This commit replaces the Boulder dependency on
gopkg.in/square/go-jose.v1 with gopkg.in/square/go-jose.v2. This is
necessary both to stay in front of bitrot and because the ACME v2 work
will require a feature from go-jose.v2 for JWS validation.
The largest part of this diff is cosmetic changes:
Changing import paths
jose.JsonWebKey -> jose.JSONWebKey
jose.JsonWebSignature -> jose.JSONWebSignature
jose.JoseHeader -> jose.Header
Some more significant changes were caused by updates in the API for
for creating new jose.Signer instances. Previously we constructed
these with jose.NewSigner(algorithm, key). Now these are created with
jose.NewSigner(jose.SigningKey{},jose.SignerOptions{}). At present all
signers specify EmbedJWK: true but this will likely change with
follow-up ACME V2 work.
Another change was the removal of the jose.LoadPrivateKey function
that the wfe tests relied on. The jose v2 API removed these functions,
moving them to a cmd's main package where we can't easily import them.
This function was reimplemented in the WFE's test code & updated to fail
fast rather than return errors.
Per CONTRIBUTING.md I have verified the go-jose.v2 tests at the imported
commit pass:
ok gopkg.in/square/go-jose.v2 14.771s
ok gopkg.in/square/go-jose.v2/cipher 0.025s
? gopkg.in/square/go-jose.v2/jose-util [no test files]
ok gopkg.in/square/go-jose.v2/json 1.230s
ok gopkg.in/square/go-jose.v2/jwt 0.073s
Resolves#2880
Prior to this PR the SA's `CountRegistrationsByIP` treated IPv6
differently than IPv4 by counting registrations within a /48 for IPv6 as
opposed to exact matches for IPv4. This PR updates
`CountRegistrationsByIP` to treat IPv4 and IPv6 the
same, always matching exactly. The existing RegistrationsPerIP rate
limit policy will be applied against this exact matching count.
A new `CountRegistrationsByIPRange` function is added to the SA that
performs the historic matching process, e.g. for IPv4 it counts exactly
the same as `CountRegistrationsByIP`, but for IPv6 it counts within
a /48.
A new `RegistrationsPerIPRange` rate limit policy is added to allow
configuring the threshold/window for the fuzzy /48 matching registration
limit. Stats for the "Exceeded" and "Pass" events for this rate limit are
separated into a separate `RegistrationsByIPRange` stats scope under
the `RateLimit` scope to allow us to track it separate from the exact
registrations per IP rate limit.
Resolves https://github.com/letsencrypt/boulder/issues/2738
Prior to this PR if a domain was an exact match to a public suffix
list entry the certificates per name rate limit was applied based on the
count of certificates issued for that exact name and all of its
subdomains.
This PR introduces an exception such that exact public suffix
matches correctly have the certificate per name rate limit applied based
on only exact name matches.
In order to accomplish this a new RPC is added to the SA
`CountCertificatesByExactNames`. This operates similar to the existing
`CountCertificatesByNames` but does *not* include subdomains in the
count, only exact matches to the names provided. The usage of this new
RPC is feature flag gated behind the "CountCertificatesExact" feature flag.
The RA unit tests are updated to test the new code paths both with and
without the feature flag enabled.
Resolves#2681
Generate first OCSP response in ca.IssueCertificate instead of ocsp-updater.newCertificateTick
if features.GenerateOCSPEarly is enabled. Adds a new field to the sa.AddCertiifcate RPC for
the OCSP response and only adds it to the certificate status + sets ocspLastUpdated if it is a
non-empty slice. ocsp-updater.newCertificateTick stays the same so we can catch certificates
that were successfully signed + stored but a OCSP response couldn't be generated (for whatever
reason).
Fixes#2477.
Fixes#976.
This implements a new rate limit, InvalidAuthorizationsPerAccount. If a given account fails authorization for a given hostname too many times within the window, subsequent new-authz attempts for that account and hostname will fail early with a rateLimited error. This mitigates the misconfigured clients that constantly retry authorization even though they always fail (e.g., because the hostname no longer resolves).
For the new rate limit, I added a new SA RPC, CountInvalidAuthorizations. I chose to implement this only in gRPC, not in AMQP-RPC, so checking the rate limit is gated on gRPC. See #2406 for some description of the how and why. I also chose to directly use the gRPC interfaces rather than wrapping them in core.StorageAuthority, as a step towards what we will want to do once we've moved fully to gRPC.
Because authorizations don't have a created time, we need to look at the expires time instead. Invalid authorizations retain the expiration they were given when they were created as pending authorizations, so we use now + pendingAuthorizationLifetime as one side of the window for rate limiting, and look backwards from there. Note that this means you could maliciously bypass this rate limit by stacking up pending authorizations over time, then failing them all at once.
Similarly, since this limit is by (account, hostname) rather than just (hostname), you can bypass it by creating multiple accounts. It would be more natural and robust to limit by hostname, like our certificate limits. However, we currently only have two indexes on the authz table: the primary key, and
(`registrationID`,`identifier`,`status`,`expires`)
Since this limit is intended mainly to combat misconfigured clients, I think this is sufficient for now.
Corresponding PR for website: letsencrypt/website#125
Adds a gRPC server to the SA and SA gRPC Clients to the WFE, RA, CA, Publisher, OCSP updater, orphan finder, admin revoker, and expiration mailer.
Also adds a CA gRPC client to the OCSP Updater which was missed in #2193.
Fixes#2347.
Daniel McCarney