This will allow implementing sub-problems without creating a cyclic
dependency between `core` and `problems`.
The `identifier` package is somewhat small/single-purpose and in the
future we may want to move more "ACME" bits beyond the `identifier`
types into a dedicated package outside of `core`.
Removes the checks for a handful of deployed feature flags in preparation for removing the flags entirely. Also moves all of the currently deprecated flags to a separate section of the flags list so they can be more easily removed once purged from production configs.
Fixes#3880.
This commit updates the `boulder-ra` and `boulder-ca` commands to refuse
to start if their configured `MaxNames` is 0 (the default value). This
should always be set to a positive number.
This commit also updates `csr/csr.go` to always apply the max names
check since it will never be 0 after the change above.
Also refactor `FailOnError` to pull out a separate `Fail` function.
Related to https://github.com/letsencrypt/boulder/issues/3632
This PR implements issuance for wildcard names in the V2 order flow. By policy, pending authorizations for wildcard names only receive a DNS-01 challenge for the base domain. We do not re-use authorizations for the base domain that do not come from a previous wildcard issuance (e.g. a normal authorization for example.com turned valid by way of a DNS-01 challenge will not be reused for a *.example.com order).
The wildcard prefix is stripped off of the authorization identifier value in two places:
When presenting the authorization to the user - ACME forbids having a wildcard character in an authorization identifier.
When performing validation - We validate the base domain name without the *. prefix.
This PR is largely a rewrite/extension of #3231. Instead of using a pseudo-challenge-type (DNS-01-Wildcard) to indicate an authorization & identifier correspond to the base name of a wildcard order name we instead allow the identifier to take the wildcard order name with the *. prefix.
In ca/certificate-authority.go, we previously had a block list of signature algorithms we will not accept for CSRs. This commit switches to an allowed list of signature algorithms that we will accept.
Previously, if we received a CSR with IPAddress or EmailAddress SANs, we would
ignore those fields, issuing only for the DNSNames in the CSR. However, we would
later check in MatchesCSR that the CSR's IPAddresses and EmailAddresses matches
those in the issued certificate. This check would fail, serving a 500 to the end
user.
Instead, we now reject the CSR earlier in the process, and send a
meaningful error message.
Fixes#2203
Part of #2080.
This change vendors `crypto/x509`, `crypto/x509/pkix`, and `encoding/asn1` from 1d5f6a765d. That commit is a direct child of the Go 1.5.4 release tag, so it contains the same code as the current Go version we are using. In that commit I rewrote imports in those packages so they depend on each other internally rather than calling out to the standard library, which would cause type disagreements.
I changed the imports in each place where we're parsing CSRs, and imported under a different name `oldx509`, both to avoid collisions and make it clear what's going on. Places that only use `x509` to parse certificates are not changed, and will use the current standard library.
This will unblock us from moving to Go 1.6, and subsequently Go 1.7.
The `regID` parameter in the PA's `WillingToIssue` function was originally used for whitelisting purposes, but is not used any longer. This PR removes it.
* Split CSR testing and name hoisting into own functions, verify CSR in RA & CA
* Move tests around and various other fixes
* 1.5.3 doesn't have the needed stringer
* Move functions to their own lib
* Remove unused imports
* Move MaxCNLength and BadSignatureAlgorithms to csr package
* Always normalizeCSR in VerifyCSR and de-export it
* Update comments
Daniel McCarney
Roland Bracewell Shoemaker
Daniel McCarney
Jacob Hoffman-Andrews
Ben Irving
Roland Bracewell Shoemaker