Continue to use a 24-hour cutoff for authzs with "long" lifetimes, so
that our behavior is unchanged for authzs created with no profile
specified. Use a 1-hour cutoff for authzs with "short" (less than
24-hour) lifetimes, so that we can reuse authzs created with modern
profiles. Use linear interpolation between those values.
Fixes https://github.com/letsencrypt/boulder/issues/7994
If validation profiles haven't been explicitly configured, use the
default profile for all incoming requests regardless of which profile
they specify.
Fixes https://github.com/letsencrypt/boulder/issues/7605
Remove the deprecated WFE & nonce config field `NoncePrefixKey`, which
has been replaced by `NonceHMACKey`.
<del>DO NOT MERGE until:</del>
- <del>#7793 (in `release-2024-11-18`) has been deployed, AND:</del>
- <del>`NoncePrefixKey` has been removed from all running configs.</del>
Fixes#7632
When we turn on explicit sharding, we'll change the CA serial prefix, so
we can know that all issuance from the new prefixes uses explicit
sharding, and all issuance from the old prefixes uses temporal sharding.
This lets us avoid putting a revoked cert in two different CRL shards
(the temporal one and the explicit one).
To achieve this, the crl-updater gets a list of temporally sharded
serial prefixes. When it queries the `certificateStatus` table by date
(`GetRevokedCerts`), it will filter out explicitly sharded certificates:
those that don't have their prefix on the list.
Part of #7094
Add three new fields to the ra.ValidationProfile structure, representing
the profile's pending authorization lifetime (used to assign an
expiration when a new authz is created), valid authorization lifetime
(used to assign an expiration when an authz is successfully validated),
and order lifetime (used to assign an expiration when a new order is
created). Remove the prior top-level fields which controlled these
values across all orders.
Add a "defaultProfileName" field to the RA as well, to facilitate
looking up a default set of lifetimes when the order doesn't specify a
profile. If this default name is explicitly configured, always provide
it to the CA when requesting issuance, so we don't have to duplicate the
default between the two services.
Modify the RA's config struct in a corresponding way: add three new
fields to the ValidationProfiles structure, and deprecate the three old
top-level fields. Also upgrade the ra.NewValidationProfile constructor
to handle these new fields, including doing validation on their values.
Fixes https://github.com/letsencrypt/boulder/issues/7605
In the RA, inspect the profile of all authorizations returned when
looking for authz reuse, and refuse to reuse any whose profile doesn't
match the requested profile of the current NewOrder request.
Fixes https://github.com/letsencrypt/boulder/issues/7949
The CRLDP is included only when the profile's
IncludeCRLDistributionPoints field is true.
Introduce a new config field for issuers, CRLShards. If
IncludeCRLDistributionPoints is true and this is zero, issuance will
error.
The CRL shard is assigned at issuance time based on the (random) low
bits of the serial number.
Part of https://github.com/letsencrypt/boulder/issues/7094
The current profiles draft
(https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-aaron-acme-profiles/00/) says:
> If a server receives a request to finalize an Order whose profile the
> CA is no longer willing to issue under, it MUST respond with a
> problem document of type "invalidProfile". The server SHOULD attempt
> to avoid this situation, e.g. by ensuring that all Orders for a
> profile have expired before it stops issuing under that profile.
Add types and helper functions representing this new error type to the
berrors, probs, and web packages. Update the WFE code which rejects
new-order requests with unrecognized profiles to use these new types,
and add similar code to the WFE's finalize path. Update the unit and
integration tests to reflect the fact that we now configure at least one
profile in both Staging and Prod (tracked in IN-10574).
This check is duplicated in the next stanza. Instead, replace it with a
check that the acctID encoded in the URL and the acctID corresponding to
the JWS used to sign the request match.
To achieve this without breaking hashes of deployed configs, create a
ProfileConfigNew containing the new field (and removing some deprecated
fields).
Move the CA's profile-hashing logic into the `issuance` package, and
gate it on the presence of IncludeCRLDistributionPoints. If that field
is false (the default), create an instance of the old `ProfileConfig`
with the appropriate values and encode/hash that instead.
Note: the IncludeCRLDistributionPoints field does not yet control any
behavior. That will be part of #7974.
Part of #7094
Improve the test of the `ra.validationProfiles` field by providing a
constructed `map[string]*ValidationProfile` instead of constructing one
inside the test. Much like how this data is provided, or `nil`, in calls
to `ra.NewRegistrationAuthorityImpl()`.
Add "certificateProfileName" to the model used to insert new authz2 rows
and to the list of column names read when retrieving rows from the
authz2 table. Add support for this column to the functions which convert
to and from authz2 model types.
Add support for the profile field to core types so that it can be
returned by the SA.
Fixes https://github.com/letsencrypt/boulder/issues/7955
Add support in the RA for an allow list of accounts permitted to request
certificates containing the OCSP Must-Staple extension. If no allow list
is configured, all accounts are permitted. When a list is provided,
Finalize requests with Must-Staple are rejected unless the account is on
the list, and metrics are updated to track allowed and denied requests.
Fixes#7914
We've been seeing some flaky integration tests where issuance fails. The
integration test only has access to the generic user-facing error. The
real error is available as `InternalError` in the WFE logs, but we need
a higher log level to see it.
Add querying by explicit shard (SA.GetRevokedCertsByShard) in addition
to querying by temporal shard (SA.GetRevokedCerts).
Merge results from both kinds of shard. De-duplicate by serial within a
shard, because the same certificate could wind up in a temporal shard
that matches its explicit shard.
When de-duplicating, validate that revocation reasons are the same or
(very unlikely) represent a re-revocation based on demonstrating key
compromise. This can happen because the two different SA queries occur
at slightly different times.
Add unit testing that CRL entries make it through the whole pipeline
from SA, to CA, to uploader.
Rename some types in the unittest to be more accessible.
Tweak a comment in SA.UpdateRevokedCertificate to make it clear that
status _and_ reason are critical for re-revocation.
Note: This GetRevokedCertsByShard code path will always return zero
certificates right now, because nothing is writing to the
`revokedCertificates` table. Writing to that table is gated on
certificates having CRL URLs in them, which is not yet implemented (and
will be config-gated).
Part of #7094
- Fix 'requesteed' -> 'requested' in errors/errors.go
- Fix 'paylod' -> 'payload' in docs/acme-divergences.md
These changes address typos identified by the linter.
In revocation_test.go, fetch all CRLs, and look for revoked certificates
on both CRLs and OCSP.
Make s3-test-srv listen on all interfaces, so the CRL URLs in the CA
config work.
Add IssuerNameIDs to the CRL URLs in ca.json, to match how those CRLs
are uploaded to S3.
Make TestRevocation parallel. Speedup from ~60s to ~3s.
Increase ocsp-responder's allowed parallelism to account for parallel
test. Also, add "maxInflightSignings" to config/ since it's in prod.
"maxSigningWaiters" is not yet in prod, so don't move that field.
Add a mutex around running crl-updater, and decrease the log level so
errors stand out more when they happen.
The SA had some logic (not yet in use) to return revoked certificates
either by temporal sharding (if `req.ShardIdx` is zero) or by explicit
sharding (if `req.ShardIdx` is nonzero).
This PR splits the function into two. The existing `GetRevokedCerts`
always does temporal sharding. The new `GetRevokedCertsByShard` always
does explicit sharding. Eventually only `GetRevokedCertsByShard` will be
necessary. This change was discussed in
https://github.com/letsencrypt/boulder/issues/7094#issuecomment-2587940962
and is a precursor to having the crl-updater call both methods, so we
can merge the results when generating CRLs.
In RA.RevokedCertificate, if the certificate being revoked has a
crlDistributionPoints extension, parse the URL and pass the appropriate
shard to the SA.
This required some changes to the `admin` tool. When a malformed
certificate is revoked, we don't have a parsed copy of the certificate
to extract a CRL URL from. So, specifically when a malformed certificate
is being revoked, allow specifying a CRL shard. Because different
certificates will have different shards, require one-at-a-time
revocation for malformed certificates.
To support that refactoring, move the serial-cleaning functionality
earlier in the `admin` tool's flow.
Also, split out one of the cases handled by the `revokeCertificate`
helper in the RA. For admin malformed revocations, we need to accept a
human-specified ShardIdx, so call the SA directly in that case (and skip
stat increment since admin revocations aren't useful for metrics). This
allows `revokeCertificate` to be a more helpful helper, by extracting
serial, issuer ID, and CRL shard automatically from an
`*x509.Certificate`.
Note: we don't yet issue certificates with the crlDistributionPoints
extension, so this code will not be active until we start doing so.
Part of #7094.
Replace the non-MPIC-compliant IsCAAValid VA method with the correct
MPIC-compliant DoCAA VA method when the EnforceMPIC feature is enabled.
This fixes the mistake introduced in #7870.
Use MariaDB's "instant add column" feature to add a new
certificateProfileName column to the existing authz2 table. This column
is nullable to reflect the fact that profiles are optional, and to
mirror the similarly-added column on the orders table.
This change is standalone, with no code reading or writing this field,
so that it can be deployed to production and a follow-up change can
begin reading and writing the field all at once with no deployability
concerns.
Part of https://github.com/letsencrypt/boulder/issues/7955
This uses a pattern that is new to our tests. setup accepts a variadic
list of options, and uses a type switch to make use of those options
during setup. This allows us to pass setup only the options that are
relevant to any given test case, leaving the rest to sensible defaults.
Remove the singular Profile field from the CA config, as it has been
replaced by the plural CertProfiles key. Remove the Expiry, Backdate,
LintConfig, and IgnoredLints keys from the top-level CA config, as they
are now also configured on a per-profile basis. Remove the LifespanCRL
key from the CA config, as it is now configured within the CRLProfile.
For all of the above, remove transitional fallbacks from within
//ca/main.go.
These config changes were deployed to production in IN-10568, IN-10506,
and IN-10045.
Fixes https://github.com/letsencrypt/boulder/issues/7414
Fixes https://github.com/letsencrypt/boulder/issues/7159
Part of #7920
There will be a followup removing the remaining places that set
`contactsPresent`.
---------
Co-authored-by: Jacob Hoffman-Andrews <jsha+github@letsencrypt.org>
This is the final stage of #5554: removing the old, combined
`UpdateRegistration` flow, which has been replaced by
`UpdateRegistrationContact` and `UpdateRegistrationKey`. Those new
functions have their own tests.
The RA's `UpdateRegistration` function no longer has any callers (as of
#7827's deployment), so it is safely deployable to remove it from the SA
too, and its request from gRPC.
Fixes#5554
---------
Co-authored-by: Jacob Hoffman-Andrews <jsha+github@letsencrypt.org>
Co-authored-by: Aaron Gable <aaron@letsencrypt.org>
In the WFE, store the User-Agent in a `context.Context` object. In our
gRPC interceptors, pass that field in a Metadata header, and re-add it
to `Context` on the server side.
Add a test in the gRPC interceptors that User-Agent is properly
propagated.
Note: this adds a new `setup()` function for the gRPC tests that is
currently only used by the new test. I'll upload another PR shortly that
expands the use of that function to more tests.
Fixes https://github.com/letsencrypt/boulder/issues/7792
The admin-revoker tool is dead. Long live the admin tool.
There's a number places that still reference admin-revoker, including
Boulder's ipki and the revocation source in the database which are still
used, even if the tool is gone. But nothing actually using the tool.
The initialIP column has been defaulted to 0.0.0.0 since #7760. Remove
this field from the all structs while leaving the schema itself intact.
Part of #7917
This is required now that we're going to issue certificates with only
the server EKU.
Fixes#7938
---------
Co-authored-by: James Renken <jprenken@users.noreply.github.com>
Replace looking for AlreadyRevoked (which is never returned by the
underlying SA method) with the correct NotFound. Also add a comment
documenting why this behavior exists.
Fixes https://github.com/letsencrypt/boulder/issues/3995
The schema tool used to parse log_list_schema.json doesn't work well
with the updated schema. This is going to be required to support
static-ct-api logs from current Chrome log lists.
Instead, use the loglist3 package inside the certificate-transparency-go
project, which Boulder already uses for CT submission otherwise.
As well, the Log IDs and keys returned from loglist3 have already been
base64 decoded, so this re-encodes them to minimize the impact on the
rest of the codebase and keep this change small.
The test log_list.json file needed to be made a bit more realistic for
loglist3 to parse without base64 or date parsing errors.
Aaron Gable