- Rename `NewOrderRequest` field `LimitsExempt` to `IsARIRenewal`
- Introduce a new `NewOrderRequest` field, `IsRenewal`
- Introduce a new (temporary) feature flag, `CheckRenewalExemptionAtWFE`
WFE:
- Perform renewal detection in the WFE when `CheckRenewalExemptionAtWFE`
is set
- Skip (key-value) `NewOrdersPerAccount` and `CertificatesPerDomain`
limit checks when renewal detection indicates the the order is a
renewal.
RA:
- Leave renewal detection in the RA intact
- Skip renewal detection and (legacy) `NewOrdersPerAccount` and
`CertificatesPerDomain` limit checks when `CheckRenewalExemptionAtWFE`
is set and the `NewOrderRequest` indicates that the order is a renewal.
Fixes#7508
Part of #5545
Add the `ra.UnpauseAccount` which takes an `rapb.UnpauseAccountRequest`
input parameter. The method is just a stub to allow downstream SFE
development to continue. There is relevant ongoing work in the SA which
will eventually reside in this stub method.
Change how goodkey.KeyPolicy keeps track of allowed RSA and ECDSA key
sizes, to make it slightly more flexible while still retaining the very
locked-down allowlist of only 6 acceptable key sizes (RSA 2048, 3076,
and 4092, and ECDSA P256, P384, and P521). Add a new constructor which
takes in a collection of allowed key sizes, so that users of the goodkey
package can customize which keys they accept. Rename the existing
constructor to make it clear that it uses hardcoded default values.
With these new constructors available, make all of the goodkey.KeyPolicy
member fields private, so that a KeyPolicy can only be built via these
constructors.
The core.Challenge.ProvidedKeyAuthorization field is problematic, both
because it is poorly named (which is admittedly easily fixable) and
because it is a field which we never expose to the client yet it is held
on a core type. Deprecate this field, and replace it with a new
vapb.PerformValidationRequest.ExpectedKeyAuthorization field.
Within the VA, this also simplifies the primary logic methods to just
take the expected key authorization, rather than taking a whole (largely
unnecessary) challenge object. This has large but wholly mechanical
knock-on effects on the unit tests.
While we're here, improve the documentation on core.Challenge itself,
and remove Challenge.URI, which was deprecated long ago and is wholly
unused.
Part of https://github.com/letsencrypt/boulder/issues/7514
Replaced our embeds of foopb.UnimplementedFooServer with
foopb.UnsafeFooServer. Per the grpc-go docs this reduces the "forwards
compatibility" of our implementations, but that is only a concern for
codebases that are implementing gRPC interfaces maintained by third
parties, and which want to be able to update those third-party
dependencies without updating their own implementations in lockstep.
Because we update our protos and our implementations simultaneously, we
can remove this safety net to replace runtime type checking with
compile-time type checking.
However, that replacement is not enough, because we never pass our
implementation objects to a function which asserts that they match a
specific interface. So this PR also replaces our reflect-based unittests
with idiomatic interface assertions. I do not view this as a perfect
solution, as it relies on people implementing new gRPC servers to add
this line, but it is no worse than the status quo which relied on people
adding the "TestImplementation" test.
Fixes https://github.com/letsencrypt/boulder/issues/7497
Update the version of protoc-gen-go-grpc that we use to generate Go gRPC
code from our proto files, and update the versions of other gRPC tools
and libraries that we use to match. Turn on the new
`use_generic_streams` code generation flag to change how
protoc-gen-go-grpc generates implementations of our streaming methods,
from creating a wholly independent implementation for every stream to
using shared generic implementations.
Take advantage of this code-sharing to remove our SA "wrapper" methods,
now that they have truly the same signature as the SARO methods which
they wrap. Also remove all references to the old-style stream names
(e.g. foopb.FooService_BarMethodClient) and replace them with the new
underlying generic names, for the sake of consistency. Finally, also
remove a few custom stream test mocks, replacing them with the generic
mocks.ServerStreamClient.
Note that this PR does not change the names in //mocks/sa.go, to avoid
conflicts with work happening in the pursuit of
https://github.com/letsencrypt/boulder/issues/7476. Note also that this
PR updates the version of protoc-gen-go-grpc that we use to a specific
commit. This is because, although a new release of grpc-go itself has
been cut, the codegen binary is a separate Go module with its own
releases, and it hasn't had a new release cut yet. Tracking for that is
in https://github.com/grpc/grpc-go/issues/7030.
Replace "mocks.StorageAuthority" with "sapb.StorageAuthorityClient" in
our test mocks. The improves them by removing implementations of the
methods the tests don't actually need, instead of inheriting lots of
extraneous methods from the huge and cumbersome mocks.StorageAuthority.
This reduces our usage of mocks.StorageAuthority to only the WFE tests
(which create one in the frequently-used setup() function), which will
make refactoring those mocks in the pursuit of
https://github.com/letsencrypt/boulder/issues/7476 much easier.
Part of https://github.com/letsencrypt/boulder/issues/7476
Adds a new metric `cert_csr_mismatch` for SRE to create an alert for.
This should never happen, but if it does we should know about it as soon
as possible. The details of the failure will end up in logs due to error
propagation.
Fixes https://github.com/letsencrypt/boulder/issues/6587
Remove the redis-tls, wfe-tls, and mail-test-srv keys which were
generated by minica and then checked in to the repo. All three are
replaced by the dynamically-generated ipki directory.
Part of https://github.com/letsencrypt/boulder/issues/7476
Also update the CA and RA doccomments to link to it and describe the
roles of key functions a little better.
Remove outdated reference to generating OCSP at issuance time.
* Adds `CertProfileName` to the CAs `capb.IssuePrecertificateResponse`
so the RA can receive the CAs configured default profile name for audit
logging/metrics. This is useful for when the RA sends an empty string as
the profile name to the CA, but we want to know exactly what the profile
name chosen by the CA was, rather than just relying on comparing hashes
between CA and RA audit logs.
* Adds the profile name and hash to RA audit logs emitted after a
successful issuance.
* Adds new labels to the existing `new_certificates` metric exported by
the RA.
```
# HELP new_certificates A counter of new certificates including the certificate profile name and hexadecimal certificate profile hash
# TYPE new_certificates counter
new_certificates{profileHash="de4c8c8866ed46b1d4af0d79e6b7ecf2d1ea625e26adcbbd3979ececd8fbd05a",profileName="defaultBoulderCertificateProfile"} 2
```
Fixes https://github.com/letsencrypt/boulder/issues/7421
Upgrade from the old go-jose v2.6.1 to the newly minted go-jose v4.0.1.
Cleans up old code now that `jose.ParseSigned` can take a list of
supported signature algorithms.
Fixes https://github.com/letsencrypt/boulder/issues/7390
---------
Co-authored-by: Aaron Gable <aaron@letsencrypt.org>
When the order object retrieved from the SA contains a profile name,
propagate that into the request for the CA to issue a precertificate.
Similarly, when the CA's precertificate issuance response contains a
profile hash, propagate that into the request for the CA to issue the
corresponding final certificate.
Fixes https://github.com/letsencrypt/boulder/issues/7366
This adds the profile name to the proto messages necessary to propagate
it from the WFE to the SA, and from the SA to the CA. This change is
safe to land prior to any logic being added, and unblocks
profile-handling logic changes to the WFE, RA, SA, and CA.
Part of https://github.com/letsencrypt/boulder/issues/7309
- Add new `replaces` field to RA.NewOrder requests
- Pass new `replaces` field to `SA.NewOrderAndAuthzs`
- Add new `limitsExempt` field to RA.NewOrder requests
- Ensure the RA follows this exemption for all NewOrder rate limits
Adds the chosen DNS resolver to the VAs `ValidationRecord` object so
that for each challenge type during a validation, boulder can audit log
the resolver(s) chosen to fulfill the request..
Fixes https://github.com/letsencrypt/boulder/issues/7140
The RA.AdministrativelyRevokeCertificate method has two primary modes of
operation: if a certificate DER blob is provided, it parses and extracts
information from that blob, and revokes the cert; if no DER is provided,
it assumes the cert is malformed, and revokes it (but doesn't do an OCSP
cache purge) based on the serial alone. However, this scheme has
slightly confusing semantics in the RA and requires that the admin
tooling look up the certificates to provide them to the RA.
Instead, add a new "malformed" field to the RA's
AdministrativelyRevokeCertificateRequest, and deprecate the "cert" field
of that same request. When the malformed boolean is false, the RA will
look up and parse the certificate itself. When the malformed field is
true, it will revoke the cert based on serial alone.
Note that the main logic of AdministrativelyRevokeCertificate -- namely
revoking, potentially re-revoking, doing an akamai cache purge, etc --
is not changed by this PR. The only thing that changes here is how the
RA gets access to the to-be-revoked certificate's information.
Part of https://github.com/letsencrypt/boulder/issues/7135
Previously, `va.IsCAAValid` would only check CAA records from the
primary VA during initial domain control validation, completely ignoring
any configured RVAs. The upcoming
[MPIC](https://github.com/ryancdickson/staging/pull/8) ballot will
require that it be done from multiple perspectives. With the currently
deployed [Multi-Perspective
Validation](https://letsencrypt.org/2020/02/19/multi-perspective-validation.html)
in staging and production, this change brings us in line with the
[proposed phase
3](https://github.com/ryancdickson/staging/pull/8/files#r1368708684).
This change reuses the existing
[MaxRemoteValidationFailures](21fc191273/cmd/boulder-va/main.go (L35))
variable for the required non-corroboration quorum.
> Phase 3: June 15, 2025 - December 14, 2025 ("CAs MUST implement MPIC
in blocking mode*"):
>
> MUST implement MPIC? Yes
> Required quorum?: Minimally, 2 remote perspectives must be used. If
using less than 6 remote perspectives, 1 non-corroboration is allowed.
If using 6 or more remote perspectives, 2 non-corroborations are
allowed.
> MUST block issuance if quorum is not met: Yes.
> Geographic diversity requirements?: Perspectives must be 500km from 1)
the primary perspective and 2) all other perspectives used in the
quorum.
>
> * Note: "Blocking Mode" is a nickname. As opposed to "monitoring mode"
(described in the last milestone), CAs MUST NOT issue a certificate if
quorum requirements are not met from this point forward.
Adds new VA feature flags:
* `EnforceMultiCAA` instructs a primary VA to command each of its
configured RVAs to perform a CAA recheck.
* `MultiCAAFullResults` causes the primary VA to block waiting for all
RVA CAA recheck results to arrive.
Renamed `va.logRemoteValidationDifferentials` to
`va.logRemoteDifferentials` because it can handle initial domain control
validations and CAA rechecking with minimal editing.
Part of https://github.com/letsencrypt/boulder/issues/7061
When a client is attempting to open a new Order which is identical to an
already-issued certificate, allow that request to bypass the normal New
Orders rate limit. This will allow renewals to go through even when a
client is exhibiting other bad behavior. This should not open the door
to floods of requests for the same certificate in rapid success, as the
Duplicate Certificates rate limit will still block those.
Fixes https://github.com/letsencrypt/boulder/issues/6792
Rename "IssuerNameID" to just "NameID". Similarly rename the standalone
functions which compute it to better describe their function. Add a
.NameID() directly to issuance.Issuer, so that callers in other packages
don't have to directly access the .Cert member of an Issuer. Finally,
rearrange the code in issuance.go to be sensibly grouped as concerning
NameIDs, Certificates, or Issuers, rather than all mixed up between the
three.
Fixes https://github.com/letsencrypt/boulder/issues/5152
Enable the atomicalign, deepequalerrors, findcall, nilness,
reflectvaluecompare, sortslice, timeformat, and unusedwrite go vet
analyzers, which golangci-lint does not enable by default. Additionally,
enable new go vet analyzers by default as they become available.
The fieldalignment and shadow analyzers remain disabled because they
report so many errors that they should be fixed in a separate PR.
Note that the nilness analyzer appears to have found one very real bug
in tlsalpn.go.
The last rows using the old-style IssuerID were written to the database
in late 2021. Those rows have long since aged out -- we no longer serve
certificates or revocation information for them -- so we can remove the
code which handles those old-style IDs. This allows for some nice
simplifications in the CA's ocspImpl and in the Issuance package, which
will be useful for further reorganization of the CA and issuance
packages.
Fixes https://github.com/letsencrypt/boulder/issues/5152
Revamp WillingToIssueWildcards to WillingToIssue. Remove the need for
identifier.ACMEIdentifiers in the WillingToIssue(Wildcards) method.
Previously, before invoking this method, a slice of identifiers was
created by looping over each dnsName. However, these identifiers were
solely used in error messages.
Segment the validation process into distinct parts for domain
validation, wildcard validation, and exact blocklist checks. This
approach eliminates the necessity of substituting *. with x. in wildcard
domains.
Introduce a new helper, ValidDomain. It checks that a domain is valid
and that it doesn't contain any invalid wildcard characters.
Functionality from the previous ValidDomain is preserved in
ValidNonWildcardDomain.
Fixes#3323
If a client attempts to validate a challenge twice in rapid succession,
we'll kick off two background validation routines. One of these will
complete first, updating the database with success or failure. The other
will fail when it attempts to update the database and finds that there
are no longer any authorizations with that ID in the "pending" state.
Reduce the level at which we log such events, since we don't
particularly care about them.
Fixes https://github.com/letsencrypt/boulder/issues/3995
Replace the current three-piece setup (enum of feature variables, map of
feature vars to default values, and autogenerated bidirectional maps of
feature variables to and from strings) with a much simpler one-piece
setup: a single struct with one boolean-typed field per feature. This
preserves the overall structure of the package -- a single global
feature set protected by a mutex, and Set, Reset, and Enabled methods --
although the exact function signatures have all changed somewhat.
The executable config format remains the same, so no deployment changes
are necessary. This change does deprecate the AllowUnrecognizedFeatures
feature, as we cannot tell the json config parser to ignore unknown
field names, but that flag is set to False in all of our deployment
environments already.
Fixes https://github.com/letsencrypt/boulder/issues/6802
Fixes https://github.com/letsencrypt/boulder/issues/5229
- Move default and override limits, and associated methods, out of the
Limiter to new limitRegistry struct, embedded in a new public
TransactionBuilder.
- Export Transaction and add corresponding Transaction constructor
methods for each limit Name, making Limiter and TransactionBuilder the
API for interacting with the ratelimits package.
- Implement batched Spends and Refunds on the Limiter, the new methods
accept a slice of Transactions.
- Add new boolean fields check and spend to Transaction to support more
complicated cases that can arise in batches:
1. the InvalidAuthorizations limit is checked at New Order time in a
batch with many other limits, but should only be spent when an
Authorization is first considered invalid.
2. the CertificatesPerDomain limit is overridden by
CertficatesPerDomainPerAccount, when this is the case, spends of the
CertificatesPerDomain limit should be "best-effort" but NOT deny the
request if capacity is lacking.
- Modify the existing Spend/Refund methods to support
Transaction.check/spend and 0 cost Transactions.
- Make bucketId private and add a constructor for each bucket key format
supported by ratelimits.
- Move domainsForRateLimiting() from the ra.go to ratelimits. This
avoids a circular import issue in ra.go.
Part of #5545
This is a cleanup PR finishing the migration from int64 timestamps to
protobuf `*timestamppb.Timestamps` by removing all usage of the old
int64 fields. In the previous PR
https://github.com/letsencrypt/boulder/pull/7121 all fields were
switched to read from the protobuf timestamppb fields.
Adds a new case to `core.IsAnyNilOrZero` to check various properties of
a `*timestamppb.Timestamp` reducing the visual complexity for receivers.
Fixes https://github.com/letsencrypt/boulder/issues/7060
- Emit override utilization only when resource counts are under
threshold.
- Override utilization accounts for anticipated issuance.
- Correct the limit metric label for `CertificatesPerName` and
`CertificatesPerFQDNSet/Fast`.
Part of #5545
Remove ThrowAwayCert's nameCount argument, since it is always set to 1
by all callers. Remove ThrowAwayCertWithSerial, because it has no
callers. Change the throwaway cert's key from RSA512 to ECDSA P-224 for
a two-orders-of-magnitude speedup in key generation. Use this simplified
form in two new places in the RA that were previously rolling their own
test certs.
Add a new clock argument to the test-only ThrowAwayCert function, and
use that clock to generate reasonable notBefore and notAfter timestamps
in the resulting throwaway test cert. This is necessary to easily test
functions which rely on the expiration timestamp of the certificate,
such as upcoming work about computing CRL shards.
Part of https://github.com/letsencrypt/boulder/issues/7094
The CA, RA, and tools importing the PA (policy authority) will no longer
be able to live reload specific config files. Each location is now
responsible for loading the config file.
* Removed the reloader package
* Removed unused `ecdsa_allow_list_status` metric from the CA
* Removed mutex from all ratelimit `limitsImpl` methods
Fixes https://github.com/letsencrypt/boulder/issues/7111
---------
Co-authored-by: Samantha <hello@entropy.cat>
Co-authored-by: Aaron Gable <aaron@letsencrypt.org>
* Renames all of int64 as a time.Duration fields to `<fieldname>NS` to
indicate they are Unix nanoseconds.
* Adds new `google.protobuf.Duration` fields to each .proto file where
we previously had been using an int64 field to populate a time.Duration.
* Updates relevant gRPC messages.
Part 1 of 3 for https://github.com/letsencrypt/boulder/issues/7097
* Adds new `google.protobuf.Timestamp` fields to each .proto file where
we had been using `int64` fields as a timestamp.
* Updates relevant gRPC messages to populate the new
`google.protobuf.Timestamp` fields in addition to the old `int64`
timestamp fields.
* Added tests for each `<x>ToPB` and `PBto<x>` functions to ensure that
new fields passed into a gRPC message arrive as intended.
* Removed an unused error return from `PBToCert` and `PBToCertStatus`
and cleaned up each call site.
Built on-top of https://github.com/letsencrypt/boulder/pull/7069
Part 2 of 4 related to
https://github.com/letsencrypt/boulder/issues/7060
This is a partial revert of #7103. Because that PR introduces a new
Boulder error code that ocsp-responder needs to be specially aware of,
it has a deployability issue: ocsp-responder needs to be made aware of
the new error code before the RA can start emitting it.
The simple fix is to not emit that error code in the RA until the
ocsp-responder is ready to receive it.
In #6478, we stopped passing through Redis errors to the top-level
Responder object, preferring instead to live-sign. As part of that
change, we logged the Redis errors so they wouldn't disappear. However,
the sample rate for those errors was hard coded to 1-in-1000, instead of
following the LogSampleRate configured in the JSON.
This adds a field to redisSource for logSampleRate, and passes it
through from the JSON config in ocsp-responder/main.go.
Part of #7091
- Use constants for each rate limit name to ensure consistency when
labeling metrics
- Consistently check `.Enabled()` outside of each limit check RA method
- Replace the existing checks counter with a latency histogram
Part of #5545
This new standard library method returns a context with all of the
original metadata (e.g. tracing spans) still attached, but which will
not be canceled by any cancel funcs, deadlines, or timeouts set on the
parent context. We do this manually in a few places to prevent client
cancellations (usually disconnects) from disrupting our work, so this
just makes that code slightly simpler.
Fixes https://github.com/letsencrypt/boulder/issues/5506
This version includes a fix that seems relevant to us:
> The HTTP/1 client did not fully validate the contents of the Host
header. A maliciously crafted Host header could inject additional
headers or entire requests. The HTTP/1 client now refuses to send
requests containing an invalid Request.Host or Request.URL.Host value.
>
> Thanks to Bartek Nowotarski for reporting this issue.
>
> Includes security fixes for CVE-2023-29406 and Go issue
https://go.dev/issue/60374
Samantha Frank