boulder/va/va.go

770 lines
27 KiB
Go

package va
import (
"bytes"
"context"
"crypto/tls"
"errors"
"fmt"
"maps"
"math/rand/v2"
"net"
"net/url"
"os"
"regexp"
"slices"
"strings"
"syscall"
"time"
"github.com/jmhodges/clock"
"github.com/prometheus/client_golang/prometheus"
"google.golang.org/protobuf/proto"
"github.com/letsencrypt/boulder/bdns"
"github.com/letsencrypt/boulder/core"
corepb "github.com/letsencrypt/boulder/core/proto"
berrors "github.com/letsencrypt/boulder/errors"
"github.com/letsencrypt/boulder/features"
bgrpc "github.com/letsencrypt/boulder/grpc"
"github.com/letsencrypt/boulder/identifier"
blog "github.com/letsencrypt/boulder/log"
"github.com/letsencrypt/boulder/metrics"
"github.com/letsencrypt/boulder/probs"
vapb "github.com/letsencrypt/boulder/va/proto"
)
const (
PrimaryPerspective = "Primary"
allPerspectives = "all"
opDCVAndCAA = "dcv+caa"
opDCV = "dcv"
opCAA = "caa"
pass = "pass"
fail = "fail"
)
var (
// badTLSHeader contains the string 'HTTP /' which is returned when
// we try to talk TLS to a server that only talks HTTP
badTLSHeader = []byte{0x48, 0x54, 0x54, 0x50, 0x2f}
// h2SettingsFrameErrRegex is a regex against a net/http error indicating
// a malformed HTTP response that matches the initial SETTINGS frame of an
// HTTP/2 connection. This happens when a server configures HTTP/2 on port
// :80, failing HTTP-01 challenges.
//
// The regex first matches the error string prefix and then matches the raw
// bytes of an arbitrarily sized HTTP/2 SETTINGS frame:
// 0x00 0x00 0x?? 0x04 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00
//
// The third byte is variable and indicates the frame size. Typically
// this will be 0x12.
// The 0x04 in the fourth byte indicates that the frame is SETTINGS type.
//
// See:
// * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7540#section-4.1
// * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7540#section-6.5
//
// NOTE(@cpu): Using a regex is a hack but unfortunately for this case
// http.Client.Do() will return a url.Error err that wraps
// a errors.ErrorString instance. There isn't much else to do with one of
// those except match the encoded byte string with a regex. :-X
//
// NOTE(@cpu): The first component of this regex is optional to avoid an
// integration test flake. In some (fairly rare) conditions the malformed
// response error will be returned simply as a http.badStringError without
// the broken transport prefix. Most of the time the error is returned with
// a transport connection error prefix.
h2SettingsFrameErrRegex = regexp.MustCompile(`(?:net\/http\: HTTP\/1\.x transport connection broken: )?malformed HTTP response \"\\x00\\x00\\x[a-f0-9]{2}\\x04\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00.*"`)
)
// RemoteClients wraps the vapb.VAClient and vapb.CAAClient interfaces to aid in
// mocking remote VAs for testing.
type RemoteClients struct {
vapb.VAClient
vapb.CAAClient
}
// RemoteVA embeds RemoteClients and adds a field containing the address of the
// remote gRPC server since the underlying gRPC client doesn't provide a way to
// extract this metadata which is useful for debugging gRPC connection issues.
type RemoteVA struct {
RemoteClients
Address string
Perspective string
RIR string
}
type vaMetrics struct {
// validationLatency is a histogram of the latency to perform validations
// from the primary and remote VA perspectives. It's labelled by:
// - operation: VA.DoDCV or VA.DoCAA as [dcv|caa|dcv+caa]
// - perspective: ValidationAuthorityImpl.perspective
// - challenge_type: core.Challenge.Type
// - problem_type: probs.ProblemType
// - result: the result of the validation as [pass|fail]
validationLatency *prometheus.HistogramVec
prospectiveRemoteCAACheckFailures prometheus.Counter
tlsALPNOIDCounter *prometheus.CounterVec
http01Fallbacks prometheus.Counter
http01Redirects prometheus.Counter
caaCounter *prometheus.CounterVec
ipv4FallbackCounter prometheus.Counter
}
func initMetrics(stats prometheus.Registerer) *vaMetrics {
validationLatency := prometheus.NewHistogramVec(
prometheus.HistogramOpts{
Name: "validation_latency",
Help: "Histogram of the latency to perform validations from the primary and remote VA perspectives",
Buckets: metrics.InternetFacingBuckets,
},
[]string{"operation", "perspective", "challenge_type", "problem_type", "result"},
)
stats.MustRegister(validationLatency)
prospectiveRemoteCAACheckFailures := prometheus.NewCounter(
prometheus.CounterOpts{
Name: "prospective_remote_caa_check_failures",
Help: "Number of CAA rechecks that would have failed due to remote VAs returning failure if consesus were enforced",
})
stats.MustRegister(prospectiveRemoteCAACheckFailures)
tlsALPNOIDCounter := prometheus.NewCounterVec(
prometheus.CounterOpts{
Name: "tls_alpn_oid_usage",
Help: "Number of TLS ALPN validations using either of the two OIDs",
},
[]string{"oid"},
)
stats.MustRegister(tlsALPNOIDCounter)
http01Fallbacks := prometheus.NewCounter(
prometheus.CounterOpts{
Name: "http01_fallbacks",
Help: "Number of IPv6 to IPv4 HTTP-01 fallback requests made",
})
stats.MustRegister(http01Fallbacks)
http01Redirects := prometheus.NewCounter(
prometheus.CounterOpts{
Name: "http01_redirects",
Help: "Number of HTTP-01 redirects followed",
})
stats.MustRegister(http01Redirects)
caaCounter := prometheus.NewCounterVec(prometheus.CounterOpts{
Name: "caa_sets_processed",
Help: "A counter of CAA sets processed labelled by result",
}, []string{"result"})
stats.MustRegister(caaCounter)
ipv4FallbackCounter := prometheus.NewCounter(prometheus.CounterOpts{
Name: "tls_alpn_ipv4_fallback",
Help: "A counter of IPv4 fallbacks during TLS ALPN validation",
})
stats.MustRegister(ipv4FallbackCounter)
return &vaMetrics{
validationLatency: validationLatency,
prospectiveRemoteCAACheckFailures: prospectiveRemoteCAACheckFailures,
tlsALPNOIDCounter: tlsALPNOIDCounter,
http01Fallbacks: http01Fallbacks,
http01Redirects: http01Redirects,
caaCounter: caaCounter,
ipv4FallbackCounter: ipv4FallbackCounter,
}
}
// PortConfig specifies what ports the VA should call to on the remote
// host when performing its checks.
type portConfig struct {
HTTPPort int
HTTPSPort int
TLSPort int
}
// newDefaultPortConfig is a constructor which returns a portConfig with default
// settings.
//
// CABF BRs section 1.6.1: Authorized Ports: One of the following ports: 80
// (http), 443 (https), 25 (smtp), 22 (ssh).
//
// RFC 8555 section 8.3: Dereference the URL using an HTTP GET request. This
// request MUST be sent to TCP port 80 on the HTTP server.
//
// RFC 8737 section 3: The ACME server initiates a TLS connection to the chosen
// IP address. This connection MUST use TCP port 443.
func newDefaultPortConfig() *portConfig {
return &portConfig{
HTTPPort: 80,
HTTPSPort: 443,
TLSPort: 443,
}
}
// ValidationAuthorityImpl represents a VA
type ValidationAuthorityImpl struct {
vapb.UnsafeVAServer
vapb.UnsafeCAAServer
log blog.Logger
dnsClient bdns.Client
issuerDomain string
httpPort int
httpsPort int
tlsPort int
userAgent string
clk clock.Clock
remoteVAs []RemoteVA
maxRemoteFailures int
accountURIPrefixes []string
singleDialTimeout time.Duration
perspective string
rir string
isReservedIPFunc func(ip net.IP) bool
metrics *vaMetrics
}
var _ vapb.VAServer = (*ValidationAuthorityImpl)(nil)
var _ vapb.CAAServer = (*ValidationAuthorityImpl)(nil)
// NewValidationAuthorityImpl constructs a new VA
func NewValidationAuthorityImpl(
resolver bdns.Client,
remoteVAs []RemoteVA,
userAgent string,
issuerDomain string,
stats prometheus.Registerer,
clk clock.Clock,
logger blog.Logger,
accountURIPrefixes []string,
perspective string,
rir string,
reservedIPChecker func(ip net.IP) bool,
) (*ValidationAuthorityImpl, error) {
if len(accountURIPrefixes) == 0 {
return nil, errors.New("no account URI prefixes configured")
}
for i, va1 := range remoteVAs {
for j, va2 := range remoteVAs {
if i != j && va1.Perspective == va2.Perspective {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("duplicate remote VA perspective %q", va1.Perspective)
}
}
}
pc := newDefaultPortConfig()
va := &ValidationAuthorityImpl{
log: logger,
dnsClient: resolver,
issuerDomain: issuerDomain,
httpPort: pc.HTTPPort,
httpsPort: pc.HTTPSPort,
tlsPort: pc.TLSPort,
userAgent: userAgent,
clk: clk,
metrics: initMetrics(stats),
remoteVAs: remoteVAs,
maxRemoteFailures: maxAllowedFailures(len(remoteVAs)),
accountURIPrefixes: accountURIPrefixes,
// singleDialTimeout specifies how long an individual `DialContext` operation may take
// before timing out. This timeout ignores the base RPC timeout and is strictly
// used for the DialContext operations that take place during an
// HTTP-01 challenge validation.
singleDialTimeout: 10 * time.Second,
perspective: perspective,
rir: rir,
isReservedIPFunc: reservedIPChecker,
}
return va, nil
}
// maxAllowedFailures returns the maximum number of allowed failures
// for a given number of remote perspectives, according to the "Quorum
// Requirements" table in BRs Section 3.2.2.9, as follows:
//
// | # of Distinct Remote Network Perspectives Used | # of Allowed non-Corroborations |
// | --- | --- |
// | 2-5 | 1 |
// | 6+ | 2 |
func maxAllowedFailures(perspectiveCount int) int {
if perspectiveCount < 2 {
return 0
}
if perspectiveCount < 6 {
return 1
}
return 2
}
// ipError is an error type used to pass though the IP address of the remote
// host when an error occurs during HTTP-01 and TLS-ALPN domain validation.
type ipError struct {
ip net.IP
err error
}
// newIPError wraps an error and the IP of the remote host in an ipError so we
// can display the IP in the problem details returned to the client.
func newIPError(ip net.IP, err error) error {
return ipError{ip: ip, err: err}
}
// Unwrap returns the underlying error.
func (i ipError) Unwrap() error {
return i.err
}
// Error returns a string representation of the error.
func (i ipError) Error() string {
return fmt.Sprintf("%s: %s", i.ip, i.err)
}
// detailedError returns a ProblemDetails corresponding to an error
// that occurred during HTTP-01 or TLS-ALPN domain validation. Specifically it
// tries to unwrap known Go error types and present something a little more
// meaningful. It additionally handles `berrors.ConnectionFailure` errors by
// passing through the detailed message.
func detailedError(err error) *probs.ProblemDetails {
var ipErr ipError
if errors.As(err, &ipErr) {
detailedErr := detailedError(ipErr.err)
if ipErr.ip == nil {
// This should never happen.
return detailedErr
}
// Prefix the error message with the IP address of the remote host.
detailedErr.Detail = fmt.Sprintf("%s: %s", ipErr.ip, detailedErr.Detail)
return detailedErr
}
// net/http wraps net.OpError in a url.Error. Unwrap them.
var urlErr *url.Error
if errors.As(err, &urlErr) {
prob := detailedError(urlErr.Err)
prob.Detail = fmt.Sprintf("Fetching %s: %s", urlErr.URL, prob.Detail)
return prob
}
var tlsErr tls.RecordHeaderError
if errors.As(err, &tlsErr) && bytes.Equal(tlsErr.RecordHeader[:], badTLSHeader) {
return probs.Malformed("Server only speaks HTTP, not TLS")
}
var netOpErr *net.OpError
if errors.As(err, &netOpErr) {
if fmt.Sprintf("%T", netOpErr.Err) == "tls.alert" {
// All the tls.alert error strings are reasonable to hand back to a
// user. Confirmed against Go 1.8.
return probs.TLS(netOpErr.Error())
} else if netOpErr.Timeout() && netOpErr.Op == "dial" {
return probs.Connection("Timeout during connect (likely firewall problem)")
} else if netOpErr.Timeout() {
return probs.Connection(fmt.Sprintf("Timeout during %s (your server may be slow or overloaded)", netOpErr.Op))
}
}
var syscallErr *os.SyscallError
if errors.As(err, &syscallErr) {
switch syscallErr.Err {
case syscall.ECONNREFUSED:
return probs.Connection("Connection refused")
case syscall.ENETUNREACH:
return probs.Connection("Network unreachable")
case syscall.ECONNRESET:
return probs.Connection("Connection reset by peer")
}
}
var netErr net.Error
if errors.As(err, &netErr) && netErr.Timeout() {
return probs.Connection("Timeout after connect (your server may be slow or overloaded)")
}
if errors.Is(err, berrors.ConnectionFailure) {
return probs.Connection(err.Error())
}
if errors.Is(err, berrors.Unauthorized) {
return probs.Unauthorized(err.Error())
}
if errors.Is(err, berrors.DNS) {
return probs.DNS(err.Error())
}
if errors.Is(err, berrors.Malformed) {
return probs.Malformed(err.Error())
}
if errors.Is(err, berrors.CAA) {
return probs.CAA(err.Error())
}
if h2SettingsFrameErrRegex.MatchString(err.Error()) {
return probs.Connection("Server is speaking HTTP/2 over HTTP")
}
return probs.Connection("Error getting validation data")
}
// isPrimaryVA returns true if the VA is the primary validation perspective.
func (va *ValidationAuthorityImpl) isPrimaryVA() bool {
return va.perspective == PrimaryPerspective
}
// validateChallenge simply passes through to the appropriate validation method
// depending on the challenge type.
func (va *ValidationAuthorityImpl) validateChallenge(
ctx context.Context,
ident identifier.ACMEIdentifier,
kind core.AcmeChallenge,
token string,
keyAuthorization string,
) ([]core.ValidationRecord, error) {
switch kind {
case core.ChallengeTypeHTTP01:
return va.validateHTTP01(ctx, ident, token, keyAuthorization)
case core.ChallengeTypeDNS01:
// Strip a (potential) leading wildcard token from the identifier.
ident.Value = strings.TrimPrefix(ident.Value, "*.")
return va.validateDNS01(ctx, ident, keyAuthorization)
case core.ChallengeTypeTLSALPN01:
return va.validateTLSALPN01(ctx, ident, keyAuthorization)
}
return nil, berrors.MalformedError("invalid challenge type %s", kind)
}
// observeLatency records entries in the validationLatency histogram of the
// latency to perform validations from the primary and remote VA perspectives.
// The labels are:
// - operation: VA.DoDCV or VA.DoCAA as [dcv|caa]
// - perspective: [ValidationAuthorityImpl.perspective|all]
// - challenge_type: core.Challenge.Type
// - problem_type: probs.ProblemType
// - result: the result of the validation as [pass|fail]
func (va *ValidationAuthorityImpl) observeLatency(op, perspective, challType, probType, result string, latency time.Duration) {
labels := prometheus.Labels{
"operation": op,
"perspective": perspective,
"challenge_type": challType,
"problem_type": probType,
"result": result,
}
va.metrics.validationLatency.With(labels).Observe(latency.Seconds())
}
// remoteOperation is a func type that encapsulates the operation and request
// passed to va.performRemoteOperation. The operation must be a method on
// vapb.VAClient or vapb.CAAClient, and the request must be the corresponding
// proto.Message passed to that method.
type remoteOperation = func(context.Context, RemoteVA, proto.Message) (remoteResult, error)
// remoteResult is an interface that must be implemented by the results of a
// remoteOperation, such as *vapb.ValidationResult and *vapb.IsCAAValidResponse.
// It provides methods to access problem details, the associated perspective,
// and the RIR.
type remoteResult interface {
proto.Message
GetProblem() *corepb.ProblemDetails
GetPerspective() string
GetRir() string
}
const (
// requiredRIRs is the minimum number of distinct Regional Internet
// Registries required for MPIC-compliant validation. Per BRs Section
// 3.2.2.9, starting March 15, 2026, the required number is 2.
requiredRIRs = 2
)
// mpicSummary is returned by doRemoteOperation and contains a summary of the
// validation results for logging purposes. To ensure that the JSON output does
// not contain nil slices, and to ensure deterministic output use the
// summarizeMPIC function to prepare an mpicSummary.
type mpicSummary struct {
// Passed are the perspectives that passed validation.
Passed []string `json:"passedPerspectives"`
// Failed are the perspectives that failed validation.
Failed []string `json:"failedPerspectives"`
// PassedRIRs are the Regional Internet Registries that the passing
// perspectives reside in.
PassedRIRs []string `json:"passedRIRs"`
// QuorumResult is the Multi-Perspective Issuance Corroboration quorum
// result, per BRs Section 5.4.1, Requirement 2.7 (i.e., "3/4" which should
// be interpreted as "Three (3) out of four (4) attempted Network
// Perspectives corroborated the determinations made by the Primary Network
// Perspective".
QuorumResult string `json:"quorumResult"`
}
// summarizeMPIC prepares an *mpicSummary for logging, ensuring there are no nil
// slices and output is deterministic.
func summarizeMPIC(passed, failed []string, passedRIRSet map[string]struct{}) *mpicSummary {
if passed == nil {
passed = []string{}
}
slices.Sort(passed)
if failed == nil {
failed = []string{}
}
slices.Sort(failed)
passedRIRs := []string{}
if passedRIRSet != nil {
for rir := range maps.Keys(passedRIRSet) {
passedRIRs = append(passedRIRs, rir)
}
}
slices.Sort(passedRIRs)
return &mpicSummary{
Passed: passed,
Failed: failed,
PassedRIRs: passedRIRs,
QuorumResult: fmt.Sprintf("%d/%d", len(passed), len(passed)+len(failed)),
}
}
// doRemoteOperation concurrently calls the provided operation with `req` and a
// RemoteVA once for each configured RemoteVA. It cancels remaining operations
// and returns early if either the required number of successful results is
// obtained or the number of failures exceeds va.maxRemoteFailures.
//
// Internal logic errors are logged. If the number of operation failures exceeds
// va.maxRemoteFailures, the first encountered problem is returned as a
// *probs.ProblemDetails.
func (va *ValidationAuthorityImpl) doRemoteOperation(ctx context.Context, op remoteOperation, req proto.Message) (*mpicSummary, *probs.ProblemDetails) {
remoteVACount := len(va.remoteVAs)
// - Mar 15, 2026: MUST implement using at least 3 perspectives
// - Jun 15, 2026: MUST implement using at least 4 perspectives
// - Dec 15, 2026: MUST implement using at least 5 perspectives
// See "Phased Implementation Timeline" in
// https://github.com/cabforum/servercert/blob/main/docs/BR.md#3229-multi-perspective-issuance-corroboration
if remoteVACount < 3 {
return nil, probs.ServerInternal("Insufficient remote perspectives: need at least 3")
}
type response struct {
addr string
perspective string
rir string
result remoteResult
err error
}
subCtx, cancel := context.WithCancel(ctx)
defer cancel()
responses := make(chan *response, remoteVACount)
for _, i := range rand.Perm(remoteVACount) {
go func(rva RemoteVA) {
res, err := op(subCtx, rva, req)
if err != nil {
responses <- &response{rva.Address, rva.Perspective, rva.RIR, res, err}
return
}
if res.GetPerspective() != rva.Perspective || res.GetRir() != rva.RIR {
err = fmt.Errorf(
"Expected perspective %q (%q) but got reply from %q (%q) - misconfiguration likely", rva.Perspective, rva.RIR, res.GetPerspective(), res.GetRir(),
)
responses <- &response{rva.Address, rva.Perspective, rva.RIR, res, err}
return
}
responses <- &response{rva.Address, rva.Perspective, rva.RIR, res, err}
}(va.remoteVAs[i])
}
required := remoteVACount - va.maxRemoteFailures
var passed []string
var failed []string
var passedRIRs = map[string]struct{}{}
var firstProb *probs.ProblemDetails
for resp := range responses {
var currProb *probs.ProblemDetails
if resp.err != nil {
// Failed to communicate with the remote VA.
failed = append(failed, resp.perspective)
if core.IsCanceled(resp.err) {
currProb = probs.ServerInternal("Secondary validation RPC canceled")
} else {
va.log.Errf("Operation on remote VA (%s) failed: %s", resp.addr, resp.err)
currProb = probs.ServerInternal("Secondary validation RPC failed")
}
} else if resp.result.GetProblem() != nil {
// The remote VA returned a problem.
failed = append(failed, resp.perspective)
var err error
currProb, err = bgrpc.PBToProblemDetails(resp.result.GetProblem())
if err != nil {
va.log.Errf("Operation on Remote VA (%s) returned malformed problem: %s", resp.addr, err)
currProb = probs.ServerInternal("Secondary validation RPC returned malformed result")
}
} else {
// The remote VA returned a successful result.
passed = append(passed, resp.perspective)
passedRIRs[resp.rir] = struct{}{}
}
if firstProb == nil && currProb != nil {
// A problem was encountered for the first time.
firstProb = currProb
}
if !features.Get().MPICFullResults {
// To respond faster, if we get enough successes or too many failures, we cancel remaining RPCs.
// Finish the loop to collect remaining responses into `failed` so we can rely on having a response
// for every request we made.
if len(passed) >= required && len(passedRIRs) >= requiredRIRs {
cancel()
}
if len(failed) > va.maxRemoteFailures {
cancel()
}
}
// Once all the VAs have returned a result, break the loop.
if len(passed)+len(failed) >= remoteVACount {
break
}
}
if len(passed) >= required && len(passedRIRs) >= requiredRIRs {
return summarizeMPIC(passed, failed, passedRIRs), nil
}
if firstProb == nil {
// This should never happen. If we didn't meet the thresholds above we
// should have seen at least one error.
return summarizeMPIC(passed, failed, passedRIRs), probs.ServerInternal(
"During secondary validation: validation failed but the problem is unavailable")
}
firstProb.Detail = fmt.Sprintf("During secondary validation: %s", firstProb.Detail)
return summarizeMPIC(passed, failed, passedRIRs), firstProb
}
// validationLogEvent is a struct that contains the information needed to log
// the results of DoCAA and DoDCV.
type validationLogEvent struct {
AuthzID string
Requester int64
Identifier identifier.ACMEIdentifier
Challenge core.Challenge
Error string `json:",omitempty"`
InternalError string `json:",omitempty"`
Latency float64
Summary *mpicSummary `json:",omitempty"`
}
// DoDCV conducts a local Domain Control Validation (DCV) for the specified
// challenge. When invoked on the primary Validation Authority (VA) and the
// local validation succeeds, it also performs DCV validations using the
// configured remote VAs. Failed validations are indicated by a non-nil Problems
// in the returned ValidationResult. DoDCV returns error only for internal logic
// errors (and the client may receive errors from gRPC in the event of a
// communication problem). ValidationResult always includes a list of
// ValidationRecords, even when it also contains Problems. This method
// implements the DCV portion of Multi-Perspective Issuance Corroboration as
// defined in BRs Sections 3.2.2.9 and 5.4.1.
func (va *ValidationAuthorityImpl) DoDCV(ctx context.Context, req *vapb.PerformValidationRequest) (*vapb.ValidationResult, error) {
// TODO(#8023): Once DnsNames are no longer used in RPCs, use req.Identifier
// directly instead of setting ident.
if req.Identifier != nil && req.DnsName != "" {
return nil, errors.New("both Identifier and DNSName are set")
}
ident := identifier.FromProtoWithDefault(req)
if core.IsAnyNilOrZero(req, ident, req.Challenge, req.Authz, req.ExpectedKeyAuthorization) {
return nil, berrors.InternalServerError("Incomplete validation request")
}
chall, err := bgrpc.PBToChallenge(req.Challenge)
if err != nil {
return nil, errors.New("challenge failed to deserialize")
}
err = chall.CheckPending()
if err != nil {
return nil, berrors.MalformedError("challenge failed consistency check: %s", err)
}
// Initialize variables and a deferred function to handle validation latency
// metrics, log validation errors, and log an MPIC summary. Avoid using :=
// to redeclare `prob`, `localLatency`, or `summary` below this point.
var prob *probs.ProblemDetails
var summary *mpicSummary
var localLatency time.Duration
start := va.clk.Now()
logEvent := validationLogEvent{
AuthzID: req.Authz.Id,
Requester: req.Authz.RegID,
Identifier: ident,
Challenge: chall,
}
defer func() {
probType := ""
outcome := fail
if prob != nil {
probType = string(prob.Type)
logEvent.Error = prob.String()
logEvent.Challenge.Error = prob
logEvent.Challenge.Status = core.StatusInvalid
} else {
logEvent.Challenge.Status = core.StatusValid
outcome = pass
}
// Observe local validation latency (primary|remote).
va.observeLatency(opDCV, va.perspective, string(chall.Type), probType, outcome, localLatency)
if va.isPrimaryVA() {
// Observe total validation latency (primary+remote).
va.observeLatency(opDCV, allPerspectives, string(chall.Type), probType, outcome, va.clk.Since(start))
logEvent.Summary = summary
}
// Log the total validation latency.
logEvent.Latency = va.clk.Since(start).Round(time.Millisecond).Seconds()
va.log.AuditObject("Validation result", logEvent)
}()
// Do local validation. Note that we process the result in a couple ways
// *before* checking whether it returned an error. These few checks are
// carefully written to ensure that they work whether the local validation
// was successful or not, and cannot themselves fail.
records, err := va.validateChallenge(
ctx,
ident,
chall.Type,
chall.Token,
req.ExpectedKeyAuthorization,
)
// Stop the clock for local validation latency.
localLatency = va.clk.Since(start)
// Check for malformed ValidationRecords
logEvent.Challenge.ValidationRecord = records
if err == nil && !logEvent.Challenge.RecordsSane() {
err = errors.New("records from local validation failed sanity check")
}
if err != nil {
logEvent.InternalError = err.Error()
prob = detailedError(err)
return bgrpc.ValidationResultToPB(records, filterProblemDetails(prob), va.perspective, va.rir)
}
if va.isPrimaryVA() {
// Do remote validation. We do this after local validation is complete
// to avoid wasting work when validation will fail anyway. This only
// returns a singular problem, because the remote VAs have already
// logged their own validationLogEvent, and it's not helpful to present
// multiple large errors to the end user.
op := func(ctx context.Context, remoteva RemoteVA, req proto.Message) (remoteResult, error) {
validationRequest, ok := req.(*vapb.PerformValidationRequest)
if !ok {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("got type %T, want *vapb.PerformValidationRequest", req)
}
return remoteva.DoDCV(ctx, validationRequest)
}
summary, prob = va.doRemoteOperation(ctx, op, req)
}
return bgrpc.ValidationResultToPB(records, filterProblemDetails(prob), va.perspective, va.rir)
}