boulder/wfe/web-front-end.go

1303 lines
49 KiB
Go

// Copyright 2014 ISRG. All rights reserved
// This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
// License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
// file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/.
package wfe
import (
"bytes"
"crypto/x509"
"encoding/json"
"fmt"
"io/ioutil"
"net"
"net/http"
"regexp"
"strconv"
"strings"
"time"
"github.com/letsencrypt/boulder/Godeps/_workspace/src/github.com/cactus/go-statsd-client/statsd"
"github.com/letsencrypt/boulder/Godeps/_workspace/src/github.com/jmhodges/clock"
jose "github.com/letsencrypt/boulder/Godeps/_workspace/src/github.com/letsencrypt/go-jose"
"github.com/letsencrypt/boulder/core"
blog "github.com/letsencrypt/boulder/log"
)
// Paths are the ACME-spec identified URL path-segments for various methods
const (
DirectoryPath = "/directory"
NewRegPath = "/acme/new-reg"
RegPath = "/acme/reg/"
NewAuthzPath = "/acme/new-authz"
AuthzPath = "/acme/authz/"
ChallengePath = "/acme/challenge/"
NewCertPath = "/acme/new-cert"
CertPath = "/acme/cert/"
RevokeCertPath = "/acme/revoke-cert"
TermsPath = "/terms"
IssuerPath = "/acme/issuer-cert"
BuildIDPath = "/build"
// StatusRateLimited is not in net/http
StatusRateLimited = 429
)
// WebFrontEndImpl provides all the logic for Boulder's web-facing interface,
// i.e., ACME. Its members configure the paths for various ACME functions,
// plus a few other data items used in ACME. Its methods are primarily handlers
// for HTTPS requests for the various ACME functions.
type WebFrontEndImpl struct {
RA core.RegistrationAuthority
SA core.StorageGetter
stats statsd.Statter
log *blog.AuditLogger
clk clock.Clock
// URL configuration parameters
BaseURL string
NewReg string
RegBase string
NewAuthz string
AuthzBase string
ChallengeBase string
NewCert string
CertBase string
// JSON encoded endpoint directory
DirectoryJSON []byte
// Issuer certificate (DER) for /acme/issuer-cert
IssuerCert []byte
// URL to the current subscriber agreement (should contain some version identifier)
SubscriberAgreementURL string
// Register of anti-replay nonces
nonceService core.NonceService
// Cache settings
CertCacheDuration time.Duration
CertNoCacheExpirationWindow time.Duration
IndexCacheDuration time.Duration
IssuerCacheDuration time.Duration
// CORS settings
AllowOrigins []string
// Graceful shutdown settings
ShutdownStopTimeout time.Duration
ShutdownKillTimeout time.Duration
}
func statusCodeFromError(err interface{}) int {
// Populate these as needed. We probably should trim the error list in util.go
switch err.(type) {
case core.MalformedRequestError:
return http.StatusBadRequest
case core.NotSupportedError:
return http.StatusNotImplemented
case core.SyntaxError:
return http.StatusBadRequest
case core.UnauthorizedError:
return http.StatusForbidden
case core.NotFoundError:
return http.StatusNotFound
case core.LengthRequiredError:
return http.StatusLengthRequired
case core.SignatureValidationError:
return http.StatusBadRequest
case core.InternalServerError:
return http.StatusInternalServerError
case core.RateLimitedError:
return StatusRateLimited
default:
return http.StatusInternalServerError
}
}
// NewWebFrontEndImpl constructs a web service for Boulder
func NewWebFrontEndImpl(stats statsd.Statter, clk clock.Clock) (WebFrontEndImpl, error) {
logger := blog.GetAuditLogger()
logger.Notice("Web Front End Starting")
nonceService, err := core.NewNonceService()
if err != nil {
return WebFrontEndImpl{}, err
}
return WebFrontEndImpl{
log: logger,
clk: clk,
nonceService: nonceService,
stats: stats,
}, nil
}
// BodylessResponseWriter wraps http.ResponseWriter, discarding
// anything written to the body.
type BodylessResponseWriter struct {
http.ResponseWriter
}
func (mrw BodylessResponseWriter) Write(buf []byte) (int, error) {
return len(buf), nil
}
// HandleFunc registers a handler at the given path. It's
// http.HandleFunc(), but with a wrapper around the handler that
// provides some generic per-request functionality:
//
// * Set a Replay-Nonce header.
//
// * Respond to OPTIONS requests, including CORS preflight requests.
//
// * Respond http.StatusMethodNotAllowed for HTTP methods other than
// those listed.
//
// * Set CORS headers when responding to CORS "actual" requests.
//
// * Never send a body in response to a HEAD request. Anything
// written by the handler will be discarded if the method is HEAD.
// Also, all handlers that accept GET automatically accept HEAD.
func (wfe *WebFrontEndImpl) HandleFunc(mux *http.ServeMux, pattern string, h wfeHandlerFunc, methods ...string) {
methodsMap := make(map[string]bool)
for _, m := range methods {
methodsMap[m] = true
}
if methodsMap["GET"] && !methodsMap["HEAD"] {
// Allow HEAD for any resource that allows GET
methods = append(methods, "HEAD")
methodsMap["HEAD"] = true
}
methodsStr := strings.Join(methods, ", ")
mux.Handle(pattern, &wfeTopHandler{
log: wfe.log,
clk: clock.Default(),
h: wfeHandlerFunc(func(e *requestEvent, response http.ResponseWriter, request *http.Request) {
// We do not propagate errors here, because (1) they should be
// transient, and (2) they fail closed.
nonce, err := wfe.nonceService.Nonce()
if err == nil {
response.Header().Set("Replay-Nonce", nonce)
}
switch request.Method {
case "HEAD":
// Whether or not we're sending a 405 error,
// we should comply with HTTP spec by not
// sending a body.
response = BodylessResponseWriter{response}
case "OPTIONS":
wfe.Options(response, request, methodsStr, methodsMap)
return
}
if !methodsMap[request.Method] {
msg := "Method not allowed"
e.AddError(msg)
response.Header().Set("Allow", methodsStr)
wfe.sendError(response, msg, request.Method, http.StatusMethodNotAllowed)
return
}
wfe.setCORSHeaders(response, request, "")
// Call the wrapped handler.
h(e, response, request)
}),
})
}
// Handler returns an http.Handler that uses various functions for
// various ACME-specified paths.
func (wfe *WebFrontEndImpl) Handler() (http.Handler, error) {
wfe.NewReg = wfe.BaseURL + NewRegPath
wfe.RegBase = wfe.BaseURL + RegPath
wfe.NewAuthz = wfe.BaseURL + NewAuthzPath
wfe.AuthzBase = wfe.BaseURL + AuthzPath
wfe.ChallengeBase = wfe.BaseURL + ChallengePath
wfe.NewCert = wfe.BaseURL + NewCertPath
wfe.CertBase = wfe.BaseURL + CertPath
// Only generate directory once
directory := map[string]string{
"new-reg": wfe.NewReg,
"new-authz": wfe.NewAuthz,
"new-cert": wfe.NewCert,
"revoke-cert": wfe.BaseURL + RevokeCertPath,
}
directoryJSON, err := json.Marshal(directory)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
wfe.DirectoryJSON = directoryJSON
m := http.NewServeMux()
wfe.HandleFunc(m, DirectoryPath, wfe.Directory, "GET")
wfe.HandleFunc(m, NewRegPath, wfe.NewRegistration, "POST")
wfe.HandleFunc(m, NewAuthzPath, wfe.NewAuthorization, "POST")
wfe.HandleFunc(m, NewCertPath, wfe.NewCertificate, "POST")
wfe.HandleFunc(m, RegPath, wfe.Registration, "POST")
wfe.HandleFunc(m, AuthzPath, wfe.Authorization, "GET")
wfe.HandleFunc(m, ChallengePath, wfe.Challenge, "GET", "POST")
wfe.HandleFunc(m, CertPath, wfe.Certificate, "GET")
wfe.HandleFunc(m, RevokeCertPath, wfe.RevokeCertificate, "POST")
wfe.HandleFunc(m, TermsPath, wfe.Terms, "GET")
wfe.HandleFunc(m, IssuerPath, wfe.Issuer, "GET")
wfe.HandleFunc(m, BuildIDPath, wfe.BuildID, "GET")
// We don't use our special HandleFunc for "/" because it matches everything,
// meaning we can wind up returning 405 when we mean to return 404. See
// https://github.com/letsencrypt/boulder/issues/717
m.Handle("/", &wfeTopHandler{
log: wfe.log,
clk: clock.Default(),
h: wfeHandlerFunc(wfe.Index),
})
return m, nil
}
// Method implementations
// Index serves a simple identification page. It is not part of the ACME spec.
func (wfe *WebFrontEndImpl) Index(logEvent *requestEvent, response http.ResponseWriter, request *http.Request) {
// http://golang.org/pkg/net/http/#example_ServeMux_Handle
// The "/" pattern matches everything, so we need to check
// that we're at the root here.
if request.URL.Path != "/" {
logEvent.AddError("Resource not found")
http.NotFound(response, request)
response.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/problem+json")
return
}
if request.Method != "GET" {
logEvent.AddError("Bad method")
response.Header().Set("Allow", "GET")
response.WriteHeader(http.StatusMethodNotAllowed)
return
}
response.Header().Set("Content-Type", "text/html")
response.Write([]byte(fmt.Sprintf(`<html>
<body>
This is an <a href="https://github.com/letsencrypt/acme-spec/">ACME</a>
Certificate Authority running <a href="https://github.com/letsencrypt/boulder">Boulder</a>.
JSON directory is available at <a href="%s">%s</a>.
</body>
</html>
`, DirectoryPath, DirectoryPath)))
addCacheHeader(response, wfe.IndexCacheDuration.Seconds())
}
func addNoCacheHeader(w http.ResponseWriter) {
w.Header().Add("Cache-Control", "public, max-age=0, no-cache")
}
func addCacheHeader(w http.ResponseWriter, age float64) {
w.Header().Add("Cache-Control", fmt.Sprintf("public, max-age=%.f", age))
}
// Directory is an HTTP request handler that simply provides the directory
// object stored in the WFE's DirectoryJSON member.
func (wfe *WebFrontEndImpl) Directory(e *requestEvent, response http.ResponseWriter, request *http.Request) {
response.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
response.Write(wfe.DirectoryJSON)
}
// The ID is always the last slash-separated token in the path
func parseIDFromPath(path string) string {
re := regexp.MustCompile("^.*/")
return re.ReplaceAllString(path, "")
}
const (
unknownKey = "No registration exists matching provided key"
malformedJWS = "Unable to read/verify body"
)
// verifyPOST reads and parses the request body, looks up the Registration
// corresponding to its JWK, verifies the JWS signature, checks that the
// resource field is present and correct in the JWS protected header, and
// returns the JWS payload bytes, the key used to verify, and the corresponding
// Registration (or error). If regCheck is false, verifyPOST will still try to
// look up a registration object, and will return it if found. However, if no
// registration object is found, verifyPOST will attempt to verify the JWS using
// the key in the JWS headers, and return the key plus a dummy registration if
// successful. If a caller passes regCheck = false, it should plan on validating
// the key itself. verifyPOST also appends its errors to requestEvent.Errors so
// code calling it does not need to if they imediately return a response to the
// user.
func (wfe *WebFrontEndImpl) verifyPOST(e *requestEvent, request *http.Request, regCheck bool, resource core.AcmeResource) ([]byte, *jose.JsonWebKey, core.Registration, error) {
var err error
// TODO: We should return a pointer to a registration, which can be nil,
// rather the a registration value with a sentinel value.
// https://github.com/letsencrypt/boulder/issues/877
reg := core.Registration{ID: 0}
if _, ok := request.Header["Content-Length"]; !ok {
err = core.LengthRequiredError("Content-Length header is required for POST.")
wfe.stats.Inc("WFE.HTTP.ClientErrors.LengthRequiredError", 1, 1.0)
e.AddError("missing Content-Length header on POST")
return nil, nil, reg, err
}
// Read body
if request.Body == nil {
err = core.MalformedRequestError("No body on POST")
wfe.stats.Inc("WFE.Errors.NoPOSTBody", 1, 1.0)
e.AddError("no body on POST")
return nil, nil, reg, err
}
bodyBytes, err := ioutil.ReadAll(request.Body)
if err != nil {
err = core.InternalServerError("unable to read request body")
wfe.stats.Inc("WFE.Errors.UnableToReadRequestBody", 1, 1.0)
e.AddError("unable to read request body")
return nil, nil, reg, err
}
body := string(bodyBytes)
// Parse as JWS
parsedJws, err := jose.ParseSigned(body)
if err != nil {
puberr := core.SignatureValidationError("Parse error reading JWS")
wfe.stats.Inc("WFE.Errors.UnableToParseJWS", 1, 1.0)
e.AddError("could not JSON parse body into JWS: %s", err)
return nil, nil, reg, puberr
}
// Verify JWS
// NOTE: It might seem insecure for the WFE to be trusted to verify
// client requests, i.e., that the verification should be done at the
// RA. However the WFE is the RA's only view of the outside world
// *anyway*, so it could always lie about what key was used by faking
// the signature itself.
if len(parsedJws.Signatures) > 1 {
err = core.SignatureValidationError("Too many signatures in POST body")
wfe.stats.Inc("WFE.Errors.TooManyJWSSignaturesInPOST", 1, 1.0)
e.AddError("too many signatures in POST body: %d", len(parsedJws.Signatures))
return nil, nil, reg, err
}
if len(parsedJws.Signatures) == 0 {
err = core.SignatureValidationError("POST JWS not signed")
wfe.stats.Inc("WFE.Errors.JWSNotSignedInPOST", 1, 1.0)
e.AddError("no signatures in POST body")
return nil, nil, reg, err
}
submittedKey := parsedJws.Signatures[0].Header.JsonWebKey
if submittedKey == nil {
err = core.SignatureValidationError("No JWK in JWS header")
wfe.stats.Inc("WFE.Errors.NoJWKInJWSSignatureHeader", 1, 1.0)
e.AddError("no JWK in JWS signature header in POST body")
return nil, nil, reg, err
}
var key *jose.JsonWebKey
reg, err = wfe.SA.GetRegistrationByKey(*submittedKey)
// Special case: If no registration was found, but regCheck is false, use an
// empty registration and the submitted key. The caller is expected to do some
// validation on the returned key.
if _, ok := err.(core.NoSuchRegistrationError); ok && !regCheck {
// When looking up keys from the registrations DB, we can be confident they
// are "good". But when we are verifying against any submitted key, we want
// to check its quality before doing the verify.
if err = core.GoodKey(submittedKey.Key); err != nil {
wfe.stats.Inc("WFE.Errors.JWKRejectedByGoodKey", 1, 1.0)
e.AddError("JWK in request was rejected by GoodKey: %s", err)
return nil, nil, reg, err
}
key = submittedKey
} else if err != nil {
// For all other errors, or if regCheck is true, return error immediately.
wfe.stats.Inc("WFE.Errors.UnableToGetRegistrationByKey", 1, 1.0)
e.AddError("unable to fetch registration by the given JWK: %s", err)
return nil, nil, reg, err
} else {
// If the lookup was successful, use that key.
key = &reg.Key
e.Requester = reg.ID
e.Contacts = reg.Contact
}
payload, header, err := parsedJws.Verify(key)
if err != nil {
puberr := core.SignatureValidationError("JWS verification error")
wfe.stats.Inc("WFE.Errors.JWSVerificationFailed", 1, 1.0)
n := len(body)
if n > 100 {
n = 100
}
e.AddError("verification of JWS with the JWK failed: %v; body: %s", err, body[:n])
return nil, nil, reg, puberr
}
// Check that the request has a known anti-replay nonce
// i.e., Nonce is in protected header and
if err != nil || len(header.Nonce) == 0 {
wfe.stats.Inc("WFE.Errors.JWSMissingNonce", 1, 1.0)
e.AddError("JWS is missing an anti-replay nonce")
err = core.SignatureValidationError("JWS has no anti-replay nonce")
return nil, nil, reg, err
} else if !wfe.nonceService.Valid(header.Nonce) {
wfe.stats.Inc("WFE.Errors.JWSInvalidNonce", 1, 1.0)
e.AddError("JWS has an invalid anti-replay nonce")
err = core.SignatureValidationError(fmt.Sprintf("JWS has invalid anti-replay nonce"))
return nil, nil, reg, err
}
// Check that the "resource" field is present and has the correct value
var parsedRequest struct {
Resource string `json:"resource"`
}
err = json.Unmarshal([]byte(payload), &parsedRequest)
if err != nil {
wfe.stats.Inc("WFE.Errors.UnparsableJWSPayload", 1, 1.0)
e.AddError("unable to JSON parse resource from JWS payload: %s", err)
puberr := core.SignatureValidationError("Request payload did not parse as JSON")
return nil, nil, reg, puberr
}
if parsedRequest.Resource == "" {
wfe.stats.Inc("WFE.Errors.NoResourceInJWSPayload", 1, 1.0)
e.AddError("JWS request payload does not specifiy a resource")
err = core.MalformedRequestError("Request payload does not specify a resource")
return nil, nil, reg, err
} else if resource != core.AcmeResource(parsedRequest.Resource) {
wfe.stats.Inc("WFE.Errors.MismatchedResourceInJWSPayload", 1, 1.0)
e.AddError("JWS request payload does not match resource")
err = core.MalformedRequestError(fmt.Sprintf("JWS resource payload does not match the HTTP resource: %s != %s", parsedRequest.Resource, resource))
return nil, nil, reg, err
}
return []byte(payload), key, reg, nil
}
// Notify the client of an error condition and log it for audit purposes.
func (wfe *WebFrontEndImpl) sendError(response http.ResponseWriter, msg string, detail interface{}, code int) {
problem := core.ProblemDetails{Detail: msg}
switch code {
case http.StatusPreconditionFailed:
fallthrough
case http.StatusForbidden:
problem.Type = core.UnauthorizedProblem
case http.StatusConflict:
fallthrough
case http.StatusMethodNotAllowed:
fallthrough
case http.StatusNotFound:
fallthrough
case http.StatusBadRequest:
fallthrough
case http.StatusLengthRequired:
problem.Type = core.MalformedProblem
case StatusRateLimited:
problem.Type = core.RateLimitedProblem
default: // Either http.StatusInternalServerError or an unexpected code
problem.Type = core.ServerInternalProblem
}
// Only audit log internal errors so users cannot purposefully cause
// auditable events.
if problem.Type == core.ServerInternalProblem {
// AUDIT[ Error Conditions ] 9cc4d537-8534-4970-8665-4b382abe82f3
wfe.log.Audit(fmt.Sprintf("Internal error - %s - %s", msg, detail))
} else if statusCodeFromError(detail) != http.StatusInternalServerError {
// If not an internal error and problem is a custom error type
problem.Detail += fmt.Sprintf(" :: %s", detail)
}
problemDoc, err := json.Marshal(problem)
if err != nil {
// AUDIT[ Error Conditions ] 9cc4d537-8534-4970-8665-4b382abe82f3
wfe.log.Audit(fmt.Sprintf("Could not marshal error message: %s - %+v", err, problem))
problemDoc = []byte("{\"detail\": \"Problem marshalling error message.\"}")
}
// Paraphrased from
// https://golang.org/src/net/http/server.go#L1272
response.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/problem+json")
response.WriteHeader(code)
response.Write(problemDoc)
wfe.stats.Inc(fmt.Sprintf("WFE.HTTP.ErrorCodes.%d", code), 1, 1.0)
problemSegments := strings.Split(string(problem.Type), ":")
if len(problemSegments) > 0 {
wfe.stats.Inc(fmt.Sprintf("WFE.HTTP.ProblemTypes.%s", problemSegments[len(problemSegments)-1]), 1, 1.0)
}
}
func link(url, relation string) string {
return fmt.Sprintf("<%s>;rel=\"%s\"", url, relation)
}
// NewRegistration is used by clients to submit a new registration/account
func (wfe *WebFrontEndImpl) NewRegistration(logEvent *requestEvent, response http.ResponseWriter, request *http.Request) {
body, key, _, err := wfe.verifyPOST(logEvent, request, false, core.ResourceNewReg)
if err != nil {
// verifyPOST handles its own setting of logEvent.Errors
wfe.sendError(response, malformedJWS, err, statusCodeFromError(err))
return
}
if existingReg, err := wfe.SA.GetRegistrationByKey(*key); err == nil {
logEvent.AddError("Registration key is already in use")
response.Header().Set("Location", fmt.Sprintf("%s%d", wfe.RegBase, existingReg.ID))
wfe.sendError(response, "Registration key is already in use", nil, http.StatusConflict)
return
}
var init core.Registration
err = json.Unmarshal(body, &init)
if err != nil {
logEvent.AddError("unable to unmarshal Registration: %s", err)
wfe.sendError(response, "Error unmarshaling JSON", err, http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
if len(init.Agreement) > 0 && init.Agreement != wfe.SubscriberAgreementURL {
msg := fmt.Sprintf("Provided agreement URL [%s] does not match current agreement URL [%s]", init.Agreement, wfe.SubscriberAgreementURL)
logEvent.AddError(msg)
wfe.sendError(response, msg, nil, http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
init.Key = *key
init.InitialIP = net.ParseIP(request.Header.Get("X-Real-IP"))
if init.InitialIP == nil {
host, _, err := net.SplitHostPort(request.RemoteAddr)
if err == nil {
init.InitialIP = net.ParseIP(host)
} else {
logEvent.AddError("Couldn't parse RemoteAddr: %s", request.RemoteAddr)
wfe.sendError(response, "couldn't parse the remote (that is, the client's) address", nil, http.StatusInternalServerError)
return
}
}
reg, err := wfe.RA.NewRegistration(init)
if err != nil {
logEvent.AddError("unable to create new registration: %s", err)
wfe.sendError(response, "Error creating new registration", err, statusCodeFromError(err))
return
}
logEvent.Requester = reg.ID
logEvent.Contacts = reg.Contact
// Use an explicitly typed variable. Otherwise `go vet' incorrectly complains
// that reg.ID is a string being passed to %d.
regURL := fmt.Sprintf("%s%d", wfe.RegBase, reg.ID)
responseBody, err := json.Marshal(reg)
if err != nil {
logEvent.AddError("unable to marsh registration: %s", err)
// StatusInternalServerError because we just created this registration, it should be OK.
wfe.sendError(response, "Error marshaling registration", err, http.StatusInternalServerError)
return
}
response.Header().Add("Location", regURL)
response.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
response.Header().Add("Link", link(wfe.NewAuthz, "next"))
if len(wfe.SubscriberAgreementURL) > 0 {
response.Header().Add("Link", link(wfe.SubscriberAgreementURL, "terms-of-service"))
}
response.WriteHeader(http.StatusCreated)
response.Write(responseBody)
}
// NewAuthorization is used by clients to submit a new ID Authorization
func (wfe *WebFrontEndImpl) NewAuthorization(logEvent *requestEvent, response http.ResponseWriter, request *http.Request) {
body, _, currReg, err := wfe.verifyPOST(logEvent, request, true, core.ResourceNewAuthz)
if err != nil {
// verifyPOST handles its own setting of logEvent.Errors
respMsg := malformedJWS
respCode := statusCodeFromError(err)
if _, ok := err.(core.NoSuchRegistrationError); ok {
respMsg = unknownKey
respCode = http.StatusForbidden
}
wfe.sendError(response, respMsg, err, respCode)
return
}
// Any version of the agreement is acceptable here. Version match is enforced in
// wfe.Registration when agreeing the first time. Agreement updates happen
// by mailing subscribers and don't require a registration update.
if currReg.Agreement == "" {
logEvent.AddError("Must agree to subscriber agreement before any further actions")
wfe.sendError(response, "Must agree to subscriber agreement before any further actions", nil, http.StatusForbidden)
return
}
var init core.Authorization
if err = json.Unmarshal(body, &init); err != nil {
logEvent.AddError("unable to JSON unmarshal Authorization: %s", err)
wfe.sendError(response, "Error unmarshaling JSON", err, http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
logEvent.Extra["Identifier"] = init.Identifier
// Create new authz and return
authz, err := wfe.RA.NewAuthorization(init, currReg.ID)
if err != nil {
logEvent.AddError("unable to create new authz: %s", err)
wfe.sendError(response, "Error creating new authz", err, statusCodeFromError(err))
return
}
logEvent.Extra["AuthzID"] = authz.ID
// Make a URL for this authz, then blow away the ID and RegID before serializing
authzURL := wfe.AuthzBase + string(authz.ID)
wfe.prepAuthorizationForDisplay(&authz)
responseBody, err := json.Marshal(authz)
if err != nil {
logEvent.AddError("unable to marshal authz: %s", err)
// StatusInternalServerError because we generated the authz, it should be OK
wfe.sendError(response, "Error marshaling authz", err, http.StatusInternalServerError)
return
}
response.Header().Add("Location", authzURL)
response.Header().Add("Link", link(wfe.NewCert, "next"))
response.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
response.WriteHeader(http.StatusCreated)
if _, err = response.Write(responseBody); err != nil {
logEvent.AddError(err.Error())
wfe.log.Warning(fmt.Sprintf("Could not write response: %s", err))
}
}
// RevokeCertificate is used by clients to request the revocation of a cert.
func (wfe *WebFrontEndImpl) RevokeCertificate(logEvent *requestEvent, response http.ResponseWriter, request *http.Request) {
// We don't ask verifyPOST to verify there is a correponding registration,
// because anyone with the right private key can revoke a certificate.
body, requestKey, registration, err := wfe.verifyPOST(logEvent, request, false, core.ResourceRevokeCert)
if err != nil {
// verifyPOST handles its own setting of logEvent.Errors
wfe.sendError(response, malformedJWS, err, statusCodeFromError(err))
return
}
type RevokeRequest struct {
CertificateDER core.JSONBuffer `json:"certificate"`
}
var revokeRequest RevokeRequest
if err = json.Unmarshal(body, &revokeRequest); err != nil {
logEvent.AddError("unable to JSON unmarshal RevokeRequest: %s", err)
wfe.log.Debug(fmt.Sprintf("Couldn't unmarshal in revoke request %s", string(body)))
wfe.sendError(response, "Unable to read/verify body", err, http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
providedCert, err := x509.ParseCertificate(revokeRequest.CertificateDER)
if err != nil {
logEvent.AddError("unable to parse revoke certificate DER: %s", err)
wfe.log.Debug("Couldn't parse cert in revoke request.")
wfe.sendError(response, "Unable to read/verify body", err, http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
serial := core.SerialToString(providedCert.SerialNumber)
logEvent.Extra["ProvidedCertificateSerial"] = serial
cert, err := wfe.SA.GetCertificate(serial)
if err != nil || !bytes.Equal(cert.DER, revokeRequest.CertificateDER) {
wfe.sendError(response, "No such certificate", err, http.StatusNotFound)
return
}
parsedCertificate, err := x509.ParseCertificate(cert.DER)
if err != nil {
logEvent.AddError("unable to parse certificate DER: %s", err)
// InternalServerError because this is a failure to decode from our DB.
wfe.sendError(response, "Invalid certificate", err, http.StatusInternalServerError)
return
}
logEvent.Extra["RetrievedCertificateSerial"] = core.SerialToString(parsedCertificate.SerialNumber)
logEvent.Extra["RetrievedCertificateDNSNames"] = parsedCertificate.DNSNames
logEvent.Extra["RetrievedCertificateEmailAddresses"] = parsedCertificate.EmailAddresses
logEvent.Extra["RetrievedCertificateIPAddresses"] = parsedCertificate.IPAddresses
certStatus, err := wfe.SA.GetCertificateStatus(serial)
if err != nil {
logEvent.AddError("unable to get certificate status: %s", err)
wfe.sendError(response, "Certificate status not yet available", err, http.StatusNotFound)
return
}
logEvent.Extra["CertificateStatus"] = certStatus.Status
if certStatus.Status == core.OCSPStatusRevoked {
logEvent.AddError("Certificate already revoked: %#v", serial)
wfe.sendError(response, "Certificate already revoked", "", http.StatusConflict)
return
}
// TODO: Implement method of revocation by authorizations on account.
if !(core.KeyDigestEquals(requestKey, parsedCertificate.PublicKey) ||
registration.ID == cert.RegistrationID) {
logEvent.AddError("Revocation request must be signed by private key of cert to be revoked, or by the account key of the account that issued it.")
wfe.sendError(response,
"Revocation request must be signed by private key of cert to be revoked, or by the account key of the account that issued it.",
requestKey,
http.StatusForbidden)
return
}
// Use revocation code 0, meaning "unspecified"
err = wfe.RA.RevokeCertificateWithReg(*parsedCertificate, 0, registration.ID)
if err != nil {
logEvent.AddError("failed to revoke certificate: %s", err)
wfe.sendError(response, "Failed to revoke certificate", err, statusCodeFromError(err))
} else {
wfe.log.Debug(fmt.Sprintf("Revoked %v", serial))
response.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
}
}
func (wfe *WebFrontEndImpl) logCsr(request *http.Request, cr core.CertificateRequest, registration core.Registration) {
var csrLog = struct {
ClientAddr string
CsrBase64 []byte
Registration core.Registration
}{
ClientAddr: getClientAddr(request),
CsrBase64: cr.Bytes,
Registration: registration,
}
wfe.log.AuditObject("Certificate request", csrLog)
}
// NewCertificate is used by clients to request the issuance of a cert for an
// authorized identifier.
func (wfe *WebFrontEndImpl) NewCertificate(logEvent *requestEvent, response http.ResponseWriter, request *http.Request) {
body, _, reg, err := wfe.verifyPOST(logEvent, request, true, core.ResourceNewCert)
if err != nil {
// verifyPOST handles its own setting of logEvent.Errors
respMsg := malformedJWS
respCode := statusCodeFromError(err)
if _, ok := err.(core.NoSuchRegistrationError); ok {
respMsg = unknownKey
respCode = http.StatusForbidden
}
wfe.sendError(response, respMsg, err, respCode)
return
}
// Any version of the agreement is acceptable here. Version match is enforced in
// wfe.Registration when agreeing the first time. Agreement updates happen
// by mailing subscribers and don't require a registration update.
if reg.Agreement == "" {
logEvent.AddError("Must agree to subscriber agreement before any further actions")
wfe.sendError(response, "Must agree to subscriber agreement before any further actions", nil, http.StatusForbidden)
return
}
var certificateRequest core.CertificateRequest
if err = json.Unmarshal(body, &certificateRequest); err != nil {
logEvent.AddError("unable to JSON unmarshal CertificateRequest: %s", err)
wfe.sendError(response, "Error unmarshaling certificate request", err, http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
wfe.logCsr(request, certificateRequest, reg)
// Check that the key in the CSR is good. This will also be checked in the CA
// component, but we want to discard CSRs with bad keys as early as possible
// because (a) it's an easy check and we can save unnecessary requests and
// bytes on the wire, and (b) the CA logs all rejections as audit events, but
// a bad key from the client is just a malformed request and doesn't need to
// be audited.
if err = core.GoodKey(certificateRequest.CSR.PublicKey); err != nil {
logEvent.AddError("CSR public key failed GoodKey: %s", err)
wfe.sendError(response, "Invalid key in certificate request", err, http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
logEvent.Extra["CSRDNSNames"] = certificateRequest.CSR.DNSNames
logEvent.Extra["CSREmailAddresses"] = certificateRequest.CSR.EmailAddresses
logEvent.Extra["CSRIPAddresses"] = certificateRequest.CSR.IPAddresses
// Create new certificate and return
// TODO IMPORTANT: The RA trusts the WFE to provide the correct key. If the
// WFE is compromised, *and* the attacker knows the public key of an account
// authorized for target site, they could cause issuance for that site by
// lying to the RA. We should probably pass a copy of the whole rquest to the
// RA for secondary validation.
cert, err := wfe.RA.NewCertificate(certificateRequest, reg.ID)
if err != nil {
logEvent.AddError("unable to create new cert: %s", err)
wfe.sendError(response, "Error creating new cert", err, statusCodeFromError(err))
return
}
// Make a URL for this certificate.
// We use only the sequential part of the serial number, because it should
// uniquely identify the certificate, and this makes it easy for anybody to
// enumerate and mirror our certificates.
parsedCertificate, err := x509.ParseCertificate([]byte(cert.DER))
if err != nil {
logEvent.AddError("unable to parse certificate: %s", err)
wfe.sendError(response,
"Error creating new cert", err,
http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
serial := parsedCertificate.SerialNumber
certURL := wfe.CertBase + core.SerialToString(serial)
// TODO Content negotiation
response.Header().Add("Location", certURL)
response.Header().Add("Link", link(wfe.BaseURL+IssuerPath, "up"))
response.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/pkix-cert")
response.WriteHeader(http.StatusCreated)
if _, err = response.Write(cert.DER); err != nil {
logEvent.AddError(err.Error())
wfe.log.Warning(fmt.Sprintf("Could not write response: %s", err))
}
}
// Challenge handles POST requests to challenge URLs. Such requests are clients'
// responses to the server's challenges.
func (wfe *WebFrontEndImpl) Challenge(
logEvent *requestEvent,
response http.ResponseWriter,
request *http.Request) {
notFound := func() {
wfe.sendError(response, "No such registration", request.URL.Path, http.StatusNotFound)
}
// Challenge URIs are of the form /acme/challenge/<auth id>/<challenge id>.
// Here we parse out the id components. TODO: Use a better tool to parse out
// URL structure: https://github.com/letsencrypt/boulder/issues/437
slug := strings.Split(request.URL.Path[len(ChallengePath):], "/")
if len(slug) != 2 {
notFound()
return
}
authorizationID := slug[0]
challengeID, err := strconv.ParseInt(slug[1], 10, 64)
if err != nil {
notFound()
return
}
logEvent.Extra["AuthorizationID"] = authorizationID
logEvent.Extra["ChallengeID"] = challengeID
authz, err := wfe.SA.GetAuthorization(authorizationID)
if err != nil {
notFound()
return
}
// After expiring, challenges are inaccessible
if authz.Expires == nil || authz.Expires.Before(wfe.clk.Now()) {
msg := fmt.Sprintf("Authorization %v expired in the past (%v)", authz.ID, *authz.Expires)
logEvent.AddError(msg)
wfe.sendError(response, "Expired authorization", msg, http.StatusNotFound)
return
}
// Check that the requested challenge exists within the authorization
challengeIndex := authz.FindChallenge(challengeID)
if challengeIndex == -1 {
notFound()
return
}
challenge := authz.Challenges[challengeIndex]
logEvent.Extra["ChallengeType"] = challenge.Type
logEvent.Extra["AuthorizationRegistrationID"] = authz.RegistrationID
logEvent.Extra["AuthorizationIdentifier"] = authz.Identifier
logEvent.Extra["AuthorizationStatus"] = authz.Status
logEvent.Extra["AuthorizationExpires"] = authz.Expires
switch request.Method {
case "GET", "HEAD":
wfe.getChallenge(response, request, authz, &challenge, logEvent)
case "POST":
wfe.postChallenge(response, request, authz, challengeIndex, logEvent)
}
}
// prepChallengeForDisplay takes a core.Challenge and prepares it for display to
// the client by filling in its URI field and clearing its AccountKey and ID
// fields.
// TODO: Come up with a cleaner way to do this.
// https://github.com/letsencrypt/boulder/issues/761
func (wfe *WebFrontEndImpl) prepChallengeForDisplay(authz core.Authorization, challenge *core.Challenge) {
challenge.URI = fmt.Sprintf("%s%s/%d", wfe.ChallengeBase, authz.ID, challenge.ID)
challenge.AccountKey = nil
// 0 is considered "empty" for the purpose of the JSON omitempty tag.
challenge.ID = 0
}
// prepAuthorizationForDisplay takes a core.Authorization and prepares it for
// display to the client by clearing its ID and RegistrationID fields, and
// preparing all its challenges.
func (wfe *WebFrontEndImpl) prepAuthorizationForDisplay(authz *core.Authorization) {
for i := range authz.Challenges {
wfe.prepChallengeForDisplay(*authz, &authz.Challenges[i])
}
authz.ID = ""
authz.RegistrationID = 0
}
func (wfe *WebFrontEndImpl) getChallenge(
response http.ResponseWriter,
request *http.Request,
authz core.Authorization,
challenge *core.Challenge,
logEvent *requestEvent) {
wfe.prepChallengeForDisplay(authz, challenge)
jsonReply, err := json.Marshal(challenge)
if err != nil {
logEvent.AddError("unable to marshal challenge: %s", err)
// InternalServerError because this is a failure to decode data passed in
// by the caller, which got it from the DB.
wfe.sendError(response, "Failed to marshal challenge", err, http.StatusInternalServerError)
return
}
authzURL := wfe.AuthzBase + string(authz.ID)
response.Header().Add("Location", challenge.URI)
response.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
response.Header().Add("Link", link(authzURL, "up"))
response.WriteHeader(http.StatusAccepted)
if _, err := response.Write(jsonReply); err != nil {
wfe.log.Warning(fmt.Sprintf("Could not write response: %s", err))
logEvent.AddError(err.Error())
return
}
}
func (wfe *WebFrontEndImpl) postChallenge(
response http.ResponseWriter,
request *http.Request,
authz core.Authorization,
challengeIndex int,
logEvent *requestEvent) {
body, _, currReg, err := wfe.verifyPOST(logEvent, request, true, core.ResourceChallenge)
if err != nil {
// verifyPOST handles its own setting of logEvent.Errors
respMsg := malformedJWS
respCode := http.StatusBadRequest
if _, ok := err.(core.NoSuchRegistrationError); ok {
respMsg = unknownKey
respCode = http.StatusForbidden
}
wfe.sendError(response, respMsg, err, respCode)
return
}
// Any version of the agreement is acceptable here. Version match is enforced in
// wfe.Registration when agreeing the first time. Agreement updates happen
// by mailing subscribers and don't require a registration update.
if currReg.Agreement == "" {
logEvent.AddError("Registration didn't agree to subscriber agreement before any further actions")
wfe.sendError(response, "Registration didn't agree to subscriber agreement before any further actions", nil, http.StatusForbidden)
return
}
// Check that the registration ID matching the key used matches
// the registration ID on the authz object
if currReg.ID != authz.RegistrationID {
logEvent.AddError("User registration id: %d != Authorization registration id: %v", currReg.ID, authz.RegistrationID)
wfe.sendError(response, "User registration ID doesn't match registration ID in authorization",
"",
http.StatusForbidden)
return
}
var challengeUpdate core.Challenge
if err = json.Unmarshal(body, &challengeUpdate); err != nil {
logEvent.AddError("error JSON unmarshalling challenge response: %s", err)
wfe.sendError(response, "Error unmarshaling challenge response", err, http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
// Ask the RA to update this authorization
updatedAuthorization, err := wfe.RA.UpdateAuthorization(authz, challengeIndex, challengeUpdate)
if err != nil {
logEvent.AddError("unable to update challenge: %s", err)
wfe.sendError(response, "Unable to update challenge", err, statusCodeFromError(err))
return
}
// assumption: UpdateAuthorization does not modify order of challenges
challenge := updatedAuthorization.Challenges[challengeIndex]
wfe.prepChallengeForDisplay(authz, &challenge)
jsonReply, err := json.Marshal(challenge)
if err != nil {
logEvent.AddError("failed to marshal challenge: %s", err)
// StatusInternalServerError because we made the challenges, they should be OK
wfe.sendError(response, "Failed to marshal challenge", err, http.StatusInternalServerError)
return
}
authzURL := wfe.AuthzBase + string(authz.ID)
response.Header().Add("Location", challenge.URI)
response.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
response.Header().Add("Link", link(authzURL, "up"))
response.WriteHeader(http.StatusAccepted)
if _, err = response.Write(jsonReply); err != nil {
logEvent.AddError(err.Error())
wfe.log.Warning(fmt.Sprintf("Could not write response: %s", err))
return
}
}
// Registration is used by a client to submit an update to their registration.
func (wfe *WebFrontEndImpl) Registration(logEvent *requestEvent, response http.ResponseWriter, request *http.Request) {
body, _, currReg, err := wfe.verifyPOST(logEvent, request, true, core.ResourceRegistration)
if err != nil {
// verifyPOST handles its own setting of logEvent.Errors
respMsg := malformedJWS
respCode := statusCodeFromError(err)
if _, ok := err.(core.NoSuchRegistrationError); ok {
respMsg = unknownKey
respCode = http.StatusForbidden
}
wfe.sendError(response, respMsg, err, respCode)
return
}
// Requests to this handler should have a path that leads to a known
// registration
idStr := parseIDFromPath(request.URL.Path)
id, err := strconv.ParseInt(idStr, 10, 64)
if err != nil {
logEvent.AddError("registration ID must be an integer, was %#v", idStr)
wfe.sendError(response, "Registration ID must be an integer", err, http.StatusBadRequest)
return
} else if id <= 0 {
logEvent.AddError("Registration ID must be a positive non-zero integer, was %d", id)
wfe.sendError(response, "Registration ID must be a positive non-zero integer", id, http.StatusBadRequest)
return
} else if id != currReg.ID {
logEvent.AddError("Request signing key did not match registration key: %d != %d", id, currReg.ID)
wfe.sendError(response, "Request signing key did not match registration key", "", http.StatusForbidden)
return
}
var update core.Registration
err = json.Unmarshal(body, &update)
if err != nil {
logEvent.AddError("unable to JSON parse registration: %s", err)
wfe.sendError(response, "Error unmarshaling registration", err, http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
if len(update.Agreement) > 0 && update.Agreement != wfe.SubscriberAgreementURL {
msg := fmt.Sprintf("Provided agreement URL [%s] does not match current agreement URL [%s]", update.Agreement, wfe.SubscriberAgreementURL)
logEvent.AddError(msg)
wfe.sendError(response, msg, nil, http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
// Registration objects contain a JWK object, which must be non-nil. We know
// the key of the updated registration object is going to be the same as the
// key of the current one, so we set it here. This ensures we can cleanly
// serialize the update as JSON to send via AMQP to the RA.
update.Key = currReg.Key
// Ask the RA to update this authorization.
updatedReg, err := wfe.RA.UpdateRegistration(currReg, update)
if err != nil {
logEvent.AddError("unable to update registration: %s", err)
wfe.sendError(response, "Unable to update registration", err, statusCodeFromError(err))
return
}
jsonReply, err := json.Marshal(updatedReg)
if err != nil {
logEvent.AddError("unable to marshal updated registration: %s", err)
// StatusInternalServerError because we just generated the reg, it should be OK
wfe.sendError(response, "Failed to marshal registration", err, http.StatusInternalServerError)
return
}
response.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
response.Header().Add("Link", link(wfe.NewAuthz, "next"))
if len(wfe.SubscriberAgreementURL) > 0 {
response.Header().Add("Link", link(wfe.SubscriberAgreementURL, "terms-of-service"))
}
response.WriteHeader(http.StatusAccepted)
response.Write(jsonReply)
}
// Authorization is used by clients to submit an update to one of their
// authorizations.
func (wfe *WebFrontEndImpl) Authorization(logEvent *requestEvent, response http.ResponseWriter, request *http.Request) {
// Requests to this handler should have a path that leads to a known authz
id := parseIDFromPath(request.URL.Path)
authz, err := wfe.SA.GetAuthorization(id)
if err != nil {
logEvent.AddError("No such authorization at id %s", id)
wfe.sendError(response,
"Unable to find authorization", err,
http.StatusNotFound)
return
}
logEvent.Extra["AuthorizationID"] = authz.ID
logEvent.Extra["AuthorizationRegistrationID"] = authz.RegistrationID
logEvent.Extra["AuthorizationIdentifier"] = authz.Identifier
logEvent.Extra["AuthorizationStatus"] = authz.Status
logEvent.Extra["AuthorizationExpires"] = authz.Expires
// After expiring, authorizations are inaccessible
if authz.Expires == nil || authz.Expires.Before(wfe.clk.Now()) {
msg := fmt.Sprintf("Authorization %v expired in the past (%v)", authz.ID, *authz.Expires)
logEvent.AddError(msg)
wfe.sendError(response, "Expired authorization", msg, http.StatusNotFound)
return
}
wfe.prepAuthorizationForDisplay(&authz)
jsonReply, err := json.Marshal(authz)
if err != nil {
logEvent.AddError("Failed to JSON marshal authz: %s", err)
// InternalServerError because this is a failure to decode from our DB.
wfe.sendError(response, "Failed to JSON marshal authz", err, http.StatusInternalServerError)
return
}
response.Header().Add("Link", link(wfe.NewCert, "next"))
response.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
response.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
if _, err = response.Write(jsonReply); err != nil {
logEvent.AddError("unable to write authorization update response: %s", err)
wfe.log.Warning(fmt.Sprintf("Could not write response: %s", err))
}
}
var allHex = regexp.MustCompile("^[0-9a-f]+$")
// Certificate is used by clients to request a copy of their current certificate, or to
// request a reissuance of the certificate.
func (wfe *WebFrontEndImpl) Certificate(logEvent *requestEvent, response http.ResponseWriter, request *http.Request) {
path := request.URL.Path
// Certificate paths consist of the CertBase path, plus exactly sixteen hex
// digits.
if !strings.HasPrefix(path, CertPath) {
logEvent.AddError("this request path should not have gotten to Certificate: %#v is not a prefix of %#v", path, CertPath)
wfe.sendError(response, "Certificate not found", path, http.StatusNotFound)
addNoCacheHeader(response)
return
}
serial := path[len(CertPath):]
if !core.ValidSerial(serial) {
logEvent.AddError("certificate serial provided was not valid: %s", serial)
wfe.sendError(response, "Certificate not found", serial, http.StatusNotFound)
addNoCacheHeader(response)
return
}
logEvent.Extra["RequestedSerial"] = serial
cert, err := wfe.SA.GetCertificate(serial)
if err != nil {
logEvent.AddError("unable to get certificate by serial id %#v: %s", serial, err)
if strings.HasPrefix(err.Error(), "gorp: multiple rows returned") {
wfe.sendError(response, "Multiple certificates with same short serial", err, http.StatusConflict)
} else {
addNoCacheHeader(response)
wfe.sendError(response, "Certificate not found", err, http.StatusNotFound)
}
return
}
addCacheHeader(response, wfe.CertCacheDuration.Seconds())
// TODO Content negotiation
response.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/pkix-cert")
response.Header().Add("Link", link(IssuerPath, "up"))
response.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
if _, err = response.Write(cert.DER); err != nil {
logEvent.AddError("unable to write new certificate response: %s", err)
wfe.log.Warning(fmt.Sprintf("Could not write response: %s", err))
}
return
}
// Terms is used by the client to obtain the current Terms of Service /
// Subscriber Agreement to which the subscriber must agree.
func (wfe *WebFrontEndImpl) Terms(logEvent *requestEvent, response http.ResponseWriter, request *http.Request) {
http.Redirect(response, request, wfe.SubscriberAgreementURL, http.StatusFound)
}
// Issuer obtains the issuer certificate used by this instance of Boulder.
func (wfe *WebFrontEndImpl) Issuer(logEvent *requestEvent, response http.ResponseWriter, request *http.Request) {
addCacheHeader(response, wfe.IssuerCacheDuration.Seconds())
// TODO Content negotiation
response.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/pkix-cert")
response.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
if _, err := response.Write(wfe.IssuerCert); err != nil {
logEvent.AddError("unable to write issuer certificate response: %s", err)
wfe.log.Warning(fmt.Sprintf("Could not write response: %s", err))
}
}
// BuildID tells the requestor what build we're running.
func (wfe *WebFrontEndImpl) BuildID(logEvent *requestEvent, response http.ResponseWriter, request *http.Request) {
response.Header().Set("Content-Type", "text/plain")
response.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
detailsString := fmt.Sprintf("Boulder=(%s %s)", core.GetBuildID(), core.GetBuildTime())
if _, err := fmt.Fprintln(response, detailsString); err != nil {
logEvent.AddError("unable to print build information: %s", err)
wfe.log.Warning(fmt.Sprintf("Could not write response: %s", err))
}
}
// Options responds to an HTTP OPTIONS request.
func (wfe *WebFrontEndImpl) Options(response http.ResponseWriter, request *http.Request, methodsStr string, methodsMap map[string]bool) {
// Every OPTIONS request gets an Allow header with a list of supported methods.
response.Header().Set("Allow", methodsStr)
// CORS preflight requests get additional headers. See
// http://www.w3.org/TR/cors/#resource-preflight-requests
reqMethod := request.Header.Get("Access-Control-Request-Method")
if reqMethod == "" {
reqMethod = "GET"
}
if methodsMap[reqMethod] {
wfe.setCORSHeaders(response, request, methodsStr)
}
}
// setCORSHeaders() tells the client that CORS is acceptable for this
// request. If allowMethods == "" the request is assumed to be a CORS
// actual request and no Access-Control-Allow-Methods header will be
// sent.
func (wfe *WebFrontEndImpl) setCORSHeaders(response http.ResponseWriter, request *http.Request, allowMethods string) {
reqOrigin := request.Header.Get("Origin")
if reqOrigin == "" {
// This is not a CORS request.
return
}
// Allow CORS if the current origin (or "*") is listed as an
// allowed origin in config. Otherwise, disallow by returning
// without setting any CORS headers.
allow := false
for _, ao := range wfe.AllowOrigins {
if ao == "*" {
response.Header().Set("Access-Control-Allow-Origin", "*")
allow = true
break
} else if ao == reqOrigin {
response.Header().Set("Vary", "Origin")
response.Header().Set("Access-Control-Allow-Origin", ao)
allow = true
break
}
}
if !allow {
return
}
if allowMethods != "" {
// For an OPTIONS request: allow all methods handled at this URL.
response.Header().Set("Access-Control-Allow-Methods", allowMethods)
}
response.Header().Set("Access-Control-Expose-Headers", "Link, Replay-Nonce")
response.Header().Set("Access-Control-Max-Age", "86400")
}