Populate the new x509.Certificate.Policies field everywhere we currently populate the x509.Certificate.PolicyIdentifiers field. This allows Go to use whichever field it prefers (go1.23 prefers PolicyIdentifiers, go1.24 prefers Policies) as the source of truth when serializing a certificate.
Part of https://github.com/letsencrypt/boulder/issues/7148
- Adds a feature flag to gate rollout for SHA256 Subject Key Identifiers
for end-entity certificates.
- The ceremony tool will now use the RFC 7093 section 2 option 1 method
for generating Subject Key Identifiers for future root CA, intermediate
CA, and cross-sign ceremonies.
- - - -
[RFC 7093 section 2 option
1](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc7093#section-2) provides a
method for generating a truncated SHA256 hash for the Subject Key
Identifier field in accordance with Baseline Requirement [section
7.1.2.11.4 Subject Key
Identifier](90a98dc7c1/docs/BR.md (712114-subject-key-identifier)).
> [RFC5280] specifies two examples for generating key identifiers from
> public keys. Four additional mechanisms are as follows:
>
> 1) The keyIdentifier is composed of the leftmost 160-bits of the
> SHA-256 hash of the value of the BIT STRING subjectPublicKey
> (excluding the tag, length, and number of unused bits).
The related [RFC 5280 section
4.2.1.2](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc5280#section-4.2.1.2)
states:
> For CA certificates, subject key identifiers SHOULD be derived from
> the public key or a method that generates unique values. Two common
> methods for generating key identifiers from the public key are:
> ...
> Other methods of generating unique numbers are also acceptable.
In `//cmd/ceremony`:
* Added `CertificateToCrossSignPath` to the `cross-certificate` ceremony
type. This new input field takes an existing certificate that will be
cross-signed and performs checks against the manually configured data in
each ceremony file.
* Added byte-for-byte subject/issuer comparison checks to root,
intermediate, and cross-certificate ceremonies to detect that signing is
happening as expected.
* Added Fermat factorization check from the `//goodkey` package to all
functions that generate new key material.
In `//linter`:
* The Check function now exports linting certificate bytes. The idea is
that a linting certificate's `tbsCertificate` bytes can be compared
against the final certificate's `tbsCertificate` bytes as a verification
that `x509.CreateCertificate` was deterministic and produced identical
DER bytes after each signing operation.
Other notable changes:
* Re-orders the issuers list in each CA config to match staging and
production. There is an ordering issue mentioned by @aarongable two
years ago on IN-5913 that didn't make it's way back to this repository.
> Order here matters – the default chain we serve for each intermediate
should be the first listed chain containing that intermediate.
* Enables `ECDSAForAll` in `config-next` CA configs to match Staging.
* Generates 2x new ECDSA subordinate CAs cross-signed by an RSA root and
adds these chains to the WFE for clients to download.
* Increased the test.sh startup timeout to account for the extra
ceremony run time.
Fixes https://github.com/letsencrypt/boulder/issues/7003
---------
Co-authored-by: Aaron Gable <aaron@letsencrypt.org>
Completely remove the ability to configure Certificate Policy OIDs in
the Boulder CA. Instead, hard-code the Baseline Requirements Domain
Validated Reserved Policy Identifier. Boulder will never perform OV or
EV validation, so this is the only identifier that will be necessary.
In the ceremony tool, introduce additional checks that assert that Root
certificates do not have policies, and Intermediate certificates have
exactly the one Baseline Requirements Domain Validated Reserved Policy
Identifier.
The inclusion of Policy Qualifiers inside Policy Information elements of
a Certificate Policies extension is now NOT RECOMMENDED by the Baseline
Requirements. We have already removed these fields from all of our
Boulder configuration, and ceased issuing certificates with Policy
Qualifiers.
Remove all support for configuring and including Policy Qualifiers in
our certificates, both in Boulder's main issuance path and in our
ceremony tool. Switch from using the policyasn1 library to manually
encode these extensions, to using the crypto/x509's
Certificate.PolicyIdentifiers field. Delete the policyasn1 package as it
is no longer necessary.
Fixes https://github.com/letsencrypt/boulder/issues/6880
Update zlint to v3.5.0, which introduces scaffolding for running lints
over CRLs.
Convert all of our existing CRL checks to structs which match the zlint
interface, and add them to the registry. Then change our linter's
CheckCRL function, and crl-checker's Validate function, to run all lints
in the zlint registry.
Finally, update the ceremony tool to run these lints as well.
This change touches a lot of files, but involves almost no logic
changes. It's all just infrastructure, changing the way our lints and
their tests are shaped, and moving test files into new homes.
Fixes https://github.com/letsencrypt/boulder/issues/6934
Fixes https://github.com/letsencrypt/boulder/issues/6979
Use constants from the go stdlib time package, such as time.DateTime and
time.RFC3339, when parsing and formatting timestamps. Additionally,
simplify or remove some of our uses of parsing timestamps, such as to
set fake clocks in tests.
Use SHA256 instead of SHA1 to compute the Subject Key Identifier when
producing new CA certs with the ceremony tool.
This change is safe, as the issuance package ensures that we directly
copy the Issuing CA's Subject Key Identifier value into the Authority
Key Identifier field of the template certificate we pass to
x509.CreateCertificate. Thus, all end-entity certs issued from a CA with
a SHA256 Subject Key Identifier will have the correct value for their
Authority Key Identifier, regardless of the method used to initially
compute that value.
This change adds 12 bytes to each self-signed Root CA certificate issued
with this change, 24 bytes to each Subordinate CA certificate (whether a
normal intermediate or a cross-signed root), and 12 bytes to each
end-entity issued from those intermediates.
Fixes#6630
The resulting `boulder` binary can be invoked by different names to
trigger the behavior of the relevant subcommand. For instance, symlinking
and invoking as `boulder-ca` acts as the CA. Symlinking and invoking as
`boulder-va` acts as the VA.
This reduces the .deb file size from about 200MB to about 20MB.
This works by creating a registry that maps subcommand names to `main`
functions. Each subcommand registers itself in an `init()` function. The
monolithic `boulder` binary then checks what name it was invoked with
(`os.Args[0]`), looks it up in the registry, and invokes the appropriate
`main`. To avoid conflicts, all of the old `package main` are replaced
with `package notmain`.
To get the list of registered subcommands, run `boulder --list`. This
is used when symlinking all the variants into place, to ensure the set
of symlinked names matches the entries in the registry.
Fixes#5692
- Change generate CSR to only use a Subject and signer in creation
- Add a method to certProfile to return subject
- Validate that CSR input does not contain unwanted values
- Update tests and documentation about ceremony
Fix: #5318
Adds a replacement issuance library that replaces CFSSL. Usage of the
new library is gated by a feature, meaning until we fully deploy the
new signer we need to support both the new one and CFSSL, which makes
a few things a bit complicated.
One Big follow-up change is that once CFSSL is completely gone we'll
be able to stop using CSRs as the internal representation of issuance
requests (i.e. instead of passing a CSR all the way through from the
WFE -> CA and then converting it to the new signer.IssuanceRequest,
we can just construct a signer.IssuanceRequest at the WFE (or RA) and
pass that through the backend instead, making things a lot less opaque).
Fixes#4906.
This ended up taking a lot more work than I expected. In order to make the implementation more robust a bunch of stuff we previously relied on has been ripped out in order to reduce unnecessary complexity (I think I insisted on a bunch of this in the first place, so glad I can kill it now).
In particular this change:
* Removes bhsm and pkcs11-proxy: softhsm and pkcs11-proxy don't play well together, and any softhsm manipulation would need to happen on bhsm, then require a restart of pkcs11-proxy to pull in the on-disk changes. This makes manipulating softhsm from the boulder container extremely difficult, and because of the need to initialize new on each run (described below) we need direct access to the softhsm2 tools since pkcs11-tool cannot do slot initialization operations over the wire. I originally argued for bhsm as a way to mimic a network attached HSM, mainly so that we could do network level fault testing. In reality we've never actually done this, and the extra complexity is not really realistic for a handful of reasons. It seems better to just rip it out and operate directly on a local softhsm instance (the other option would be to use pkcs11-proxy locally, but this still would require manually restarting the proxy whenever softhsm2-util was used, and wouldn't really offer any realistic benefit).
* Initializes the softhsm slots on each integration test run, rather than when creating the docker image (this is necessary to prevent churn in test/cert-ceremonies/generate.go, which would need to be updated to reflect the new slot IDs each time a new boulder-tools image was created since slot IDs are randomly generated)
* Installs softhsm from source so that we can use a more up to date version (2.5.0 vs. 2.2.0 which is in the debian repo)
* Generates the root and intermediate private keys in softhsm and writes out the root and intermediate public keys to /tmp for use in integration tests (the existing test-{ca,root} certs are kept in test/ because they are used in a whole bunch of unit tests. At some point these should probably be renamed/moved to be more representative of what they are used for, but that is left for a follow-up in order to keep the churn in this PR as related to the ceremony work as possible)
Another follow-up item here is that we should really be zeroing out the database at the start of each integration test run, since certain things like certificates and ocsp responses will be signed by a key/issuer that is no longer is use/doesn't match the current key/issuer.
Fixes#4832.
Initially this was going to just be a bool on the `intermediate` type,
but there is enough different in terms of what is generated that I think
it makes sense to add a completely separate type. Internally they share
the same config, since basically everything else is the same (apart from
a few constraints on what fields can be populated in the profile).
This additionally fixes a bug where we weren't actually validating
root/intermediate/key configs.
Fixes#4741
Adds support for qualified CPS policies to root/intermediate generation.
This changes the existing policy-oids fields to a policies field which covers both bare policies and id-qt-cps qualified policies.
Fixes#4724
Merges gen-ca and gen-key into a single tool that can be used to complete a key/certificate generation ceremony. The driving idea here is that instead of having to write out multiple long commands in a specific order in order to complete a ceremony a configuration file is fed to a single binary. This config file contains all of the information needed to complete the ceremony, and can be easily tested outside of the secure environment before hand without fear of later typing a command/flag incorrectly etc.
The tooling works against the test hardware I have (there are minimal changes to the actual PKCS#11 code behind the scenes). Specific attention should be given to the documentation, and the general UX of the tool.
Fixes#4639 and fixes#4667.
Samantha Frank