- Adds a feature flag to gate rollout for SHA256 Subject Key Identifiers
for end-entity certificates.
- The ceremony tool will now use the RFC 7093 section 2 option 1 method
for generating Subject Key Identifiers for future root CA, intermediate
CA, and cross-sign ceremonies.
- - - -
[RFC 7093 section 2 option
1](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc7093#section-2) provides a
method for generating a truncated SHA256 hash for the Subject Key
Identifier field in accordance with Baseline Requirement [section
7.1.2.11.4 Subject Key
Identifier](90a98dc7c1/docs/BR.md (712114-subject-key-identifier)).
> [RFC5280] specifies two examples for generating key identifiers from
> public keys. Four additional mechanisms are as follows:
>
> 1) The keyIdentifier is composed of the leftmost 160-bits of the
> SHA-256 hash of the value of the BIT STRING subjectPublicKey
> (excluding the tag, length, and number of unused bits).
The related [RFC 5280 section
4.2.1.2](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc5280#section-4.2.1.2)
states:
> For CA certificates, subject key identifiers SHOULD be derived from
> the public key or a method that generates unique values. Two common
> methods for generating key identifiers from the public key are:
> ...
> Other methods of generating unique numbers are also acceptable.
The RequireCommonName feature flag was our only "inverted" feature flag,
which defaulted to true and had to be explicitly set to false. This
inversion can lead to confusion, especially to readers who expect all Go
default values to be zero values. We plan to remove the ability for our
feature flag system to support default-true flags, which the existence
of this flag blocked. Since this flag has not been set in any real
configs, inverting it is easy.
Part of https://github.com/letsencrypt/boulder/issues/6802
Add a new feature flag "CAAAfterValidation" which, when set to true in
the VA, causes the VA to only begin CAA checks after basic domain
control validation has completed successfully. This will make successful
validations take longer, since the DCV and CAA checks are performed
serially instead of in parallel. However, it will also reduce the number
of CAA checks we perform by up to 80%, since such a high percentage of
validations also fail.
IN-9575 tracks enabling this feature flag in staging and prod
Fixes https://github.com/letsencrypt/boulder/issues/7058
This adds a lookup in cert-checker to find the linting precertificate
with the same serial number as a given final certificate, and checks
precertificate correspondence between the two.
Fixes#6959
Add a new feature flag, LeaseCRLShards, which controls certain aspects
of crl-updater's behavior.
When this flag is enabled, crl-updater calls the new SA.LeaseCRLShard
method before beginning work on a shard. This prevents it from stepping
on the toes of another crl-updater instance which may be working on the
same shard. This is important to prevent two competing instances from
accidentally updating a CRL's Number (which is an integer representation
of its thisUpdate timestamp) *backwards*, which would be a compliance
violation.
When this flag is enabled, crl-updater also calls the new
SA.UpdateCRLShard method after finishing work on a shard.
In the future, additional work will be done to make crl-updater use the
"give me the oldest available shard" mode of the LeaseCRLShard method.
Fixes https://github.com/letsencrypt/boulder/issues/6897
In order to get rid of the orphan queue, we want to make sure that
before we sign a precertificate, we have enough data in the database
that we can fulfill our revocation-checking obligations even if storing
that precertificate in the database fails. That means:
- We should have a row in the certificateStatus table for the serial.
- But we should not serve "good" for that serial until we are positive
the precertificate was issued (BRs 4.9.10).
- We should have a record in the live DB of the proposed certificate's
public key, so the bad-key-revoker can mark it revoked.
- We should have a record in the live DB of the proposed certificate's
names, so it can be revoked if we are required to revoke based on names.
The SA.AddPrecertificate method already achieves these goals for
precertificates by writing to the various metadata tables. This PR
repurposes the SA.AddPrecertificate method to write "proposed
precertificates" instead.
We already create a linting certificate before the precertificate, and
that linting certificate is identical to the precertificate that will be
issued except for the private key used to sign it (and the AKID). So for
instance it contains the right pubkey and SANs, and the Issuer name is
the same as the Issuer name that will be used. So we'll use the linting
certificate as the "proposed precertificate" and store it to the DB,
along with appropriate metadata.
In the new code path, rather than writing "good" for the new
certificateStatus row, we write a new, fake OCSP status string "wait".
This will cause us to return internalServerError to OCSP requests for
that serial (but we won't get such requests because the serial has not
yet been published). After we finish precertificate issuance, we update
the status to "good" with SA.SetCertificateStatusReady.
Part of #6665
Deprecate the ROCSPStage7 feature flag, which caused the RA and CA to
stop generating OCSP responses when issuing new certs and when revoking
certs. (That functionality is now handled just-in-time by the
ocsp-responder.) Delete the old OCSP-generating codepaths from the RA
and CA. Remove the CA's internal reference to an OCSP implementation,
because it no longer needs it.
Additionally, remove the SA's "Issuers" config field, which was never
used.
Fixes#6285
Deprecate the ROCSPStage6 feature flag. Remove all references to the
`ocspResponse` column from the SA, both when reading from and when
writing to the `certificateStatus` table. This makes it safe to fully
remove that column from the database.
IN-8731 enabled this flag in all environments, so it is safe to
deprecate.
Part of #6285
Change the SetCommonName flag, introduced in #6706, to
RequireCommonName. Rather than having the flag control both whether or
not a name is hoisted from the SANs into the CN *and* whether or not the
CA is willing to issue certs with no CN, this updated flag now only
controls the latter. By default, the new flag is true, and continues our
current behavior of failing issuance if we cannot set a CN in the cert.
When the flag is set to false, then we are willing to issue certificates
for which the CSR contains no CN and there is no SAN short enough to be
hoisted into the CN field.
When we have rolled out this change, we can move on to the next flag in
this series: HoistCommonName, which will control whether or not a SAN is
hoisted at all, effectively giving the CSRs (and therefore the clients)
full control over whether their certificate contains a SAN.
This change is safe because no environment explicitly sets the
SetCommonName flag to false yet.
Fixes#5112
Add a new feature flag, `SetCommonName`, which defaults to `true`. In
this default state, no behavior changes.
When set to `false` on the CA, this flag will cause the CA to leave the
Subject commonName field of the certificate blank, as is recommended by
the Baseline Requirements Section 7.1.4.2.2(a).
Also slightly modify the behavior of the RA's `matchesCSR()` function,
to allow for both certificates that have a CN and certificates that
don't. It is not feasible to put this behavior behind the same
SetCommonName flag, because that would require an atomic deploy of both
the RA and the CA.
Obsoletes #5112
Add the "AsyncFinalize" feature flag. When enabled, this causes the RA
to return almost immediately from FinalizeOrder requests, with the
actual hard work of issuing the precertificate, getting SCTs, issuing
the final certificate, and updating the database accordingly all
occuring in a background goroutine while the client polls the GetOrder
endpoint waiting for the result.
This is implemented by factoring out the majority of the finalization
work into a new `issueCertificateOuter` helper function, and simply
using the new flag to determine whether we call that helper in a
goroutine or not. This makes removing the feature flag in the future
trivially easy.
Also add a new prometheus metric named `inflight_finalizes` which can be
used to count the number of simultaneous goroutines which are performing
finalization work. This metric is exported regardless of the state of
the AsyncFinalize flag, so that we can observe any changes to this
metric when the flag is flipped.
Fixes#6575
Remove the `MandatoryPOSTasGET` flag from the WFE2.
Update the ACMEv2 divergence doc to note that neither staging nor
production use MandatoryPOSTasGET.
Fixes#6582.
This includes two feature flags: one that controls turning on the extra
database queries, and one that causes cert-checker to fail on missing
validations. If the second flag isn't turned on, it will just emit error
log lines. This will help us find any edge conditions we need to deal
with before making the new code trigger alerts.
Fixes#6562
Right now the expiration mailer does one big SELECT on
`certificateStatus` to find certificates to work on, then several
thousand SELECTs of individual serial numbers in `certificates`.
Since it's more efficient to get that data as a stream from a single
query, rather than thousands of separate queries, turn that into a JOIN.
NOTE: We used to use a JOIN, and switched to the current approach in
#2440 for performance reasons. I _believe_ part of the issue was that at
the time we were not using READ UNCOMMITTED, so we may have been slowing
down the database by requiring it to keep copies of a lot of rows during
the query. Still, it's possible that I've misunderstood the performance
characteristics here and it will still be a regression to use JOIN. So
I've gated the new behavior behind a feature flag.
The feature flag required extracting a new function, `getCerts`. That in
turn required changing some return types so we are not as closely tied
to `core.Certificate`. Instead we use a new local type named
`certDERWithRegId`, which can be provided either by the new code path or
the old code path.
Deprecate these feature flags, which are consistently set in both prod
and staging and which we do not expect to change the value of ever
again:
- AllowReRevocation
- AllowV1Registration
- CheckFailedAuthorizationsFirst
- FasterNewOrdersRateLimit
- GetAuthzReadOnly
- GetAuthzUseIndex
- MozRevocationReasons
- RejectDuplicateCSRExtensions
- RestrictRSAKeySizes
- SHA1CSRs
Move each feature flag to the "deprecated" section of features.go.
Remove all references to these feature flags from Boulder application
code, and make the code they were guarding the only path. Deduplicate
tests which were testing both the feature-enabled and feature-disabled
code paths. Remove the flags from all config-next JSON configs (but
leave them in config ones until they're fully deleted, not just
deprecated). Finally, replace a few testdata CSRs used in CA tests,
because they had SHA1WithRSAEncryption signatures that are now rejected.
Fixes#5171Fixes#6476
Part of #5997
Rather than simply refusing to write OCSP Response bytes to the
database (which is what ROCSP Stage 6 did), Stage 7 refuses to
even generate those bytes in the first place. We obviously can't
disable OCSP Response generation in the CA, since it still needs to
be usable by the ocsp-responder's live-signing path, so instead we
disable it in all of the non-live-signing codepaths (orphan finder,
issue precertificate, revoke certificate, and re-revoke certificate)
which have previously called GenerateOCSP.
Part of #6285
Clean up several spots where we were behaving differently on
go1.18 and go1.19, now that we're using go1.19 everywhere. Also
re-enable the lint and generate tests, and fix the various places where
the two versions disagreed on how comments should be formatted.
Also clean up the OldTLS codepaths, now that both go1.19 and our
own feature flags have forbidden TLS < 1.2 everywhere.
Fixes#6011
These flags are set in both staging and prod. Deprecate them, make
all code gated behind them the only path, and delete code (multi_source)
which was only accessible when these flags were not set.
Part of #6285
Create a new `ROCSPStage6` feature flag which affects the behavior of
the SA. When enabled, this flag causes the `AddPrecertificate`,
`RevokeCertificate`, and `UpdateRevokedCertificate` methods to ignore
the OCSP response bytes provided by their caller. They will no longer
error out if those bytes are missing, and if the bytes are present they
will still not be written to the database.
This allows us to, in the future, cause the RA and CA to stop generating
those OCSP responses entirely, and stop providing them to the SA,
without causing any errors when we do.
Part of #6079
Add checkedRedisSource, a new OCSP Source which gets
responses from Redis, gets metadata from the database, and
only serves the Redis response if it matches the authoritative
metadata. If there is a mismatch, it requests a new OCSP
response from the CA, stores it in Redis, and serves the new
response.
This behavior is locked behind a new ROCSPStage3 feature flag.
Part of #6079
This enables ocsp-responder to talk to the RA and request freshly signed
OCSP responses.
ocsp/responder/redis_source is moved to ocsp/responder/redis/redis_source.go
and significantly modified. Instead of assuming a response is always available
in Redis, it wraps a live-signing source. When a response is not available,
it attempts a live signing.
If live signing succeeds, the Redis responder returns the result right away
and attempts to write a copy to Redis on a goroutine using a background
context.
To make things more efficient, I eliminate an unneeded ocsp.ParseResponse
from the storage path. And I factored out a FakeResponse helper to make
the unittests more manageable.
Commits should be reviewable one-by-one.
Fixes#6191
We recently landed a fix so the expiration-mailer won't look twice at
the same certificate. This will cause an immediate behavior change when
it is deployed, and that might have surprising effects. Put the fix
behind a feature flag so we can control when it rolls out more
carefully.
By default, Boulder's feature flag code verifies that the list of flags
being set (from a JSON file) maps to actually-existing flags.
However, this gets in the way of a deployment strategy where feature
flags are added to config templates during a staging deploy with "true"
or "false" filled in depending on production or staging status - for
instance, when rolling out a deprecation to staging ahead of production.
If those configs get rolled to prod before the corresponding Boulder
deploy, Boulder will refuse to start up, even though it would be fine to
start up with the unrecognized flag ignored.
The envisioned deployment behavior here is that prod will have
AllowUnrecognizedFeatures: true while staging will have it set to false,
to ensure that misspellings of feature flag names are caught during
staging deploy. As a correlary, this assumes that the list of flags in
configs will be the same between staging and prod, with only their
values changing.
This adds three features flags: SHA1CSRs, OldTLSOutbound, and
OldTLSInbound. Each controls the behavior of an upcoming deprecation
(except OldTLSInbound, which isn't yet scheduled for a deprecation
but will be soon). Note that these feature flags take advantage of
`features`' default values, so they can default to "true" (that is, each
of these features is enabled by default), and we set them to "false"
in the config JSON to turn them off when the time comes.
The unittest for OldTLSOutbound requires that `example.com` resolves
to 127.0.0.1. This is because there's logic in the VA that checks
that redirected-to hosts end in an IANA TLD. The unittest relies on
redirecting, and we can't use e.g. `localhost` in it because of that
TLD check, so we use example.com.
Fixes#6036 and #6037
Simplify the WFE `RevokeCertificate` API method in three ways:
- Remove most of the logic checking if the requester is authorized to
revoke the certificate in question (based on who is making the
request, what authorizations they have, and what reason they're
requesting). That checking is now done by the RA. Instead, simply
verify that the JWS is authenticated.
- Remove the hard-to-read `authorizedToRevoke` callbacks, and make the
`revokeCertBySubscriberKey` (nee `revokeCertByKeyID`) and
`revokeCertByCertKey` (nee `revokeCertByJWK`) helpers much more
straight-line in their execution logic.
- Call the RA's new `RevokeCertByApplicant` and `RevokeCertByKey` gRPC
methods, rather than the deprecated `RevokeCertificateWithReg`.
This change, without any flag flips, should be invisible to the
end-user. It will slightly change some of our log message formats.
However, by now relying on the new RA gRPC revocation methods, this
change allows us to change our revocation policies by enabling the
`AllowDoubleRevocation` and `MozRevocationReasons` feature flags, which
affect the behavior of those new helpers.
Fixes#5936
Add two new gRPC methods to the SA:
- `RevokeCertByKey` will be used when the API request was signed by the
certificate's keypair, rather than a Subscriber keypair. If the
request is for reason `keyCompromise`, it will ensure that the key is
added to the blocked keys table, and will attempt to "re-revoke" a
certificate that was already revoked for some other reason.
- `RevokeCertByApplicant` supports both the path where the original
subscriber or another account which has proven control over all of the
identifier in the certificate requests revocation via the API. It does
not allow the requested reason to be `keyCompromise`, as these
requests do not represent a demonstration of key compromise.
In addition, add a new feature flag `MozRevocationReasons` which
controls the behavior of these new methods. If the flag is not set, they
behave like they have historically (see above). If the flag is set to true,
then the new methods enforce the upcoming Mozilla policies around
revocation reasons, namely:
- Only the original Subscriber can choose the revocation reason; other
clients will get a set reason code based on the method of requesting
revocation. When the original Subscriber requests reason
`keyCompromise`, this request will be honored, but the key will not be
blocked and other certificates with that key will not also be revoked.
- Revocations signed with the certificate key will always get reason
`keyCompromise`, because we do not know who is sending the request and
therefore must assume that the use of the key in this way represents
compromise. Because these requests will always be fore reason
`keyCompromise`, they will always be added to the blocked keys table
and they will always attempt "re-revocation".
- Revocations authorized via control of all names in the cert will
always get reason `cessationOfOperation`, which is to be used when the
original Subscriber does not control all names in the certificate
anymore.
Finally, update the existing `AdministrativelyRevokeCertificate` method
to use the new helper functions shared by the two new methods.
Part of #5936
Empty the bodies of the WFE's and RA's `NewAuthorization` methods. These
were used exclusively by the ACMEv1 flow. Also remove any helper functions
which were used exclusively by this code, and any tests which were testing
exclusively this code and which have equivalent tests for the ACMEv2 flow.
Greatly simply `SA.GetAuthorizations2`, as it no longer has to contend with
there being two different kinds of authorizations in the database. Add a few
TODOs to consider removing a few other SA gRPC methods which no longer
have any callers.
Part of #5681
Add a new feature flag `GetAuthzUseIndex` which causes the SA
to add `USE INDEX (regID_identifer_status_expires_idx)` to its authz2
database queries. This should encourage the query planner to actually
use that index instead of falling back to large table-scans.
Fixes#5822
Add a feature flag which causes the SA to switch between using the
traditional read-write database connector (pointed at the primary db)
or the newer read-only database connector (usually pointed at a
replica) when executing the `GetAuthorizations2` query.
Add a new feature flag to control whether or not the experimental ARI
information is exposed. Add a new entry to the Directory object which
provides the base URL for ARI requests. Add a new handler to the WFE
which parses incoming requests and returns reasonable renewalInfo.
Part of #5674
Add a new method to the SA's gRPC interface which takes both an Order
and a list of new Authorizations to insert into the database, and adds
both (as well as the various ancillary rows) inside a transaction.
To enable this, add a new abstraction layer inside the `db/` package
that facilitates inserting many rows at once, as we do for the `authz2`,
`orderToAuthz2`, and `requestedNames` tables in this operation.
Finally, add a new codepath to the RA (and a feature flag to control it)
which uses this new SA method instead of separately calling the
`NewAuthorization` method multiple times. Enable this feature flag in
the config-next integration tests.
This should reduce the failure rate of the new-order flow by reducing
the number of database operations by coalescing multiple inserts into a
single multi-row insert. It should also reduce the incidence of new
authorizations being created in the database but then never exposed to
the subscriber because of a failure later in the new-order flow, both by
reducing failures overall and by adding those authorizations in a
transaction which will be rolled back if there is a later failure.
Fixes#5577
Make the `NonCFSSLSigner` code path the only code path through the CA.
Remove all code related to the old, CFSSL-based code path. Update tests
to supply (or mock) issuers of the new kind. Remove or simplify a few
tests that were testing for behavior only exhibited by the old code
path, such as incrementing certain metrics. Remove code from `//cmd/`
for initializing the CFSSL library. Finally, mark the `NonCFSSLSigner`
feature flag itself as deprecated.
Delete the portions of the vendored CFSSL code which were only used
by these deleted code paths. This does not remove the CFSSL library
entirely, the rest of the cleanup will follow shortly.
Part of #5115
This flag is now enabled in Let's Encrypt staging/prod.
This change deprecates the flag and prepares it for deletion in a future
change. It can then be removed once no staging/prod configs reference the
flag.
Fixes#5236
features.go contains some feature flags that no longer control any Boulder
behavior. They have been removed from Let's Encrypt staging and prod
configs and can now be removed from Boulder.
This change removes the deprecated feature flags.
Currently, the CA is configured with a set of `internalIssuer`s,
and a mapping of public key algorithms (e.g. `x509.RSA`) to which
internalIssuer to use. In operation today, we use the same issuer
for all kinds of public key algorithms. In the future, we will use
different issuers for different algorithms (in particular, we will
use R3 to issue for RSA keys, and E1 to issue for ECDSA keys). But
we want to roll that out slowly, continuing to use our RSA issuer
to issue for all types of public keys, except for ECDSA keys which
are presented by a specific set of allowed accounts.
This change adds a new config field to the CA, which lets us specify
a small list of registration IDs which are allowed to have issuance
from our ECDSA issuer. If the config list is empty, then all accounts
are allowed. The CA checks to see if the key being issued for is
ECDSA: if it is, it then checks to make sure that the associated
registration ID is in the allowlist. If the account is not allowed,
it then overrides the issuance algorithm to use RSA instead,
mimicking our old behavior. It also adds a new feature flag, which
can be enabled to skip the allowlist entirely (effectively allowing
all registered accounts). This feature flag will be enabled when
we're done with our testing and confident in our ECDSA issuance.
Fixes#5259
The PrecertificateRevocation flag is turned on everywhere, so the
else case is unused code. This change updates the WFE to always
use the PrecertificateRevocation code path, and deprecates the old
feature flag.
The TestRevokeCertificateWithAuthz method was deleted because
it is redundant with TestRevokeCertificateWithAuthorizations.
Fixes#5240
Adds a replacement issuance library that replaces CFSSL. Usage of the
new library is gated by a feature, meaning until we fully deploy the
new signer we need to support both the new one and CFSSL, which makes
a few things a bit complicated.
One Big follow-up change is that once CFSSL is completely gone we'll
be able to stop using CSRs as the internal representation of issuance
requests (i.e. instead of passing a CSR all the way through from the
WFE -> CA and then converting it to the new signer.IssuanceRequest,
we can just construct a signer.IssuanceRequest at the WFE (or RA) and
pass that through the backend instead, making things a lot less opaque).
Fixes#4906.
The StoreKeyHashes feature flag controls whether rows are added to the
keyHashToSerial table. This feature is now enabled everywhere, so the
flag-protected code can be turned on unconditionally and the flag
removed from configs.
Related to #4895
This commit consists of three classes of changes:
1) Changing various command main.go files to always behave as they
would have when features.BlockedKeyTable was true. Also changing
one test in the same manner.
2) Removing the BlockedKeyTable flag from configuration in config-next,
because the flag is already live.
3) Moving the BlockedKeyTable flag to the "deprecated" section of
features.go, and regenerating featureflag_strings.go.
A future change will remove the BlockedKeyTable flag (and other
similarly deprecated flags) from features.go entirely.
Fixes#4873
Currently 99.99% of RSA keys we see in certificates at Let's Encrypt are
either 2048, 3072, or 4096 bits, but we support every 8 bit increment
between 2048 and 4096. Supporting these uncommon key sizes opens us up to
having to block much larger ranges of keys when dealing with something
like the Debian weak keys incident. Instead we should just reduce the
set of key sizes we support down to what people actually use.
Fixes#4835.
Phil Porada