boulder/wfe/web-front-end.go

1259 lines
47 KiB
Go

// Copyright 2014 ISRG. All rights reserved
// This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
// License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
// file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/.
package wfe
import (
"bytes"
"crypto/x509"
"encoding/json"
"fmt"
"io/ioutil"
"net"
"net/http"
"regexp"
"strconv"
"strings"
"time"
"github.com/letsencrypt/boulder/Godeps/_workspace/src/github.com/cactus/go-statsd-client/statsd"
"github.com/letsencrypt/boulder/Godeps/_workspace/src/github.com/jmhodges/clock"
jose "github.com/letsencrypt/boulder/Godeps/_workspace/src/github.com/letsencrypt/go-jose"
"github.com/letsencrypt/boulder/core"
blog "github.com/letsencrypt/boulder/log"
)
// Paths are the ACME-spec identified URL path-segments for various methods
const (
DirectoryPath = "/directory"
NewRegPath = "/acme/new-reg"
RegPath = "/acme/reg/"
NewAuthzPath = "/acme/new-authz"
AuthzPath = "/acme/authz/"
ChallengePath = "/acme/challenge/"
NewCertPath = "/acme/new-cert"
CertPath = "/acme/cert/"
RevokeCertPath = "/acme/revoke-cert"
TermsPath = "/terms"
IssuerPath = "/acme/issuer-cert"
BuildIDPath = "/build"
// StatusRateLimited is not in net/http
StatusRateLimited = 429
)
// WebFrontEndImpl provides all the logic for Boulder's web-facing interface,
// i.e., ACME. Its members configure the paths for various ACME functions,
// plus a few other data items used in ACME. Its methods are primarily handlers
// for HTTPS requests for the various ACME functions.
type WebFrontEndImpl struct {
RA core.RegistrationAuthority
SA core.StorageGetter
stats statsd.Statter
log *blog.AuditLogger
clk clock.Clock
// URL configuration parameters
BaseURL string
NewReg string
RegBase string
NewAuthz string
AuthzBase string
ChallengeBase string
NewCert string
CertBase string
// JSON encoded endpoint directory
DirectoryJSON []byte
// Issuer certificate (DER) for /acme/issuer-cert
IssuerCert []byte
// URL to the current subscriber agreement (should contain some version identifier)
SubscriberAgreementURL string
// Register of anti-replay nonces
nonceService core.NonceService
// Cache settings
CertCacheDuration time.Duration
CertNoCacheExpirationWindow time.Duration
IndexCacheDuration time.Duration
IssuerCacheDuration time.Duration
// CORS settings
AllowOrigins []string
// Graceful shutdown settings
ShutdownStopTimeout time.Duration
ShutdownKillTimeout time.Duration
}
func statusCodeFromError(err interface{}) int {
// Populate these as needed. We probably should trim the error list in util.go
switch err.(type) {
case core.MalformedRequestError:
return http.StatusBadRequest
case core.NotSupportedError:
return http.StatusNotImplemented
case core.SyntaxError:
return http.StatusBadRequest
case core.UnauthorizedError:
return http.StatusForbidden
case core.NotFoundError:
return http.StatusNotFound
case core.LengthRequiredError:
return http.StatusLengthRequired
case core.SignatureValidationError:
return http.StatusBadRequest
case core.InternalServerError:
return http.StatusInternalServerError
case core.RateLimitedError:
return StatusRateLimited
default:
return http.StatusInternalServerError
}
}
// NewWebFrontEndImpl constructs a web service for Boulder
func NewWebFrontEndImpl(stats statsd.Statter, clk clock.Clock) (WebFrontEndImpl, error) {
logger := blog.GetAuditLogger()
logger.Notice("Web Front End Starting")
nonceService, err := core.NewNonceService()
if err != nil {
return WebFrontEndImpl{}, err
}
return WebFrontEndImpl{
log: logger,
clk: clk,
nonceService: nonceService,
stats: stats,
}, nil
}
// BodylessResponseWriter wraps http.ResponseWriter, discarding
// anything written to the body.
type BodylessResponseWriter struct {
http.ResponseWriter
}
func (mrw BodylessResponseWriter) Write(buf []byte) (int, error) {
return len(buf), nil
}
// HandleFunc registers a handler at the given path. It's
// http.HandleFunc(), but with a wrapper around the handler that
// provides some generic per-request functionality:
//
// * Set a Replay-Nonce header.
//
// * Respond to OPTIONS requests, including CORS preflight requests.
//
// * Respond http.StatusMethodNotAllowed for HTTP methods other than
// those listed.
//
// * Set CORS headers when responding to CORS "actual" requests.
//
// * Never send a body in response to a HEAD request. Anything
// written by the handler will be discarded if the method is HEAD.
// Also, all handlers that accept GET automatically accept HEAD.
func (wfe *WebFrontEndImpl) HandleFunc(mux *http.ServeMux, pattern string, h wfeHandlerFunc, methods ...string) {
methodsMap := make(map[string]bool)
for _, m := range methods {
methodsMap[m] = true
}
if methodsMap["GET"] && !methodsMap["HEAD"] {
// Allow HEAD for any resource that allows GET
methods = append(methods, "HEAD")
methodsMap["HEAD"] = true
}
methodsStr := strings.Join(methods, ", ")
mux.Handle(pattern, &topHandler{
log: wfe.log,
clk: clock.Default(),
wfe: wfeHandlerFunc(func(logEvent *requestEvent, response http.ResponseWriter, request *http.Request) {
// We do not propagate errors here, because (1) they should be
// transient, and (2) they fail closed.
nonce, err := wfe.nonceService.Nonce()
if err == nil {
response.Header().Set("Replay-Nonce", nonce)
}
switch request.Method {
case "HEAD":
// Whether or not we're sending a 405 error,
// we should comply with HTTP spec by not
// sending a body.
response = BodylessResponseWriter{response}
case "OPTIONS":
wfe.Options(response, request, methodsStr, methodsMap)
return
}
if !methodsMap[request.Method] {
msg := "Method not allowed"
response.Header().Set("Allow", methodsStr)
wfe.sendError(response, logEvent, msg, request.Method, http.StatusMethodNotAllowed)
return
}
wfe.setCORSHeaders(response, request, "")
// Call the wrapped handler.
h(logEvent, response, request)
}),
})
}
// Handler returns an http.Handler that uses various functions for
// various ACME-specified paths.
func (wfe *WebFrontEndImpl) Handler() (http.Handler, error) {
wfe.NewReg = wfe.BaseURL + NewRegPath
wfe.RegBase = wfe.BaseURL + RegPath
wfe.NewAuthz = wfe.BaseURL + NewAuthzPath
wfe.AuthzBase = wfe.BaseURL + AuthzPath
wfe.ChallengeBase = wfe.BaseURL + ChallengePath
wfe.NewCert = wfe.BaseURL + NewCertPath
wfe.CertBase = wfe.BaseURL + CertPath
// Only generate directory once
directory := map[string]string{
"new-reg": wfe.NewReg,
"new-authz": wfe.NewAuthz,
"new-cert": wfe.NewCert,
"revoke-cert": wfe.BaseURL + RevokeCertPath,
}
directoryJSON, err := json.Marshal(directory)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
wfe.DirectoryJSON = directoryJSON
m := http.NewServeMux()
wfe.HandleFunc(m, DirectoryPath, wfe.Directory, "GET")
wfe.HandleFunc(m, NewRegPath, wfe.NewRegistration, "POST")
wfe.HandleFunc(m, NewAuthzPath, wfe.NewAuthorization, "POST")
wfe.HandleFunc(m, NewCertPath, wfe.NewCertificate, "POST")
wfe.HandleFunc(m, RegPath, wfe.Registration, "POST")
wfe.HandleFunc(m, AuthzPath, wfe.Authorization, "GET")
wfe.HandleFunc(m, ChallengePath, wfe.Challenge, "GET", "POST")
wfe.HandleFunc(m, CertPath, wfe.Certificate, "GET")
wfe.HandleFunc(m, RevokeCertPath, wfe.RevokeCertificate, "POST")
wfe.HandleFunc(m, TermsPath, wfe.Terms, "GET")
wfe.HandleFunc(m, IssuerPath, wfe.Issuer, "GET")
wfe.HandleFunc(m, BuildIDPath, wfe.BuildID, "GET")
// We don't use our special HandleFunc for "/" because it matches everything,
// meaning we can wind up returning 405 when we mean to return 404. See
// https://github.com/letsencrypt/boulder/issues/717
m.Handle("/", &topHandler{
log: wfe.log,
clk: clock.Default(),
wfe: wfeHandlerFunc(wfe.Index),
})
return m, nil
}
// Method implementations
// Index serves a simple identification page. It is not part of the ACME spec.
func (wfe *WebFrontEndImpl) Index(logEvent *requestEvent, response http.ResponseWriter, request *http.Request) {
// http://golang.org/pkg/net/http/#example_ServeMux_Handle
// The "/" pattern matches everything, so we need to check
// that we're at the root here.
if request.URL.Path != "/" {
logEvent.AddError("Resource not found")
http.NotFound(response, request)
response.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/problem+json")
return
}
if request.Method != "GET" {
logEvent.AddError("Bad method")
response.Header().Set("Allow", "GET")
response.WriteHeader(http.StatusMethodNotAllowed)
return
}
response.Header().Set("Content-Type", "text/html")
response.Write([]byte(fmt.Sprintf(`<html>
<body>
This is an <a href="https://github.com/letsencrypt/acme-spec/">ACME</a>
Certificate Authority running <a href="https://github.com/letsencrypt/boulder">Boulder</a>.
JSON directory is available at <a href="%s">%s</a>.
</body>
</html>
`, DirectoryPath, DirectoryPath)))
addCacheHeader(response, wfe.IndexCacheDuration.Seconds())
}
func addNoCacheHeader(w http.ResponseWriter) {
w.Header().Add("Cache-Control", "public, max-age=0, no-cache")
}
func addCacheHeader(w http.ResponseWriter, age float64) {
w.Header().Add("Cache-Control", fmt.Sprintf("public, max-age=%.f", age))
}
// Directory is an HTTP request handler that simply provides the directory
// object stored in the WFE's DirectoryJSON member.
func (wfe *WebFrontEndImpl) Directory(logEvent *requestEvent, response http.ResponseWriter, request *http.Request) {
response.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
response.Write(wfe.DirectoryJSON)
}
// The ID is always the last slash-separated token in the path
func parseIDFromPath(path string) string {
re := regexp.MustCompile("^.*/")
return re.ReplaceAllString(path, "")
}
const (
unknownKey = "No registration exists matching provided key"
malformedJWS = "Unable to read/verify body"
)
// verifyPOST reads and parses the request body, looks up the Registration
// corresponding to its JWK, verifies the JWS signature, checks that the
// resource field is present and correct in the JWS protected header, and
// returns the JWS payload bytes, the key used to verify, and the corresponding
// Registration (or error). If regCheck is false, verifyPOST will still try to
// look up a registration object, and will return it if found. However, if no
// registration object is found, verifyPOST will attempt to verify the JWS using
// the key in the JWS headers, and return the key plus a dummy registration if
// successful. If a caller passes regCheck = false, it should plan on validating
// the key itself. verifyPOST also appends its errors to requestEvent.Errors so
// code calling it does not need to if they imediately return a response to the
// user.
func (wfe *WebFrontEndImpl) verifyPOST(logEvent *requestEvent, request *http.Request, regCheck bool, resource core.AcmeResource) ([]byte, *jose.JsonWebKey, core.Registration, error) {
var err error
// TODO: We should return a pointer to a registration, which can be nil,
// rather the a registration value with a sentinel value.
// https://github.com/letsencrypt/boulder/issues/877
reg := core.Registration{ID: 0}
if _, ok := request.Header["Content-Length"]; !ok {
err = core.LengthRequiredError("Content-Length header is required for POST.")
wfe.stats.Inc("WFE.HTTP.ClientErrors.LengthRequiredError", 1, 1.0)
logEvent.AddError("missing Content-Length header on POST")
return nil, nil, reg, err
}
// Read body
if request.Body == nil {
err = core.MalformedRequestError("No body on POST")
wfe.stats.Inc("WFE.Errors.NoPOSTBody", 1, 1.0)
logEvent.AddError("no body on POST")
return nil, nil, reg, err
}
bodyBytes, err := ioutil.ReadAll(request.Body)
if err != nil {
err = core.InternalServerError("unable to read request body")
wfe.stats.Inc("WFE.Errors.UnableToReadRequestBody", 1, 1.0)
logEvent.AddError("unable to read request body")
return nil, nil, reg, err
}
body := string(bodyBytes)
// Parse as JWS
parsedJws, err := jose.ParseSigned(body)
if err != nil {
puberr := core.SignatureValidationError("Parse error reading JWS")
wfe.stats.Inc("WFE.Errors.UnableToParseJWS", 1, 1.0)
logEvent.AddError("could not JSON parse body into JWS: %s", err)
return nil, nil, reg, puberr
}
// Verify JWS
// NOTE: It might seem insecure for the WFE to be trusted to verify
// client requests, i.e., that the verification should be done at the
// RA. However the WFE is the RA's only view of the outside world
// *anyway*, so it could always lie about what key was used by faking
// the signature itself.
if len(parsedJws.Signatures) > 1 {
err = core.SignatureValidationError("Too many signatures in POST body")
wfe.stats.Inc("WFE.Errors.TooManyJWSSignaturesInPOST", 1, 1.0)
logEvent.AddError("too many signatures in POST body: %d", len(parsedJws.Signatures))
return nil, nil, reg, err
}
if len(parsedJws.Signatures) == 0 {
err = core.SignatureValidationError("POST JWS not signed")
wfe.stats.Inc("WFE.Errors.JWSNotSignedInPOST", 1, 1.0)
logEvent.AddError("no signatures in POST body")
return nil, nil, reg, err
}
submittedKey := parsedJws.Signatures[0].Header.JsonWebKey
if submittedKey == nil {
err = core.SignatureValidationError("No JWK in JWS header")
wfe.stats.Inc("WFE.Errors.NoJWKInJWSSignatureHeader", 1, 1.0)
logEvent.AddError("no JWK in JWS signature header in POST body")
return nil, nil, reg, err
}
var key *jose.JsonWebKey
reg, err = wfe.SA.GetRegistrationByKey(*submittedKey)
// Special case: If no registration was found, but regCheck is false, use an
// empty registration and the submitted key. The caller is expected to do some
// validation on the returned key.
if _, ok := err.(core.NoSuchRegistrationError); ok && !regCheck {
// When looking up keys from the registrations DB, we can be confident they
// are "good". But when we are verifying against any submitted key, we want
// to check its quality before doing the verify.
if err = core.GoodKey(submittedKey.Key); err != nil {
wfe.stats.Inc("WFE.Errors.JWKRejectedByGoodKey", 1, 1.0)
logEvent.AddError("JWK in request was rejected by GoodKey: %s", err)
return nil, nil, reg, err
}
key = submittedKey
} else if err != nil {
// For all other errors, or if regCheck is true, return error immediately.
wfe.stats.Inc("WFE.Errors.UnableToGetRegistrationByKey", 1, 1.0)
logEvent.AddError("unable to fetch registration by the given JWK: %s", err)
return nil, nil, reg, err
} else {
// If the lookup was successful, use that key.
key = &reg.Key
logEvent.Requester = reg.ID
logEvent.Contacts = reg.Contact
}
payload, header, err := parsedJws.Verify(key)
if err != nil {
puberr := core.SignatureValidationError("JWS verification error")
wfe.stats.Inc("WFE.Errors.JWSVerificationFailed", 1, 1.0)
n := len(body)
if n > 100 {
n = 100
}
logEvent.AddError("verification of JWS with the JWK failed: %v; body: %s", err, body[:n])
return nil, nil, reg, puberr
}
// Check that the request has a known anti-replay nonce
// i.e., Nonce is in protected header and
if err != nil || len(header.Nonce) == 0 {
wfe.stats.Inc("WFE.Errors.JWSMissingNonce", 1, 1.0)
logEvent.AddError("JWS is missing an anti-replay nonce")
err = core.SignatureValidationError("JWS has no anti-replay nonce")
return nil, nil, reg, err
} else if !wfe.nonceService.Valid(header.Nonce) {
wfe.stats.Inc("WFE.Errors.JWSInvalidNonce", 1, 1.0)
logEvent.AddError("JWS has an invalid anti-replay nonce")
err = core.SignatureValidationError(fmt.Sprintf("JWS has invalid anti-replay nonce"))
return nil, nil, reg, err
}
// Check that the "resource" field is present and has the correct value
var parsedRequest struct {
Resource string `json:"resource"`
}
err = json.Unmarshal([]byte(payload), &parsedRequest)
if err != nil {
wfe.stats.Inc("WFE.Errors.UnparsableJWSPayload", 1, 1.0)
logEvent.AddError("unable to JSON parse resource from JWS payload: %s", err)
puberr := core.SignatureValidationError("Request payload did not parse as JSON")
return nil, nil, reg, puberr
}
if parsedRequest.Resource == "" {
wfe.stats.Inc("WFE.Errors.NoResourceInJWSPayload", 1, 1.0)
logEvent.AddError("JWS request payload does not specifiy a resource")
err = core.MalformedRequestError("Request payload does not specify a resource")
return nil, nil, reg, err
} else if resource != core.AcmeResource(parsedRequest.Resource) {
wfe.stats.Inc("WFE.Errors.MismatchedResourceInJWSPayload", 1, 1.0)
logEvent.AddError("JWS request payload does not match resource")
err = core.MalformedRequestError(fmt.Sprintf("JWS resource payload does not match the HTTP resource: %s != %s", parsedRequest.Resource, resource))
return nil, nil, reg, err
}
return []byte(payload), key, reg, nil
}
// Notify the client of an error condition and log it for audit purposes.
func (wfe *WebFrontEndImpl) sendError(response http.ResponseWriter, logEvent *requestEvent, msg string, detail interface{}, code int) {
problem := core.ProblemDetails{Detail: msg}
switch code {
case http.StatusPreconditionFailed:
fallthrough
case http.StatusForbidden:
problem.Type = core.UnauthorizedProblem
case http.StatusConflict:
fallthrough
case http.StatusMethodNotAllowed:
fallthrough
case http.StatusNotFound:
fallthrough
case http.StatusBadRequest:
fallthrough
case http.StatusLengthRequired:
problem.Type = core.MalformedProblem
case StatusRateLimited:
problem.Type = core.RateLimitedProblem
default: // Either http.StatusInternalServerError or an unexpected code
problem.Type = core.ServerInternalProblem
}
// Record details to the log event
logEvent.AddError(msg)
// Only audit log internal errors so users cannot purposefully cause
// auditable events.
if problem.Type == core.ServerInternalProblem {
// AUDIT[ Error Conditions ] 9cc4d537-8534-4970-8665-4b382abe82f3
wfe.log.Audit(fmt.Sprintf("Internal error - %s - %s", msg, detail))
} else if statusCodeFromError(detail) != http.StatusInternalServerError {
// If not an internal error and problem is a custom error type
problem.Detail += fmt.Sprintf(" :: %s", detail)
}
problemDoc, err := json.Marshal(problem)
if err != nil {
// AUDIT[ Error Conditions ] 9cc4d537-8534-4970-8665-4b382abe82f3
wfe.log.Audit(fmt.Sprintf("Could not marshal error message: %s - %+v", err, problem))
problemDoc = []byte("{\"detail\": \"Problem marshalling error message.\"}")
}
// Paraphrased from
// https://golang.org/src/net/http/server.go#L1272
response.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/problem+json")
response.WriteHeader(code)
response.Write(problemDoc)
wfe.stats.Inc(fmt.Sprintf("WFE.HTTP.ErrorCodes.%d", code), 1, 1.0)
problemSegments := strings.Split(string(problem.Type), ":")
if len(problemSegments) > 0 {
wfe.stats.Inc(fmt.Sprintf("WFE.HTTP.ProblemTypes.%s", problemSegments[len(problemSegments)-1]), 1, 1.0)
}
}
func link(url, relation string) string {
return fmt.Sprintf("<%s>;rel=\"%s\"", url, relation)
}
// NewRegistration is used by clients to submit a new registration/account
func (wfe *WebFrontEndImpl) NewRegistration(logEvent *requestEvent, response http.ResponseWriter, request *http.Request) {
body, key, _, err := wfe.verifyPOST(logEvent, request, false, core.ResourceNewReg)
if err != nil {
// verifyPOST handles its own setting of logEvent.Errors
wfe.sendError(response, logEvent, malformedJWS, err, statusCodeFromError(err))
return
}
if existingReg, err := wfe.SA.GetRegistrationByKey(*key); err == nil {
response.Header().Set("Location", fmt.Sprintf("%s%d", wfe.RegBase, existingReg.ID))
wfe.sendError(response, logEvent, "Registration key is already in use", nil, http.StatusConflict)
return
}
var init core.Registration
err = json.Unmarshal(body, &init)
if err != nil {
wfe.sendError(response, logEvent, "Error unmarshaling JSON", err, http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
if len(init.Agreement) > 0 && init.Agreement != wfe.SubscriberAgreementURL {
msg := fmt.Sprintf("Provided agreement URL [%s] does not match current agreement URL [%s]", init.Agreement, wfe.SubscriberAgreementURL)
wfe.sendError(response, logEvent, msg, nil, http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
init.Key = *key
init.InitialIP = net.ParseIP(request.Header.Get("X-Real-IP"))
if init.InitialIP == nil {
host, _, err := net.SplitHostPort(request.RemoteAddr)
if err == nil {
init.InitialIP = net.ParseIP(host)
} else {
wfe.sendError(response, logEvent, "couldn't parse the remote (that is, the client's) address", nil, http.StatusInternalServerError)
return
}
}
reg, err := wfe.RA.NewRegistration(init)
if err != nil {
wfe.sendError(response, logEvent, "Error creating new registration", err, statusCodeFromError(err))
return
}
logEvent.Requester = reg.ID
logEvent.Contacts = reg.Contact
// Use an explicitly typed variable. Otherwise `go vet' incorrectly complains
// that reg.ID is a string being passed to %d.
regURL := fmt.Sprintf("%s%d", wfe.RegBase, reg.ID)
responseBody, err := json.Marshal(reg)
if err != nil {
// StatusInternalServerError because we just created this registration, it should be OK.
wfe.sendError(response, logEvent, "Error marshaling registration", err, http.StatusInternalServerError)
return
}
response.Header().Add("Location", regURL)
response.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
response.Header().Add("Link", link(wfe.NewAuthz, "next"))
if len(wfe.SubscriberAgreementURL) > 0 {
response.Header().Add("Link", link(wfe.SubscriberAgreementURL, "terms-of-service"))
}
response.WriteHeader(http.StatusCreated)
response.Write(responseBody)
}
// NewAuthorization is used by clients to submit a new ID Authorization
func (wfe *WebFrontEndImpl) NewAuthorization(logEvent *requestEvent, response http.ResponseWriter, request *http.Request) {
body, _, currReg, err := wfe.verifyPOST(logEvent, request, true, core.ResourceNewAuthz)
if err != nil {
// verifyPOST handles its own setting of logEvent.Errors
respMsg := malformedJWS
respCode := statusCodeFromError(err)
if _, ok := err.(core.NoSuchRegistrationError); ok {
respMsg = unknownKey
respCode = http.StatusForbidden
}
wfe.sendError(response, logEvent, respMsg, err, respCode)
return
}
// Any version of the agreement is acceptable here. Version match is enforced in
// wfe.Registration when agreeing the first time. Agreement updates happen
// by mailing subscribers and don't require a registration update.
if currReg.Agreement == "" {
wfe.sendError(response, logEvent, "Must agree to subscriber agreement before any further actions", nil, http.StatusForbidden)
return
}
var init core.Authorization
if err = json.Unmarshal(body, &init); err != nil {
wfe.sendError(response, logEvent, "Error unmarshaling JSON", err, http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
logEvent.Extra["Identifier"] = init.Identifier
// Create new authz and return
authz, err := wfe.RA.NewAuthorization(init, currReg.ID)
if err != nil {
wfe.sendError(response, logEvent, "Error creating new authz", err, statusCodeFromError(err))
return
}
logEvent.Extra["AuthzID"] = authz.ID
// Make a URL for this authz, then blow away the ID and RegID before serializing
authzURL := wfe.AuthzBase + string(authz.ID)
wfe.prepAuthorizationForDisplay(&authz)
responseBody, err := json.Marshal(authz)
if err != nil {
// StatusInternalServerError because we generated the authz, it should be OK
wfe.sendError(response, logEvent, "Error marshaling authz", err, http.StatusInternalServerError)
return
}
response.Header().Add("Location", authzURL)
response.Header().Add("Link", link(wfe.NewCert, "next"))
response.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
response.WriteHeader(http.StatusCreated)
if _, err = response.Write(responseBody); err != nil {
logEvent.AddError(err.Error())
wfe.log.Warning(fmt.Sprintf("Could not write response: %s", err))
}
}
// RevokeCertificate is used by clients to request the revocation of a cert.
func (wfe *WebFrontEndImpl) RevokeCertificate(logEvent *requestEvent, response http.ResponseWriter, request *http.Request) {
// We don't ask verifyPOST to verify there is a correponding registration,
// because anyone with the right private key can revoke a certificate.
body, requestKey, registration, err := wfe.verifyPOST(logEvent, request, false, core.ResourceRevokeCert)
if err != nil {
// verifyPOST handles its own setting of logEvent.Errors
wfe.sendError(response, logEvent, malformedJWS, err, statusCodeFromError(err))
return
}
type RevokeRequest struct {
CertificateDER core.JSONBuffer `json:"certificate"`
}
var revokeRequest RevokeRequest
if err = json.Unmarshal(body, &revokeRequest); err != nil {
wfe.log.Debug(fmt.Sprintf("Couldn't unmarshal in revoke request %s", string(body)))
wfe.sendError(response, logEvent, "Unable to read/verify body", err, http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
providedCert, err := x509.ParseCertificate(revokeRequest.CertificateDER)
if err != nil {
wfe.log.Debug("Couldn't parse cert in revoke request.")
wfe.sendError(response, logEvent, "Unable to read/verify body", err, http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
serial := core.SerialToString(providedCert.SerialNumber)
logEvent.Extra["ProvidedCertificateSerial"] = serial
cert, err := wfe.SA.GetCertificate(serial)
if err != nil || !bytes.Equal(cert.DER, revokeRequest.CertificateDER) {
wfe.sendError(response, logEvent, "No such certificate", err, http.StatusNotFound)
return
}
parsedCertificate, err := x509.ParseCertificate(cert.DER)
if err != nil {
// InternalServerError because this is a failure to decode from our DB.
wfe.sendError(response, logEvent, "Invalid certificate", err, http.StatusInternalServerError)
return
}
logEvent.Extra["RetrievedCertificateSerial"] = core.SerialToString(parsedCertificate.SerialNumber)
logEvent.Extra["RetrievedCertificateDNSNames"] = parsedCertificate.DNSNames
logEvent.Extra["RetrievedCertificateEmailAddresses"] = parsedCertificate.EmailAddresses
logEvent.Extra["RetrievedCertificateIPAddresses"] = parsedCertificate.IPAddresses
certStatus, err := wfe.SA.GetCertificateStatus(serial)
if err != nil {
wfe.sendError(response, logEvent, "Certificate status not yet available", err, http.StatusNotFound)
return
}
logEvent.Extra["CertificateStatus"] = certStatus.Status
if certStatus.Status == core.OCSPStatusRevoked {
wfe.sendError(response, logEvent, "Certificate already revoked", "", http.StatusConflict)
return
}
// TODO: Implement method of revocation by authorizations on account.
if !(core.KeyDigestEquals(requestKey, parsedCertificate.PublicKey) ||
registration.ID == cert.RegistrationID) {
wfe.sendError(response, logEvent,
"Revocation request must be signed by private key of cert to be revoked, or by the account key of the account that issued it.",
requestKey,
http.StatusForbidden)
return
}
// Use revocation code 0, meaning "unspecified"
err = wfe.RA.RevokeCertificateWithReg(*parsedCertificate, 0, registration.ID)
if err != nil {
wfe.sendError(response, logEvent, "Failed to revoke certificate", err, statusCodeFromError(err))
} else {
wfe.log.Debug(fmt.Sprintf("Revoked %v", serial))
response.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
}
}
func (wfe *WebFrontEndImpl) logCsr(request *http.Request, cr core.CertificateRequest, registration core.Registration) {
var csrLog = struct {
ClientAddr string
CsrBase64 []byte
Registration core.Registration
}{
ClientAddr: getClientAddr(request),
CsrBase64: cr.Bytes,
Registration: registration,
}
wfe.log.AuditObject("Certificate request", csrLog)
}
// NewCertificate is used by clients to request the issuance of a cert for an
// authorized identifier.
func (wfe *WebFrontEndImpl) NewCertificate(logEvent *requestEvent, response http.ResponseWriter, request *http.Request) {
body, _, reg, err := wfe.verifyPOST(logEvent, request, true, core.ResourceNewCert)
if err != nil {
// verifyPOST handles its own setting of logEvent.Errors
respMsg := malformedJWS
respCode := statusCodeFromError(err)
if _, ok := err.(core.NoSuchRegistrationError); ok {
respMsg = unknownKey
respCode = http.StatusForbidden
}
wfe.sendError(response, logEvent, respMsg, err, respCode)
return
}
// Any version of the agreement is acceptable here. Version match is enforced in
// wfe.Registration when agreeing the first time. Agreement updates happen
// by mailing subscribers and don't require a registration update.
if reg.Agreement == "" {
wfe.sendError(response, logEvent, "Must agree to subscriber agreement before any further actions", nil, http.StatusForbidden)
return
}
var certificateRequest core.CertificateRequest
if err = json.Unmarshal(body, &certificateRequest); err != nil {
wfe.sendError(response, logEvent, "Error unmarshaling certificate request", err, http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
wfe.logCsr(request, certificateRequest, reg)
// Check that the key in the CSR is good. This will also be checked in the CA
// component, but we want to discard CSRs with bad keys as early as possible
// because (a) it's an easy check and we can save unnecessary requests and
// bytes on the wire, and (b) the CA logs all rejections as audit events, but
// a bad key from the client is just a malformed request and doesn't need to
// be audited.
if err = core.GoodKey(certificateRequest.CSR.PublicKey); err != nil {
wfe.sendError(response, logEvent, "Invalid key in certificate request", err, http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
logEvent.Extra["CSRDNSNames"] = certificateRequest.CSR.DNSNames
logEvent.Extra["CSREmailAddresses"] = certificateRequest.CSR.EmailAddresses
logEvent.Extra["CSRIPAddresses"] = certificateRequest.CSR.IPAddresses
// Create new certificate and return
// TODO IMPORTANT: The RA trusts the WFE to provide the correct key. If the
// WFE is compromised, *and* the attacker knows the public key of an account
// authorized for target site, they could cause issuance for that site by
// lying to the RA. We should probably pass a copy of the whole rquest to the
// RA for secondary validation.
cert, err := wfe.RA.NewCertificate(certificateRequest, reg.ID)
if err != nil {
wfe.sendError(response, logEvent, "Error creating new cert", err, statusCodeFromError(err))
return
}
// Make a URL for this certificate.
// We use only the sequential part of the serial number, because it should
// uniquely identify the certificate, and this makes it easy for anybody to
// enumerate and mirror our certificates.
parsedCertificate, err := x509.ParseCertificate([]byte(cert.DER))
if err != nil {
wfe.sendError(response, logEvent, "Error creating new cert", err, http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
serial := parsedCertificate.SerialNumber
certURL := wfe.CertBase + core.SerialToString(serial)
// TODO Content negotiation
response.Header().Add("Location", certURL)
response.Header().Add("Link", link(wfe.BaseURL+IssuerPath, "up"))
response.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/pkix-cert")
response.WriteHeader(http.StatusCreated)
if _, err = response.Write(cert.DER); err != nil {
logEvent.AddError(err.Error())
wfe.log.Warning(fmt.Sprintf("Could not write response: %s", err))
}
}
// Challenge handles POST requests to challenge URLs. Such requests are clients'
// responses to the server's challenges.
func (wfe *WebFrontEndImpl) Challenge(
logEvent *requestEvent,
response http.ResponseWriter,
request *http.Request) {
notFound := func() {
wfe.sendError(response, logEvent, "No such registration", request.URL.Path, http.StatusNotFound)
}
// Challenge URIs are of the form /acme/challenge/<auth id>/<challenge id>.
// Here we parse out the id components. TODO: Use a better tool to parse out
// URL structure: https://github.com/letsencrypt/boulder/issues/437
slug := strings.Split(request.URL.Path[len(ChallengePath):], "/")
if len(slug) != 2 {
notFound()
return
}
authorizationID := slug[0]
challengeID, err := strconv.ParseInt(slug[1], 10, 64)
if err != nil {
notFound()
return
}
logEvent.Extra["AuthorizationID"] = authorizationID
logEvent.Extra["ChallengeID"] = challengeID
authz, err := wfe.SA.GetAuthorization(authorizationID)
if err != nil {
notFound()
return
}
// After expiring, challenges are inaccessible
if authz.Expires == nil || authz.Expires.Before(wfe.clk.Now()) {
msg := fmt.Sprintf("Authorization %v expired in the past (%v)", authz.ID, *authz.Expires)
wfe.sendError(response, logEvent, "Expired authorization", msg, http.StatusNotFound)
return
}
// Check that the requested challenge exists within the authorization
challengeIndex := authz.FindChallenge(challengeID)
if challengeIndex == -1 {
notFound()
return
}
challenge := authz.Challenges[challengeIndex]
logEvent.Extra["ChallengeType"] = challenge.Type
logEvent.Extra["AuthorizationRegistrationID"] = authz.RegistrationID
logEvent.Extra["AuthorizationIdentifier"] = authz.Identifier
logEvent.Extra["AuthorizationStatus"] = authz.Status
logEvent.Extra["AuthorizationExpires"] = authz.Expires
switch request.Method {
case "GET", "HEAD":
wfe.getChallenge(response, request, authz, &challenge, logEvent)
case "POST":
wfe.postChallenge(response, request, authz, challengeIndex, logEvent)
}
}
// prepChallengeForDisplay takes a core.Challenge and prepares it for display to
// the client by filling in its URI field and clearing its AccountKey and ID
// fields.
// TODO: Come up with a cleaner way to do this.
// https://github.com/letsencrypt/boulder/issues/761
func (wfe *WebFrontEndImpl) prepChallengeForDisplay(authz core.Authorization, challenge *core.Challenge) {
challenge.URI = fmt.Sprintf("%s%s/%d", wfe.ChallengeBase, authz.ID, challenge.ID)
challenge.AccountKey = nil
// 0 is considered "empty" for the purpose of the JSON omitempty tag.
challenge.ID = 0
}
// prepAuthorizationForDisplay takes a core.Authorization and prepares it for
// display to the client by clearing its ID and RegistrationID fields, and
// preparing all its challenges.
func (wfe *WebFrontEndImpl) prepAuthorizationForDisplay(authz *core.Authorization) {
for i := range authz.Challenges {
wfe.prepChallengeForDisplay(*authz, &authz.Challenges[i])
}
authz.ID = ""
authz.RegistrationID = 0
}
func (wfe *WebFrontEndImpl) getChallenge(
response http.ResponseWriter,
request *http.Request,
authz core.Authorization,
challenge *core.Challenge,
logEvent *requestEvent) {
wfe.prepChallengeForDisplay(authz, challenge)
jsonReply, err := json.Marshal(challenge)
if err != nil {
// InternalServerError because this is a failure to decode data passed in
// by the caller, which got it from the DB.
wfe.sendError(response, logEvent, "Failed to marshal challenge", err, http.StatusInternalServerError)
return
}
authzURL := wfe.AuthzBase + string(authz.ID)
response.Header().Add("Location", challenge.URI)
response.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
response.Header().Add("Link", link(authzURL, "up"))
response.WriteHeader(http.StatusAccepted)
if _, err := response.Write(jsonReply); err != nil {
wfe.log.Warning(fmt.Sprintf("Could not write response: %s", err))
logEvent.AddError(err.Error())
return
}
}
func (wfe *WebFrontEndImpl) postChallenge(
response http.ResponseWriter,
request *http.Request,
authz core.Authorization,
challengeIndex int,
logEvent *requestEvent) {
body, _, currReg, err := wfe.verifyPOST(logEvent, request, true, core.ResourceChallenge)
if err != nil {
// verifyPOST handles its own setting of logEvent.Errors
respMsg := malformedJWS
respCode := http.StatusBadRequest
if _, ok := err.(core.NoSuchRegistrationError); ok {
respMsg = unknownKey
respCode = http.StatusForbidden
}
wfe.sendError(response, logEvent, respMsg, err, respCode)
return
}
// Any version of the agreement is acceptable here. Version match is enforced in
// wfe.Registration when agreeing the first time. Agreement updates happen
// by mailing subscribers and don't require a registration update.
if currReg.Agreement == "" {
wfe.sendError(response, logEvent, "Registration didn't agree to subscriber agreement before any further actions", nil, http.StatusForbidden)
return
}
// Check that the registration ID matching the key used matches
// the registration ID on the authz object
if currReg.ID != authz.RegistrationID {
wfe.sendError(response, logEvent, "User registration ID doesn't match registration ID in authorization",
"",
http.StatusForbidden)
return
}
var challengeUpdate core.Challenge
if err = json.Unmarshal(body, &challengeUpdate); err != nil {
wfe.sendError(response, logEvent, "Error unmarshaling challenge response", err, http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
// Ask the RA to update this authorization
updatedAuthorization, err := wfe.RA.UpdateAuthorization(authz, challengeIndex, challengeUpdate)
if err != nil {
wfe.sendError(response, logEvent, "Unable to update challenge", err, statusCodeFromError(err))
return
}
// assumption: UpdateAuthorization does not modify order of challenges
challenge := updatedAuthorization.Challenges[challengeIndex]
wfe.prepChallengeForDisplay(authz, &challenge)
jsonReply, err := json.Marshal(challenge)
if err != nil {
// StatusInternalServerError because we made the challenges, they should be OK
wfe.sendError(response, logEvent, "Failed to marshal challenge", err, http.StatusInternalServerError)
return
}
authzURL := wfe.AuthzBase + string(authz.ID)
response.Header().Add("Location", challenge.URI)
response.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
response.Header().Add("Link", link(authzURL, "up"))
response.WriteHeader(http.StatusAccepted)
if _, err = response.Write(jsonReply); err != nil {
logEvent.AddError(err.Error())
wfe.log.Warning(fmt.Sprintf("Could not write response: %s", err))
return
}
}
// Registration is used by a client to submit an update to their registration.
func (wfe *WebFrontEndImpl) Registration(logEvent *requestEvent, response http.ResponseWriter, request *http.Request) {
body, _, currReg, err := wfe.verifyPOST(logEvent, request, true, core.ResourceRegistration)
if err != nil {
// verifyPOST handles its own setting of logEvent.Errors
respMsg := malformedJWS
respCode := statusCodeFromError(err)
if _, ok := err.(core.NoSuchRegistrationError); ok {
respMsg = unknownKey
respCode = http.StatusForbidden
}
wfe.sendError(response, logEvent, respMsg, err, respCode)
return
}
// Requests to this handler should have a path that leads to a known
// registration
idStr := parseIDFromPath(request.URL.Path)
id, err := strconv.ParseInt(idStr, 10, 64)
if err != nil {
wfe.sendError(response, logEvent, "Registration ID must be an integer", err, http.StatusBadRequest)
return
} else if id <= 0 {
wfe.sendError(response, logEvent, "Registration ID must be a positive non-zero integer", id, http.StatusBadRequest)
return
} else if id != currReg.ID {
wfe.sendError(response, logEvent, "Request signing key did not match registration key", "", http.StatusForbidden)
return
}
var update core.Registration
err = json.Unmarshal(body, &update)
if err != nil {
wfe.sendError(response, logEvent, "Error unmarshaling registration", err, http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
if len(update.Agreement) > 0 && update.Agreement != wfe.SubscriberAgreementURL {
msg := fmt.Sprintf("Provided agreement URL [%s] does not match current agreement URL [%s]", update.Agreement, wfe.SubscriberAgreementURL)
logEvent.AddError(msg)
wfe.sendError(response, logEvent, msg, nil, http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
// Registration objects contain a JWK object, which must be non-nil. We know
// the key of the updated registration object is going to be the same as the
// key of the current one, so we set it here. This ensures we can cleanly
// serialize the update as JSON to send via AMQP to the RA.
update.Key = currReg.Key
// Ask the RA to update this authorization.
updatedReg, err := wfe.RA.UpdateRegistration(currReg, update)
if err != nil {
wfe.sendError(response, logEvent, "Unable to update registration", err, statusCodeFromError(err))
return
}
jsonReply, err := json.Marshal(updatedReg)
if err != nil {
// StatusInternalServerError because we just generated the reg, it should be OK
wfe.sendError(response, logEvent, "Failed to marshal registration", err, http.StatusInternalServerError)
return
}
response.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
response.Header().Add("Link", link(wfe.NewAuthz, "next"))
if len(wfe.SubscriberAgreementURL) > 0 {
response.Header().Add("Link", link(wfe.SubscriberAgreementURL, "terms-of-service"))
}
response.WriteHeader(http.StatusAccepted)
response.Write(jsonReply)
}
// Authorization is used by clients to submit an update to one of their
// authorizations.
func (wfe *WebFrontEndImpl) Authorization(logEvent *requestEvent, response http.ResponseWriter, request *http.Request) {
// Requests to this handler should have a path that leads to a known authz
id := parseIDFromPath(request.URL.Path)
authz, err := wfe.SA.GetAuthorization(id)
if err != nil {
wfe.sendError(response, logEvent, "Unable to find authorization", err, http.StatusNotFound)
return
}
logEvent.Extra["AuthorizationID"] = authz.ID
logEvent.Extra["AuthorizationRegistrationID"] = authz.RegistrationID
logEvent.Extra["AuthorizationIdentifier"] = authz.Identifier
logEvent.Extra["AuthorizationStatus"] = authz.Status
logEvent.Extra["AuthorizationExpires"] = authz.Expires
// After expiring, authorizations are inaccessible
if authz.Expires == nil || authz.Expires.Before(wfe.clk.Now()) {
msg := fmt.Sprintf("Authorization %v expired in the past (%v)", authz.ID, *authz.Expires)
wfe.sendError(response, logEvent, "Expired authorization", msg, http.StatusNotFound)
return
}
wfe.prepAuthorizationForDisplay(&authz)
jsonReply, err := json.Marshal(authz)
if err != nil {
// InternalServerError because this is a failure to decode from our DB.
wfe.sendError(response, logEvent, "Failed to JSON marshal authz", err, http.StatusInternalServerError)
return
}
response.Header().Add("Link", link(wfe.NewCert, "next"))
response.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
response.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
if _, err = response.Write(jsonReply); err != nil {
logEvent.AddError("unable to write authorization update response: %s", err)
wfe.log.Warning(fmt.Sprintf("Could not write response: %s", err))
}
}
var allHex = regexp.MustCompile("^[0-9a-f]+$")
// Certificate is used by clients to request a copy of their current certificate, or to
// request a reissuance of the certificate.
func (wfe *WebFrontEndImpl) Certificate(logEvent *requestEvent, response http.ResponseWriter, request *http.Request) {
path := request.URL.Path
// Certificate paths consist of the CertBase path, plus exactly sixteen hex
// digits.
if !strings.HasPrefix(path, CertPath) {
wfe.sendError(response, logEvent, "Certificate not found", path, http.StatusNotFound)
addNoCacheHeader(response)
return
}
serial := path[len(CertPath):]
if !core.ValidSerial(serial) {
wfe.sendError(response, logEvent, "Certificate not found", serial, http.StatusNotFound)
addNoCacheHeader(response)
return
}
logEvent.Extra["RequestedSerial"] = serial
cert, err := wfe.SA.GetCertificate(serial)
if err != nil {
if strings.HasPrefix(err.Error(), "gorp: multiple rows returned") {
wfe.sendError(response, logEvent, "Multiple certificates with same short serial", err, http.StatusConflict)
} else {
addNoCacheHeader(response)
wfe.sendError(response, logEvent, "Certificate not found", err, http.StatusNotFound)
}
return
}
addCacheHeader(response, wfe.CertCacheDuration.Seconds())
// TODO Content negotiation
response.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/pkix-cert")
response.Header().Add("Link", link(IssuerPath, "up"))
response.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
if _, err = response.Write(cert.DER); err != nil {
wfe.log.Warning(fmt.Sprintf("Could not write response: %s", err))
}
return
}
// Terms is used by the client to obtain the current Terms of Service /
// Subscriber Agreement to which the subscriber must agree.
func (wfe *WebFrontEndImpl) Terms(logEvent *requestEvent, response http.ResponseWriter, request *http.Request) {
http.Redirect(response, request, wfe.SubscriberAgreementURL, http.StatusFound)
}
// Issuer obtains the issuer certificate used by this instance of Boulder.
func (wfe *WebFrontEndImpl) Issuer(logEvent *requestEvent, response http.ResponseWriter, request *http.Request) {
addCacheHeader(response, wfe.IssuerCacheDuration.Seconds())
// TODO Content negotiation
response.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/pkix-cert")
response.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
if _, err := response.Write(wfe.IssuerCert); err != nil {
logEvent.AddError("unable to write issuer certificate response: %s", err)
wfe.log.Warning(fmt.Sprintf("Could not write response: %s", err))
}
}
// BuildID tells the requestor what build we're running.
func (wfe *WebFrontEndImpl) BuildID(logEvent *requestEvent, response http.ResponseWriter, request *http.Request) {
response.Header().Set("Content-Type", "text/plain")
response.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
detailsString := fmt.Sprintf("Boulder=(%s %s)", core.GetBuildID(), core.GetBuildTime())
if _, err := fmt.Fprintln(response, detailsString); err != nil {
logEvent.AddError("unable to print build information: %s", err)
wfe.log.Warning(fmt.Sprintf("Could not write response: %s", err))
}
}
// Options responds to an HTTP OPTIONS request.
func (wfe *WebFrontEndImpl) Options(response http.ResponseWriter, request *http.Request, methodsStr string, methodsMap map[string]bool) {
// Every OPTIONS request gets an Allow header with a list of supported methods.
response.Header().Set("Allow", methodsStr)
// CORS preflight requests get additional headers. See
// http://www.w3.org/TR/cors/#resource-preflight-requests
reqMethod := request.Header.Get("Access-Control-Request-Method")
if reqMethod == "" {
reqMethod = "GET"
}
if methodsMap[reqMethod] {
wfe.setCORSHeaders(response, request, methodsStr)
}
}
// setCORSHeaders() tells the client that CORS is acceptable for this
// request. If allowMethods == "" the request is assumed to be a CORS
// actual request and no Access-Control-Allow-Methods header will be
// sent.
func (wfe *WebFrontEndImpl) setCORSHeaders(response http.ResponseWriter, request *http.Request, allowMethods string) {
reqOrigin := request.Header.Get("Origin")
if reqOrigin == "" {
// This is not a CORS request.
return
}
// Allow CORS if the current origin (or "*") is listed as an
// allowed origin in config. Otherwise, disallow by returning
// without setting any CORS headers.
allow := false
for _, ao := range wfe.AllowOrigins {
if ao == "*" {
response.Header().Set("Access-Control-Allow-Origin", "*")
allow = true
break
} else if ao == reqOrigin {
response.Header().Set("Vary", "Origin")
response.Header().Set("Access-Control-Allow-Origin", ao)
allow = true
break
}
}
if !allow {
return
}
if allowMethods != "" {
// For an OPTIONS request: allow all methods handled at this URL.
response.Header().Set("Access-Control-Allow-Methods", allowMethods)
}
response.Header().Set("Access-Control-Expose-Headers", "Link, Replay-Nonce")
response.Header().Set("Access-Control-Max-Age", "86400")
}