakenly returned status 204 (no content) for all
requests to new-nonce, including HEAD. This status should only be used
for GET requests.
When the `HeadNonceStatusOK` feature flag is enabled we will now return
the correct status for HEAD requests. When the flag is disabled we return
status 204 to preserve backwards compatibility.
The existing RA `UpdateAuthorization` RPC needs replacing for
two reasons:
1. The name isn't accurate - `PerformValidation` better captures
the purpose of the RPC.
2. The `core.Challenge` argument is superfluous since Key
Authorizations are not sent in the initiation POST from the client
anymore. The corresponding unmarshal and verification is now
removed. Notably this means broken clients that were POSTing
the wrong thing and failing pre-validation will now likely fail
post-validation.
To remove `UpdateAuthorization` the new `PerformValidation`
RPC is added alongside the old one. WFE and WFE2 are
updated to use the new RPC when the perform validation
feature flag is enabled. We can remove
`UpdateAuthorization` and its associated wrappers once all
WFE instances have been updated.
Resolves https://github.com/letsencrypt/boulder/issues/3930
Continued bugs from the custom dialer approach used by the VA for HTTP-01 (most recently https://github.com/letsencrypt/boulder/issues/3889) motivated a rewrite.
Instead of using a custom dialer to be able to control DNS resolution for HTTP validation requests we can construct URLs for the IP addresses we resolve and overload the Host header. This avoids having to do address resolution within the dialer and eliminates the complexity of the dialer `addrInfoChan`. The only thing left for our custom dialer now is to shave some time off of the provided context to help us discern timeouts before/after connect.
The existing IP preference & fallback behaviour is preserved: e.g. if a host has both IPv6 and IPv4 addresses we connect to the first IPv6 address. If there is a network error connecting to that address (e.g. an error during "dial"), we try once more with the first IPv4 address. No other retries are done. Matching existing behaviour no fallback is done for HTTP level failures on an IPv6 address (e.g. mismatched webroots, redirect loops, etc). A new Prometheus counter "http01_fallbacks" is used to keep track of the number of fallbacks performed.
As a result of moving the layer at which the retry happens a fallback like described above will now produce two validation records: one for the initial IPv6 connection, and one for the IPv4 connection. Neither will have the "addressesTried" field populated, just "addressesResolved" and "addressUsed". Previously with the dialer doing the retry we would have created just one validation record with an IPv4 "addressUsed" field and both an IPv6 and IPv4 address in the "addressesTried" field.
Because this is a big diff for a key part of the VA the new code is gated by the `SimplifiedVAHTTP` feature flag.
Resolves#3889
Removes the checks for a handful of deployed feature flags in preparation for removing the flags entirely. Also moves all of the currently deprecated flags to a separate section of the flags list so they can be more easily removed once purged from production configs.
Fixes#3880.
Does a simpler probe than compared to using a `blackbox_exporter`, but directly collects the info we think will aid debugging publisher outages.
Updates #3821.
ACME draft-13 changed the inner JWS' body to contain the old key
that signed the outer JWS. Because this is a backwards incompatible
change with the draft-12 ACME v2 key rollover we introduce a new feature
flag `features.ACME13KeyRollover` and conditionally use the old or new
key rollover semantics based on its value.
This adds support for the account-uri CAA parameter as specified by
section 3 of https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-acme-caa-04, allowing
issuance to be restricted to one or more ACME accounts as specified by CAA
records.
When performing CAA checking respect the validation-methods parameter (if
present) and restrict the allowed authorization methods to those specified.
This allows a domain to restrict authorization methods that can be used with
Let's Encrypt.
This is largely based on PR #3003 (by @lukaslihotzki), which was landed and
then later reverted due to issue #3143. The bug the resulted in the previous
code being reverted has been addressed (likely inadvertently) by 76973d0f.
This implementation also includes integration tests for CAA validation-methods.
Fixes issue #3143.
* SA: Add Order "Ready" status, feature flag.
This commit adds the new "Ready" status to `core/objects.go` and updates
`sa.statusForOrder` to use it conditionally for orders with all valid
authorizations that haven't been finalized yet. This state is used
conditionally based on the `features.OrderReadyStatus` feature flag
since it will likely break some existing clients that expect status
"Processing" for this state. The SA unit test for `statusForOrder` is
updated with a "ready" status test case.
* RA: Enforce order ready status conditionally.
This commit updates the RA to conditionally expect orders that are being
finalized to be in the "ready" status instead of "pending". This is
conditionally enforced based on the `OrderReadyStatus` feature flag.
Along the way the SA was changed to calculate the order status for the
order returned in `sa.NewOrder` dynamically now that it could be
something other than "pending".
* WFE2: Conditionally enforce order ready status for finalization.
Similar to the RA the WFE2 should conditionally enforce that an order's
status is either "ready" or "pending" based on the "OrderReadyStatus"
feature flag.
* Integration: Fix `test_order_finalize_early`.
This commit updates the V2 `test_order_finalize_early` test for the
"ready" status. A nice side-effect of the ready state change is that we
no longer invalidate an order when it is finalized too soon because we
can reject the finalization in the WFE. Subsequently the
`test_order_finalize_early` testcase is also smaller.
* Integration: Test classic behaviour w/o feature flag.
In the previous commit I fixed the integration test for the
`config/test-next` run that has the `OrderReadyStatus` feature flag set
but broke it for the `config/test` run without the feature flag.
This commit updates the `test_order_finalize_early` test to work
correctly based on the feature flag status in both cases.
gRPC passes deadline information through the RPC boundary, but client and server have the same deadline. Ideally we'd like the server to have a slightly tighter deadline than the client, so if one of the server's onward RPCs or other network calls times out, the server can pass back more detailed information to the client, rather than the client timing out the server and losing the opportunity to log more detailed information about which component caused the timeout.
In this change, I subtract 100ms from the deadline on the server side of our interceptors, using our existing serverInterceptor. I also check that there is at least 100ms remaining in which to do useful work, so the server doesn't begin a potentially expensive task only to abort it.
Fixes#3608.
Adds SCT embedding to the certificate issuance flow. When a issuance is requested a precertificate (the requested certificate but poisoned with the critical CT extension) is issued and submitted to the required CT logs. Once the SCTs for the precertificate have been collected a new certificate is issued with the poison extension replace with a SCT list extension containing the retrieved SCTs.
Fixes#2244, fixes#3492 and fixes#3429.
This is in general the case, but occasionally when there are two inflight validations for
a challenge at once, the authz can get marked invalid while leaving the challenge
"pending". For clients that poll the challenge instead of the authz this can lead to infinite
polling. To stop those clients, we just ensure the challenge status is consistent with its
authorization object.
Fixes#3493.
Right now we check safe browsing at new-authz time, which introduces a possible
external dependency when calling new-authz. This is usually fine, since most safe
browsing checks can be satisfied locally, but when requests have to go external,
it can create variance in new-authz timing.
Fixes#3491.
This commit adds a new WFE2 feature flag "EnforceV2ContentType". When
enabled, the WFE2's validPostRequest function will enforce that the
request carries a Content-Type header equal to
application/jose+json. This is required by ACME draft-10 per section
6.2 "Request Authentication".
This is behind a feature flag because it is likely to break
some number of existing ACMEv2 clients that may not be sending the
correct Content-Type.
We are defaulting to not setting the new feature flag in test/config-next
because it currently break's Certbot's acme module's revocation support
and we rely on this in our V2 integration tests.
Resolves#3529
This code was never enabled in production. Our original intent was to
ship this as part of the ACMEv2 API. Before that could happen flaws were
identified in TLS-SNI-01|02 that resulted in TLS-SNI-02 being removed
from the ACME protocol. We won't ever be enabling this code and so we
might as well remove it.
Add a set of logs which will be submitted to but not relied on for their SCTs,
this allows us to test submissions to a particular log or submit to a log which
is not yet approved by a browser/root program.
Also add a feature which stops cancellations of remaining submissions when racing
to get a SCT from a group of logs.
Additionally add an informational log that always times out in config-next.
Fixes#3464 and fixes#3465.
Daniel McCarney
Jacob Hoffman-Andrews
Roland Bracewell Shoemaker
Roland Bracewell Shoemaker
Daniel McCarney
Joel Sing