2565 lines
93 KiB
Go
2565 lines
93 KiB
Go
package ra
|
|
|
|
import (
|
|
"context"
|
|
"crypto/x509"
|
|
"encoding/json"
|
|
"errors"
|
|
"fmt"
|
|
"math/big"
|
|
"net"
|
|
"net/url"
|
|
"reflect"
|
|
"sort"
|
|
"strconv"
|
|
"strings"
|
|
"time"
|
|
|
|
"github.com/honeycombio/beeline-go"
|
|
"github.com/jmhodges/clock"
|
|
"github.com/prometheus/client_golang/prometheus"
|
|
"github.com/weppos/publicsuffix-go/publicsuffix"
|
|
"golang.org/x/crypto/ocsp"
|
|
grpc "google.golang.org/grpc"
|
|
"google.golang.org/protobuf/types/known/emptypb"
|
|
"gopkg.in/go-jose/go-jose.v2"
|
|
|
|
"github.com/letsencrypt/boulder/akamai"
|
|
akamaipb "github.com/letsencrypt/boulder/akamai/proto"
|
|
capb "github.com/letsencrypt/boulder/ca/proto"
|
|
"github.com/letsencrypt/boulder/core"
|
|
corepb "github.com/letsencrypt/boulder/core/proto"
|
|
csrlib "github.com/letsencrypt/boulder/csr"
|
|
"github.com/letsencrypt/boulder/ctpolicy"
|
|
berrors "github.com/letsencrypt/boulder/errors"
|
|
"github.com/letsencrypt/boulder/features"
|
|
"github.com/letsencrypt/boulder/goodkey"
|
|
bgrpc "github.com/letsencrypt/boulder/grpc"
|
|
"github.com/letsencrypt/boulder/identifier"
|
|
"github.com/letsencrypt/boulder/issuance"
|
|
blog "github.com/letsencrypt/boulder/log"
|
|
"github.com/letsencrypt/boulder/metrics"
|
|
"github.com/letsencrypt/boulder/policy"
|
|
"github.com/letsencrypt/boulder/probs"
|
|
pubpb "github.com/letsencrypt/boulder/publisher/proto"
|
|
rapb "github.com/letsencrypt/boulder/ra/proto"
|
|
"github.com/letsencrypt/boulder/ratelimit"
|
|
"github.com/letsencrypt/boulder/reloader"
|
|
"github.com/letsencrypt/boulder/revocation"
|
|
sapb "github.com/letsencrypt/boulder/sa/proto"
|
|
vapb "github.com/letsencrypt/boulder/va/proto"
|
|
"github.com/letsencrypt/boulder/web"
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
var (
|
|
errIncompleteGRPCRequest = errors.New("incomplete gRPC request message")
|
|
errIncompleteGRPCResponse = errors.New("incomplete gRPC response message")
|
|
|
|
// caaRecheckDuration is the amount of time after a CAA check that we will
|
|
// recheck the CAA records for a domain. Per Baseline Requirements, we must
|
|
// recheck CAA records within 8 hours of issuance. We set this to 7 hours to
|
|
// stay on the safe side.
|
|
caaRecheckDuration = -7 * time.Hour
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
type caaChecker interface {
|
|
IsCAAValid(
|
|
ctx context.Context,
|
|
in *vapb.IsCAAValidRequest,
|
|
opts ...grpc.CallOption,
|
|
) (*vapb.IsCAAValidResponse, error)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// RegistrationAuthorityImpl defines an RA.
|
|
//
|
|
// NOTE: All of the fields in RegistrationAuthorityImpl need to be
|
|
// populated, or there is a risk of panic.
|
|
type RegistrationAuthorityImpl struct {
|
|
rapb.UnimplementedRegistrationAuthorityServer
|
|
CA capb.CertificateAuthorityClient
|
|
OCSP capb.OCSPGeneratorClient
|
|
VA vapb.VAClient
|
|
SA sapb.StorageAuthorityClient
|
|
PA core.PolicyAuthority
|
|
publisher pubpb.PublisherClient
|
|
caa caaChecker
|
|
|
|
clk clock.Clock
|
|
log blog.Logger
|
|
keyPolicy goodkey.KeyPolicy
|
|
// How long before a newly created authorization expires.
|
|
authorizationLifetime time.Duration
|
|
pendingAuthorizationLifetime time.Duration
|
|
rlPolicies ratelimit.Limits
|
|
maxContactsPerReg int
|
|
maxNames int
|
|
reuseValidAuthz bool
|
|
orderLifetime time.Duration
|
|
|
|
issuersByNameID map[issuance.IssuerNameID]*issuance.Certificate
|
|
issuersByID map[issuance.IssuerID]*issuance.Certificate
|
|
purger akamaipb.AkamaiPurgerClient
|
|
|
|
ctpolicy *ctpolicy.CTPolicy
|
|
|
|
ctpolicyResults *prometheus.HistogramVec
|
|
rateLimitCounter *prometheus.CounterVec
|
|
revocationReasonCounter *prometheus.CounterVec
|
|
namesPerCert *prometheus.HistogramVec
|
|
newRegCounter prometheus.Counter
|
|
reusedValidAuthzCounter prometheus.Counter
|
|
recheckCAACounter prometheus.Counter
|
|
newCertCounter prometheus.Counter
|
|
recheckCAAUsedAuthzLifetime prometheus.Counter
|
|
authzAges prometheus.Histogram
|
|
orderAges prometheus.Histogram
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// NewRegistrationAuthorityImpl constructs a new RA object.
|
|
func NewRegistrationAuthorityImpl(
|
|
clk clock.Clock,
|
|
logger blog.Logger,
|
|
stats prometheus.Registerer,
|
|
maxContactsPerReg int,
|
|
keyPolicy goodkey.KeyPolicy,
|
|
maxNames int,
|
|
reuseValidAuthz bool,
|
|
authorizationLifetime time.Duration,
|
|
pendingAuthorizationLifetime time.Duration,
|
|
pubc pubpb.PublisherClient,
|
|
caaClient caaChecker,
|
|
orderLifetime time.Duration,
|
|
ctp *ctpolicy.CTPolicy,
|
|
purger akamaipb.AkamaiPurgerClient,
|
|
issuers []*issuance.Certificate,
|
|
) *RegistrationAuthorityImpl {
|
|
ctpolicyResults := prometheus.NewHistogramVec(
|
|
prometheus.HistogramOpts{
|
|
Name: "ctpolicy_results",
|
|
Help: "Histogram of latencies of ctpolicy.GetSCTs calls with success/failure/deadlineExceeded labels",
|
|
Buckets: metrics.InternetFacingBuckets,
|
|
},
|
|
[]string{"result"},
|
|
)
|
|
stats.MustRegister(ctpolicyResults)
|
|
|
|
namesPerCert := prometheus.NewHistogramVec(
|
|
prometheus.HistogramOpts{
|
|
Name: "names_per_cert",
|
|
Help: "Histogram of the number of SANs in requested and issued certificates",
|
|
// The namesPerCert buckets are chosen based on the current Let's Encrypt
|
|
// limit of 100 SANs per certificate.
|
|
Buckets: []float64{1, 5, 10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60, 70, 80, 90, 100},
|
|
},
|
|
// Type label value is either "requested" or "issued".
|
|
[]string{"type"},
|
|
)
|
|
stats.MustRegister(namesPerCert)
|
|
|
|
rateLimitCounter := prometheus.NewCounterVec(prometheus.CounterOpts{
|
|
Name: "ra_ratelimits",
|
|
Help: "A counter of RA ratelimit checks labelled by type and pass/exceed",
|
|
}, []string{"limit", "result"})
|
|
stats.MustRegister(rateLimitCounter)
|
|
|
|
newRegCounter := prometheus.NewCounter(prometheus.CounterOpts{
|
|
Name: "new_registrations",
|
|
Help: "A counter of new registrations",
|
|
})
|
|
stats.MustRegister(newRegCounter)
|
|
|
|
reusedValidAuthzCounter := prometheus.NewCounter(prometheus.CounterOpts{
|
|
Name: "reused_valid_authz",
|
|
Help: "A counter of reused valid authorizations",
|
|
})
|
|
stats.MustRegister(reusedValidAuthzCounter)
|
|
|
|
recheckCAACounter := prometheus.NewCounter(prometheus.CounterOpts{
|
|
Name: "recheck_caa",
|
|
Help: "A counter of CAA rechecks",
|
|
})
|
|
stats.MustRegister(recheckCAACounter)
|
|
|
|
recheckCAAUsedAuthzLifetime := prometheus.NewCounter(prometheus.CounterOpts{
|
|
Name: "recheck_caa_used_authz_lifetime",
|
|
Help: "A counter times the old codepath was used for CAA recheck time",
|
|
})
|
|
stats.MustRegister(recheckCAAUsedAuthzLifetime)
|
|
|
|
newCertCounter := prometheus.NewCounter(prometheus.CounterOpts{
|
|
Name: "new_certificates",
|
|
Help: "A counter of new certificates",
|
|
})
|
|
stats.MustRegister(newCertCounter)
|
|
|
|
revocationReasonCounter := prometheus.NewCounterVec(prometheus.CounterOpts{
|
|
Name: "revocation_reason",
|
|
Help: "A counter of certificate revocation reasons",
|
|
}, []string{"reason"})
|
|
stats.MustRegister(revocationReasonCounter)
|
|
|
|
authzAges := prometheus.NewHistogram(prometheus.HistogramOpts{
|
|
Name: "authz_ages",
|
|
Help: "Histogram of ages of Authorization objects when they're attached to a new Order",
|
|
// authzAges keeps track of how old, in seconds, authorizations were at
|
|
// the time that we attached them to an order. We give it a non-standard
|
|
// bucket distribution so that the leftmost (closest to zero) bucket can be
|
|
// used exclusively for brand-new (i.e. not reused) authzs. Our buckets are:
|
|
// one nanosecond, one second, one minute, one hour, 7 hours (our CAA reuse
|
|
// time), 1 day, 2 days, 7 days, 30 days, +inf (should be empty).
|
|
Buckets: []float64{0.000000001, 1, 60, 3600, 25200, 86400, 172800, 604800, 2592000, 7776000},
|
|
})
|
|
stats.MustRegister(authzAges)
|
|
|
|
orderAges := prometheus.NewHistogram(prometheus.HistogramOpts{
|
|
Name: "order_ages",
|
|
Help: "Histogram of ages of Order objects when they're Finalized",
|
|
// Orders currently have a max age of 7 days (168hrs), so our buckets are:
|
|
// 1 second, 10 seconds, 1 minute, 10 minutes, 1 hour, 10 hours, 1 day,
|
|
// 7 days, +inf.
|
|
Buckets: []float64{1, 10, 60, 600, 3600, 36000, 86400, 172800},
|
|
})
|
|
stats.MustRegister(orderAges)
|
|
|
|
issuersByNameID := make(map[issuance.IssuerNameID]*issuance.Certificate)
|
|
issuersByID := make(map[issuance.IssuerID]*issuance.Certificate)
|
|
for _, issuer := range issuers {
|
|
issuersByNameID[issuer.NameID()] = issuer
|
|
issuersByID[issuer.ID()] = issuer
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ra := &RegistrationAuthorityImpl{
|
|
clk: clk,
|
|
log: logger,
|
|
authorizationLifetime: authorizationLifetime,
|
|
pendingAuthorizationLifetime: pendingAuthorizationLifetime,
|
|
rlPolicies: ratelimit.New(),
|
|
maxContactsPerReg: maxContactsPerReg,
|
|
keyPolicy: keyPolicy,
|
|
maxNames: maxNames,
|
|
// TODO(#2734): Remove reuseValidAuthz hardcoding.
|
|
reuseValidAuthz: true,
|
|
publisher: pubc,
|
|
caa: caaClient,
|
|
orderLifetime: orderLifetime,
|
|
ctpolicy: ctp,
|
|
ctpolicyResults: ctpolicyResults,
|
|
purger: purger,
|
|
issuersByNameID: issuersByNameID,
|
|
issuersByID: issuersByID,
|
|
namesPerCert: namesPerCert,
|
|
rateLimitCounter: rateLimitCounter,
|
|
newRegCounter: newRegCounter,
|
|
reusedValidAuthzCounter: reusedValidAuthzCounter,
|
|
recheckCAACounter: recheckCAACounter,
|
|
newCertCounter: newCertCounter,
|
|
revocationReasonCounter: revocationReasonCounter,
|
|
recheckCAAUsedAuthzLifetime: recheckCAAUsedAuthzLifetime,
|
|
authzAges: authzAges,
|
|
orderAges: orderAges,
|
|
}
|
|
return ra
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (ra *RegistrationAuthorityImpl) SetRateLimitPoliciesFile(filename string) error {
|
|
_, err := reloader.New(filename, ra.rlPolicies.LoadPolicies, ra.log)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// certificateRequestAuthz is a struct for holding information about a valid
|
|
// authz referenced during a certificateRequestEvent. It holds both the
|
|
// authorization ID and the challenge type that made the authorization valid. We
|
|
// specifically include the challenge type that solved the authorization to make
|
|
// some common analysis easier.
|
|
type certificateRequestAuthz struct {
|
|
ID string
|
|
ChallengeType core.AcmeChallenge
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// certificateRequestEvent is a struct for holding information that is logged as
|
|
// JSON to the audit log as the result of an issuance event.
|
|
type certificateRequestEvent struct {
|
|
ID string `json:",omitempty"`
|
|
// Requester is the associated account ID
|
|
Requester int64 `json:",omitempty"`
|
|
// OrderID is the associated order ID (may be empty for an ACME v1 issuance)
|
|
OrderID int64 `json:",omitempty"`
|
|
// SerialNumber is the string representation of the issued certificate's
|
|
// serial number
|
|
SerialNumber string `json:",omitempty"`
|
|
// VerifiedFields are required by the baseline requirements and are always
|
|
// a static value for Boulder.
|
|
VerifiedFields []string `json:",omitempty"`
|
|
// CommonName is the subject common name from the issued cert
|
|
CommonName string `json:",omitempty"`
|
|
// Names are the DNS SAN entries from the issued cert
|
|
Names []string `json:",omitempty"`
|
|
// NotBefore is the starting timestamp of the issued cert's validity period
|
|
NotBefore time.Time `json:",omitempty"`
|
|
// NotAfter is the ending timestamp of the issued cert's validity period
|
|
NotAfter time.Time `json:",omitempty"`
|
|
// RequestTime and ResponseTime are for tracking elapsed time during issuance
|
|
RequestTime time.Time `json:",omitempty"`
|
|
ResponseTime time.Time `json:",omitempty"`
|
|
// Error contains any encountered errors
|
|
Error string `json:",omitempty"`
|
|
// Authorizations is a map of identifier names to certificateRequestAuthz
|
|
// objects. It can be used to understand how the names in a certificate
|
|
// request were authorized.
|
|
Authorizations map[string]certificateRequestAuthz
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// certificateRevocationEvent is a struct for holding information that is logged
|
|
// as JSON to the audit log as the result of a revocation event.
|
|
type certificateRevocationEvent struct {
|
|
ID string `json:",omitempty"`
|
|
// SerialNumber is the string representation of the revoked certificate's
|
|
// serial number.
|
|
SerialNumber string `json:",omitempty"`
|
|
// Reason is the integer representing the revocation reason used.
|
|
Reason int64 `json:",omitempty"`
|
|
// Method is the way in which revocation was requested.
|
|
// It will be one of the strings: "applicant", "subscriber", "control", "key", or "admin".
|
|
Method string `json:",omitempty"`
|
|
// RequesterID is the account ID of the requester.
|
|
// Will be zero for admin revocations.
|
|
RequesterID int64 `json:",omitempty"`
|
|
// AdminName is the name of the admin requester.
|
|
// Will be zero for subscriber revocations.
|
|
AdminName string `json:",omitempty"`
|
|
// Error contains any error encountered during revocation.
|
|
Error string `json:",omitempty"`
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// finalizationCAACheckEvent is a struct for holding information logged as JSON
|
|
// to the info log as the result of an issuance event. It is logged when the RA
|
|
// performs the final CAA check of a certificate finalization request.
|
|
type finalizationCAACheckEvent struct {
|
|
// Requester is the associated account ID.
|
|
Requester int64 `json:",omitempty"`
|
|
// Reused is a count of Authz where the original CAA check was performed in
|
|
// the last 7 hours.
|
|
Reused int `json:",omitempty"`
|
|
// Rechecked is a count of Authz where a new CAA check was performed because
|
|
// the original check was older than 7 hours.
|
|
Rechecked int `json:",omitempty"`
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// noRegistrationID is used for the regID parameter to GetThreshold when no
|
|
// registration-based overrides are necessary.
|
|
const noRegistrationID = -1
|
|
|
|
// registrationCounter is a type to abstract the use of `CountRegistrationsByIP`
|
|
// or `CountRegistrationsByIPRange` SA methods.
|
|
type registrationCounter func(context.Context, *sapb.CountRegistrationsByIPRequest, ...grpc.CallOption) (*sapb.Count, error)
|
|
|
|
// checkRegistrationIPLimit checks a specific registraton limit by using the
|
|
// provided registrationCounter function to determine if the limit has been
|
|
// exceeded for a given IP or IP range
|
|
func (ra *RegistrationAuthorityImpl) checkRegistrationIPLimit(ctx context.Context, limit ratelimit.RateLimitPolicy, ip net.IP, counter registrationCounter) error {
|
|
if !limit.Enabled() {
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
now := ra.clk.Now()
|
|
count, err := counter(ctx, &sapb.CountRegistrationsByIPRequest{
|
|
Ip: ip,
|
|
Range: &sapb.Range{
|
|
Earliest: limit.WindowBegin(now).UnixNano(),
|
|
Latest: now.UnixNano(),
|
|
},
|
|
})
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if count.Count >= limit.GetThreshold(ip.String(), noRegistrationID) {
|
|
return berrors.RegistrationsPerIPError(0, "too many registrations for this IP")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// checkRegistrationLimits enforces the RegistrationsPerIP and
|
|
// RegistrationsPerIPRange limits
|
|
func (ra *RegistrationAuthorityImpl) checkRegistrationLimits(ctx context.Context, ip net.IP) error {
|
|
// Check the registrations per IP limit using the CountRegistrationsByIP SA
|
|
// function that matches IP addresses exactly
|
|
exactRegLimit := ra.rlPolicies.RegistrationsPerIP()
|
|
err := ra.checkRegistrationIPLimit(ctx, exactRegLimit, ip, ra.SA.CountRegistrationsByIP)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
ra.rateLimitCounter.WithLabelValues("registrations_by_ip", "exceeded").Inc()
|
|
ra.log.Infof("Rate limit exceeded, RegistrationsByIP, IP: %s", ip)
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
ra.rateLimitCounter.WithLabelValues("registrations_by_ip", "pass").Inc()
|
|
|
|
// We only apply the fuzzy reg limit to IPv6 addresses.
|
|
// Per https://golang.org/pkg/net/#IP.To4 "If ip is not an IPv4 address, To4
|
|
// returns nil"
|
|
if ip.To4() != nil {
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Check the registrations per IP range limit using the
|
|
// CountRegistrationsByIPRange SA function that fuzzy-matches IPv6 addresses
|
|
// within a larger address range
|
|
fuzzyRegLimit := ra.rlPolicies.RegistrationsPerIPRange()
|
|
err = ra.checkRegistrationIPLimit(ctx, fuzzyRegLimit, ip, ra.SA.CountRegistrationsByIPRange)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
ra.rateLimitCounter.WithLabelValues("registrations_by_ip_range", "exceeded").Inc()
|
|
ra.log.Infof("Rate limit exceeded, RegistrationsByIPRange, IP: %s", ip)
|
|
// For the fuzzyRegLimit we use a new error message that specifically
|
|
// mentions that the limit being exceeded is applied to a *range* of IPs
|
|
return berrors.RateLimitError(0, "too many registrations for this IP range")
|
|
}
|
|
ra.rateLimitCounter.WithLabelValues("registrations_by_ip_range", "pass").Inc()
|
|
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// NewRegistration constructs a new Registration from a request.
|
|
func (ra *RegistrationAuthorityImpl) NewRegistration(ctx context.Context, request *corepb.Registration) (*corepb.Registration, error) {
|
|
// Error if the request is nil, there is no account key or IP address
|
|
if request == nil || len(request.Key) == 0 || len(request.InitialIP) == 0 {
|
|
return nil, errIncompleteGRPCRequest
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Check if account key is acceptable for use.
|
|
var key jose.JSONWebKey
|
|
err := key.UnmarshalJSON(request.Key)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, berrors.InternalServerError("failed to unmarshal account key: %s", err.Error())
|
|
}
|
|
err = ra.keyPolicy.GoodKey(ctx, key.Key)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, berrors.MalformedError("invalid public key: %s", err.Error())
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Check IP address rate limits.
|
|
var ipAddr net.IP
|
|
err = ipAddr.UnmarshalText(request.InitialIP)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, berrors.InternalServerError("failed to unmarshal ip address: %s", err.Error())
|
|
}
|
|
err = ra.checkRegistrationLimits(ctx, ipAddr)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Check that contacts conform to our expectations.
|
|
err = validateContactsPresent(request.Contact, request.ContactsPresent)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
err = ra.validateContacts(request.Contact)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Don't populate ID or CreatedAt because those will be set by the SA.
|
|
req := &corepb.Registration{
|
|
Key: request.Key,
|
|
Contact: request.Contact,
|
|
ContactsPresent: request.ContactsPresent,
|
|
Agreement: request.Agreement,
|
|
InitialIP: request.InitialIP,
|
|
Status: string(core.StatusValid),
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Store the registration object, then return the version that got stored.
|
|
res, err := ra.SA.NewRegistration(ctx, req)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ra.newRegCounter.Inc()
|
|
return res, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// validateContacts checks the provided list of contacts, returning an error if
|
|
// any are not acceptable. Unacceptable contacts lists include:
|
|
// * An empty list
|
|
// * A list has more than maxContactsPerReg contacts
|
|
// * A list containing an empty contact
|
|
// * A list containing a contact that does not parse as a URL
|
|
// * A list containing a contact that has a URL scheme other than mailto
|
|
// * A list containing a mailto contact that contains hfields
|
|
// * A list containing a contact that has non-ascii characters
|
|
// * A list containing a contact that doesn't pass `policy.ValidEmail`
|
|
func (ra *RegistrationAuthorityImpl) validateContacts(contacts []string) error {
|
|
if len(contacts) == 0 {
|
|
return nil // Nothing to validate
|
|
}
|
|
if ra.maxContactsPerReg > 0 && len(contacts) > ra.maxContactsPerReg {
|
|
return berrors.MalformedError(
|
|
"too many contacts provided: %d > %d",
|
|
len(contacts),
|
|
ra.maxContactsPerReg,
|
|
)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
for _, contact := range contacts {
|
|
if contact == "" {
|
|
return berrors.InvalidEmailError("empty contact")
|
|
}
|
|
parsed, err := url.Parse(contact)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return berrors.InvalidEmailError("invalid contact")
|
|
}
|
|
if parsed.Scheme != "mailto" {
|
|
return berrors.InvalidEmailError("contact method %q is not supported", parsed.Scheme)
|
|
}
|
|
if parsed.RawQuery != "" || contact[len(contact)-1] == '?' {
|
|
return berrors.InvalidEmailError("contact email %q contains a question mark", contact)
|
|
}
|
|
if parsed.Fragment != "" || contact[len(contact)-1] == '#' {
|
|
return berrors.InvalidEmailError("contact email %q contains a '#'", contact)
|
|
}
|
|
if !core.IsASCII(contact) {
|
|
return berrors.InvalidEmailError(
|
|
"contact email [%q] contains non-ASCII characters",
|
|
contact,
|
|
)
|
|
}
|
|
err = policy.ValidEmail(parsed.Opaque)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// NOTE(@cpu): For historical reasons (</3) we store ACME account contact
|
|
// information de-normalized in a fixed size `contact` field on the
|
|
// `registrations` table. At the time of writing this field is VARCHAR(191)
|
|
// That means the largest marshalled JSON value we can store is 191 bytes.
|
|
const maxContactBytes = 191
|
|
if jsonBytes, err := json.Marshal(contacts); err != nil {
|
|
// This shouldn't happen with a simple []string but if it does we want the
|
|
// error to be logged internally but served as a 500 to the user so we
|
|
// return a bare error and not a berror here.
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("failed to marshal reg.Contact to JSON: %#v", contacts)
|
|
} else if len(jsonBytes) >= maxContactBytes {
|
|
return berrors.InvalidEmailError(
|
|
"too many/too long contact(s). Please use shorter or fewer email addresses")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (ra *RegistrationAuthorityImpl) checkPendingAuthorizationLimit(ctx context.Context, regID int64) error {
|
|
limit := ra.rlPolicies.PendingAuthorizationsPerAccount()
|
|
if limit.Enabled() {
|
|
// This rate limit's threshold can only be overridden on a per-regID basis,
|
|
// not based on any other key.
|
|
threshold := limit.GetThreshold("", regID)
|
|
if threshold == -1 {
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
countPB, err := ra.SA.CountPendingAuthorizations2(ctx, &sapb.RegistrationID{
|
|
Id: regID,
|
|
})
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
if countPB.Count >= threshold {
|
|
ra.rateLimitCounter.WithLabelValues("pending_authorizations_by_registration_id", "exceeded").Inc()
|
|
ra.log.Infof("Rate limit exceeded, PendingAuthorizationsByRegID, regID: %d", regID)
|
|
return berrors.RateLimitError(0, "too many currently pending authorizations: %d", countPB.Count)
|
|
}
|
|
ra.rateLimitCounter.WithLabelValues("pending_authorizations_by_registration_id", "pass").Inc()
|
|
}
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// checkInvalidAuthorizationLimits checks the failed validation limit for each
|
|
// of the provided hostnames. It returns the first error.
|
|
func (ra *RegistrationAuthorityImpl) checkInvalidAuthorizationLimits(ctx context.Context, regID int64, hostnames []string) error {
|
|
results := make(chan error, len(hostnames))
|
|
for _, hostname := range hostnames {
|
|
go func(hostname string) {
|
|
results <- ra.checkInvalidAuthorizationLimit(ctx, regID, hostname)
|
|
}(hostname)
|
|
}
|
|
// We don't have to wait for all of the goroutines to finish because there's
|
|
// enough capacity in the chan for them all to write their result even if
|
|
// nothing is reading off the chan anymore.
|
|
for i := 0; i < len(hostnames); i++ {
|
|
err := <-results
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (ra *RegistrationAuthorityImpl) checkInvalidAuthorizationLimit(ctx context.Context, regID int64, hostname string) error {
|
|
limit := ra.rlPolicies.InvalidAuthorizationsPerAccount()
|
|
if !limit.Enabled() {
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
latest := ra.clk.Now().Add(ra.pendingAuthorizationLifetime)
|
|
earliest := latest.Add(-limit.Window.Duration)
|
|
req := &sapb.CountInvalidAuthorizationsRequest{
|
|
RegistrationID: regID,
|
|
Hostname: hostname,
|
|
Range: &sapb.Range{
|
|
Earliest: earliest.UnixNano(),
|
|
Latest: latest.UnixNano(),
|
|
},
|
|
}
|
|
count, err := ra.SA.CountInvalidAuthorizations2(ctx, req)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
// Most rate limits have a key for overrides, but there is no meaningful key
|
|
// here.
|
|
noKey := ""
|
|
if count.Count >= limit.GetThreshold(noKey, regID) {
|
|
ra.log.Infof("Rate limit exceeded, InvalidAuthorizationsByRegID, regID: %d", regID)
|
|
return berrors.FailedValidationError(0, "too many failed authorizations recently")
|
|
}
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// checkNewOrdersPerAccountLimit enforces the rlPolicies `NewOrdersPerAccount`
|
|
// rate limit. This rate limit ensures a client can not create more than the
|
|
// specified threshold of new orders within the specified time window.
|
|
func (ra *RegistrationAuthorityImpl) checkNewOrdersPerAccountLimit(ctx context.Context, acctID int64) error {
|
|
limit := ra.rlPolicies.NewOrdersPerAccount()
|
|
if !limit.Enabled() {
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
now := ra.clk.Now()
|
|
count, err := ra.SA.CountOrders(ctx, &sapb.CountOrdersRequest{
|
|
AccountID: acctID,
|
|
Range: &sapb.Range{
|
|
Earliest: now.Add(-limit.Window.Duration).UnixNano(),
|
|
Latest: now.UnixNano(),
|
|
},
|
|
})
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
// There is no meaningful override key to use for this rate limit
|
|
noKey := ""
|
|
if count.Count >= limit.GetThreshold(noKey, acctID) {
|
|
ra.rateLimitCounter.WithLabelValues("new_order_by_registration_id", "exceeded").Inc()
|
|
return berrors.RateLimitError(0, "too many new orders recently")
|
|
}
|
|
ra.rateLimitCounter.WithLabelValues("new_order_by_registration_id", "pass").Inc()
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// matchesCSR tests the contents of a generated certificate to make sure
|
|
// that the PublicKey, CommonName, and DNSNames match those provided in
|
|
// the CSR that was used to generate the certificate. It also checks the
|
|
// following fields for:
|
|
// - notBefore is not more than 24 hours ago
|
|
// - BasicConstraintsValid is true
|
|
// - IsCA is false
|
|
// - ExtKeyUsage only contains ExtKeyUsageServerAuth & ExtKeyUsageClientAuth
|
|
// - Subject only contains CommonName & Names
|
|
func (ra *RegistrationAuthorityImpl) matchesCSR(parsedCertificate *x509.Certificate, csr *x509.CertificateRequest) error {
|
|
// Check issued certificate matches what was expected from the CSR
|
|
hostNames := make([]string, len(csr.DNSNames))
|
|
copy(hostNames, csr.DNSNames)
|
|
if len(csr.Subject.CommonName) > 0 {
|
|
hostNames = append(hostNames, csr.Subject.CommonName)
|
|
}
|
|
hostNames = core.UniqueLowerNames(hostNames)
|
|
|
|
if !core.KeyDigestEquals(parsedCertificate.PublicKey, csr.PublicKey) {
|
|
return berrors.InternalServerError("generated certificate public key doesn't match CSR public key")
|
|
}
|
|
if parsedCertificate.Subject.CommonName != strings.ToLower(csr.Subject.CommonName) {
|
|
return berrors.InternalServerError("generated certificate CommonName doesn't match CSR CommonName")
|
|
}
|
|
// Sort both slices of names before comparison.
|
|
parsedNames := parsedCertificate.DNSNames
|
|
sort.Strings(parsedNames)
|
|
sort.Strings(hostNames)
|
|
if !reflect.DeepEqual(parsedNames, hostNames) {
|
|
return berrors.InternalServerError("generated certificate DNSNames don't match CSR DNSNames")
|
|
}
|
|
if !reflect.DeepEqual(parsedCertificate.IPAddresses, csr.IPAddresses) {
|
|
return berrors.InternalServerError("generated certificate IPAddresses don't match CSR IPAddresses")
|
|
}
|
|
if !reflect.DeepEqual(parsedCertificate.EmailAddresses, csr.EmailAddresses) {
|
|
return berrors.InternalServerError("generated certificate EmailAddresses don't match CSR EmailAddresses")
|
|
}
|
|
if len(parsedCertificate.Subject.Country) > 0 || len(parsedCertificate.Subject.Organization) > 0 ||
|
|
len(parsedCertificate.Subject.OrganizationalUnit) > 0 || len(parsedCertificate.Subject.Locality) > 0 ||
|
|
len(parsedCertificate.Subject.Province) > 0 || len(parsedCertificate.Subject.StreetAddress) > 0 ||
|
|
len(parsedCertificate.Subject.PostalCode) > 0 {
|
|
return berrors.InternalServerError("generated certificate Subject contains fields other than CommonName, or SerialNumber")
|
|
}
|
|
now := ra.clk.Now()
|
|
if now.Sub(parsedCertificate.NotBefore) > time.Hour*24 {
|
|
return berrors.InternalServerError("generated certificate is back dated %s", now.Sub(parsedCertificate.NotBefore))
|
|
}
|
|
if !parsedCertificate.BasicConstraintsValid {
|
|
return berrors.InternalServerError("generated certificate doesn't have basic constraints set")
|
|
}
|
|
if parsedCertificate.IsCA {
|
|
return berrors.InternalServerError("generated certificate can sign other certificates")
|
|
}
|
|
if !reflect.DeepEqual(parsedCertificate.ExtKeyUsage, []x509.ExtKeyUsage{x509.ExtKeyUsageServerAuth, x509.ExtKeyUsageClientAuth}) {
|
|
return berrors.InternalServerError("generated certificate doesn't have correct key usage extensions")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// checkOrderAuthorizations verifies that a provided set of names associated
|
|
// with a specific order and account has all of the required valid, unexpired
|
|
// authorizations to proceed with issuance. It returns the authorizations that
|
|
// satisfied the set of names or it returns an error. If it returns an error, it
|
|
// will be of type BoulderError.
|
|
func (ra *RegistrationAuthorityImpl) checkOrderAuthorizations(
|
|
ctx context.Context,
|
|
names []string,
|
|
acctID accountID,
|
|
orderID orderID) (map[string]*core.Authorization, error) {
|
|
// Get all of the valid authorizations for this account/order
|
|
req := &sapb.GetValidOrderAuthorizationsRequest{
|
|
Id: int64(orderID),
|
|
AcctID: int64(acctID),
|
|
}
|
|
authzMapPB, err := ra.SA.GetValidOrderAuthorizations2(ctx, req)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, berrors.InternalServerError("error in GetValidOrderAuthorizations: %s", err)
|
|
}
|
|
authzs, err := bgrpc.PBToAuthzMap(authzMapPB)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Ensure the names from the CSR are free of duplicates & lowercased.
|
|
names = core.UniqueLowerNames(names)
|
|
|
|
// Check the authorizations to ensure validity for the names required.
|
|
err = ra.checkAuthorizationsCAA(ctx, int64(acctID), names, authzs, ra.clk.Now())
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Check the challenges themselves too.
|
|
for _, authz := range authzs {
|
|
err = ra.PA.CheckAuthz(authz)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return authzs, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// validatedBefore checks if a given authorization's challenge was
|
|
// validated before a given time. Returns a bool.
|
|
func validatedBefore(authz *core.Authorization, caaRecheckTime time.Time) (bool, error) {
|
|
numChallenges := len(authz.Challenges)
|
|
if numChallenges != 1 {
|
|
return false, fmt.Errorf("authorization has incorrect number of challenges. 1 expected, %d found for: id %s", numChallenges, authz.ID)
|
|
}
|
|
if authz.Challenges[0].Validated == nil {
|
|
return false, fmt.Errorf("authorization's challenge has no validated timestamp for: id %s", authz.ID)
|
|
}
|
|
return authz.Challenges[0].Validated.Before(caaRecheckTime), nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// checkAuthorizationsCAA implements the common logic of validating a set of
|
|
// authorizations against a set of names that is used by both
|
|
// `checkAuthorizations` and `checkOrderAuthorizations`. If required CAA will be
|
|
// rechecked for authorizations that are too old.
|
|
// If it returns an error, it will be of type BoulderError.
|
|
func (ra *RegistrationAuthorityImpl) checkAuthorizationsCAA(
|
|
ctx context.Context,
|
|
acctID int64,
|
|
names []string,
|
|
authzs map[string]*core.Authorization,
|
|
now time.Time) error {
|
|
// badNames contains the names that were unauthorized
|
|
var badNames []string
|
|
// recheckAuthzs is a list of authorizations that must have their CAA records rechecked
|
|
var recheckAuthzs []*core.Authorization
|
|
|
|
// Per Baseline Requirements, CAA must be checked within 8 hours of
|
|
// issuance. CAA is checked when an authorization is validated, so as
|
|
// long as that was less than 8 hours ago, we're fine. We recheck if
|
|
// that was more than 7 hours ago, to be on the safe side. We can
|
|
// check to see if the authorized challenge `AttemptedAt`
|
|
// (`Validated`) value from the database is before our caaRecheckTime.
|
|
// Set the recheck time to 7 hours ago.
|
|
caaRecheckAfter := now.Add(caaRecheckDuration)
|
|
|
|
// Set a CAA recheck time based on the assumption of a 30 day authz
|
|
// lifetime. This has been deprecated in favor of a new check based
|
|
// off the Validated time stored in the database, but we want to check
|
|
// both for a time and increment a stat if this code path is hit for
|
|
// compliance safety.
|
|
caaRecheckTime := now.Add(ra.authorizationLifetime).Add(caaRecheckDuration)
|
|
|
|
for _, name := range names {
|
|
authz := authzs[name]
|
|
if authz == nil {
|
|
badNames = append(badNames, name)
|
|
} else if authz.Expires == nil {
|
|
return berrors.InternalServerError("found an authorization with a nil Expires field: id %s", authz.ID)
|
|
} else if authz.Expires.Before(now) {
|
|
badNames = append(badNames, name)
|
|
} else if staleCAA, err := validatedBefore(authz, caaRecheckAfter); err != nil {
|
|
return berrors.InternalServerError(err.Error())
|
|
} else if staleCAA {
|
|
// Ensure that CAA is rechecked for this name
|
|
recheckAuthzs = append(recheckAuthzs, authz)
|
|
} else if authz.Expires.Before(caaRecheckTime) {
|
|
// Ensure that CAA is rechecked for this name
|
|
recheckAuthzs = append(recheckAuthzs, authz)
|
|
// This codepath should not be used, but is here as a safety
|
|
// net until the new codepath is proven. Increment metric if
|
|
// it is used.
|
|
ra.recheckCAAUsedAuthzLifetime.Add(1)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if len(recheckAuthzs) > 0 {
|
|
err := ra.recheckCAA(ctx, recheckAuthzs)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if len(badNames) > 0 {
|
|
return berrors.UnauthorizedError(
|
|
"authorizations for these names not found or expired: %s",
|
|
strings.Join(badNames, ", "),
|
|
)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
caaEvent := &finalizationCAACheckEvent{
|
|
Requester: acctID,
|
|
Reused: len(authzs) - len(recheckAuthzs),
|
|
Rechecked: len(recheckAuthzs),
|
|
}
|
|
ra.log.InfoObject("FinalizationCaaCheck", caaEvent)
|
|
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// recheckCAA accepts a list of of names that need to have their CAA records
|
|
// rechecked because their associated authorizations are sufficiently old and
|
|
// performs the CAA checks required for each. If any of the rechecks fail an
|
|
// error is returned.
|
|
func (ra *RegistrationAuthorityImpl) recheckCAA(ctx context.Context, authzs []*core.Authorization) error {
|
|
ra.recheckCAACounter.Add(float64(len(authzs)))
|
|
|
|
type authzCAAResult struct {
|
|
authz *core.Authorization
|
|
err error
|
|
}
|
|
ch := make(chan authzCAAResult, len(authzs))
|
|
for _, authz := range authzs {
|
|
go func(authz *core.Authorization) {
|
|
name := authz.Identifier.Value
|
|
|
|
// If an authorization has multiple valid challenges,
|
|
// the type of the first valid challenge is used for
|
|
// the purposes of CAA rechecking.
|
|
var method string
|
|
for _, challenge := range authz.Challenges {
|
|
if challenge.Status == core.StatusValid {
|
|
method = string(challenge.Type)
|
|
break
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if method == "" {
|
|
ch <- authzCAAResult{
|
|
authz: authz,
|
|
err: berrors.InternalServerError(
|
|
"Internal error determining validation method for authorization ID %v (%v)",
|
|
authz.ID, name),
|
|
}
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
resp, err := ra.caa.IsCAAValid(ctx, &vapb.IsCAAValidRequest{
|
|
Domain: name,
|
|
ValidationMethod: method,
|
|
AccountURIID: authz.RegistrationID,
|
|
})
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
ra.log.AuditErrf("Rechecking CAA: %s", err)
|
|
err = berrors.InternalServerError(
|
|
"Internal error rechecking CAA for authorization ID %v (%v)",
|
|
authz.ID, name,
|
|
)
|
|
} else if resp.Problem != nil {
|
|
err = berrors.CAAError(resp.Problem.Detail)
|
|
}
|
|
ch <- authzCAAResult{
|
|
authz: authz,
|
|
err: err,
|
|
}
|
|
}(authz)
|
|
}
|
|
var subErrors []berrors.SubBoulderError
|
|
// Read a recheckResult for each authz from the results channel
|
|
for i := 0; i < len(authzs); i++ {
|
|
recheckResult := <-ch
|
|
// If the result had a CAA boulder error, construct a suberror with the
|
|
// identifier from the authorization that was checked.
|
|
err := recheckResult.err
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
var bErr *berrors.BoulderError
|
|
if errors.As(err, &bErr) && bErr.Type == berrors.CAA {
|
|
subErrors = append(subErrors, berrors.SubBoulderError{
|
|
Identifier: recheckResult.authz.Identifier,
|
|
BoulderError: bErr})
|
|
} else {
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if len(subErrors) > 0 {
|
|
var detail string
|
|
// If there was only one error, then use it as the top level error that is
|
|
// returned.
|
|
if len(subErrors) == 1 {
|
|
return subErrors[0].BoulderError
|
|
}
|
|
detail = fmt.Sprintf(
|
|
"Rechecking CAA for %q and %d more identifiers failed. "+
|
|
"Refer to sub-problems for more information",
|
|
subErrors[0].Identifier.Value,
|
|
len(subErrors)-1)
|
|
return (&berrors.BoulderError{
|
|
Type: berrors.CAA,
|
|
Detail: detail,
|
|
}).WithSubErrors(subErrors)
|
|
}
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// failOrder marks an order as failed by setting the problem details field of
|
|
// the order & persisting it through the SA. If an error occurs doing this we
|
|
// log it and don't modify the input order. There aren't any alternatives if we
|
|
// can't add the error to the order. This function MUST only be called when we
|
|
// are already returning an error for another reason.
|
|
func (ra *RegistrationAuthorityImpl) failOrder(
|
|
ctx context.Context,
|
|
order *corepb.Order,
|
|
prob *probs.ProblemDetails) {
|
|
|
|
// Convert the problem to a protobuf problem for the *corepb.Order field
|
|
pbProb, err := bgrpc.ProblemDetailsToPB(prob)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
ra.log.AuditErrf("Could not convert order error problem to PB: %q", err)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Assign the protobuf problem to the field and save it via the SA
|
|
order.Error = pbProb
|
|
_, err = ra.SA.SetOrderError(ctx, &sapb.SetOrderErrorRequest{
|
|
Id: order.Id,
|
|
Error: order.Error,
|
|
})
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
ra.log.AuditErrf("Could not persist order error: %q", err)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// To help minimize the chance that an accountID would be used as an order ID
|
|
// (or vice versa) when calling functions that use both we define internal
|
|
// `accountID` and `orderID` types so that callers must explicitly cast.
|
|
type accountID int64
|
|
type orderID int64
|
|
|
|
// FinalizeOrder accepts a request to finalize an order object and, if possible,
|
|
// issues a certificate to satisfy the order. If an order does not have valid,
|
|
// unexpired authorizations for all of its associated names an error is
|
|
// returned. Similarly we vet that all of the names in the order are acceptable
|
|
// based on current policy and return an error if the order can't be fulfilled.
|
|
// If successful the order will be returned in processing status for the client
|
|
// to poll while awaiting finalization to occur.
|
|
func (ra *RegistrationAuthorityImpl) FinalizeOrder(ctx context.Context, req *rapb.FinalizeOrderRequest) (*corepb.Order, error) {
|
|
// Step 1: Set up logging/tracing and validate the Order
|
|
if req == nil || req.Order == nil || len(req.Csr) == 0 {
|
|
return nil, errIncompleteGRPCRequest
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
logEvent := certificateRequestEvent{
|
|
ID: core.NewToken(),
|
|
OrderID: req.Order.Id,
|
|
Requester: req.Order.RegistrationID,
|
|
RequestTime: ra.clk.Now(),
|
|
}
|
|
beeline.AddFieldToTrace(ctx, "issuance.id", logEvent.ID)
|
|
beeline.AddFieldToTrace(ctx, "order.id", req.Order.Id)
|
|
beeline.AddFieldToTrace(ctx, "acct.id", req.Order.RegistrationID)
|
|
|
|
csr, err := ra.validateFinalizeRequest(ctx, req, &logEvent)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Observe the age of this order, so we know how quickly most clients complete
|
|
// issuance flows.
|
|
ra.orderAges.Observe(ra.clk.Since(time.Unix(0, req.Order.Created)).Seconds())
|
|
|
|
// Step 2: Set the Order to Processing status
|
|
//
|
|
// We do this separately from the issuance process itself so that, when we
|
|
// switch to doing issuance asynchronously, we aren't lying to the client
|
|
// when we say that their order is already Processing.
|
|
//
|
|
// NOTE(@cpu): After this point any errors that are encountered must update
|
|
// the state of the order to invalid by setting the order's error field.
|
|
// Otherwise the order will be "stuck" in processing state. It can not be
|
|
// finalized because it isn't pending, but we aren't going to process it
|
|
// further because we already did and encountered an error.
|
|
_, err = ra.SA.SetOrderProcessing(ctx, &sapb.OrderRequest{Id: req.Order.Id})
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
// Fail the order with a server internal error - we weren't able to set the
|
|
// status to processing and that's unexpected & weird.
|
|
ra.failOrder(ctx, req.Order, probs.ServerInternal("Error setting order processing"))
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Step 3: Issue the Certificate
|
|
cert, err := ra.issueCertificateInner(
|
|
ctx, csr, accountID(req.Order.RegistrationID), orderID(req.Order.Id))
|
|
|
|
// Step 4: Fail the order if necessary, and update metrics and log fields
|
|
var result string
|
|
order := req.Order
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
// The problem is computed using `web.ProblemDetailsForError`, the same
|
|
// function the WFE uses to convert between `berrors` and problems. This
|
|
// will turn normal expected berrors like berrors.UnauthorizedError into the
|
|
// correct `urn:ietf:params:acme:error:unauthorized` problem while not
|
|
// letting anything like a server internal error through with sensitive
|
|
// info.
|
|
ra.failOrder(ctx, req.Order, web.ProblemDetailsForError(err, "Error finalizing order"))
|
|
|
|
// Update the order status locally since the SA doesn't return the updated
|
|
// order itself after setting the status
|
|
order.Status = string(core.StatusInvalid)
|
|
|
|
logEvent.Error = err.Error()
|
|
beeline.AddFieldToTrace(ctx, "issuance.error", err)
|
|
result = "error"
|
|
} else {
|
|
// Update the order status locally since the SA doesn't return the updated
|
|
// order itself after setting the status
|
|
order.CertificateSerial = core.SerialToString(cert.SerialNumber)
|
|
order.Status = string(core.StatusValid)
|
|
|
|
ra.namesPerCert.With(
|
|
prometheus.Labels{"type": "issued"},
|
|
).Observe(float64(len(order.Names)))
|
|
|
|
ra.newCertCounter.Inc()
|
|
|
|
logEvent.SerialNumber = core.SerialToString(cert.SerialNumber)
|
|
beeline.AddFieldToTrace(ctx, "cert.serial", core.SerialToString(cert.SerialNumber))
|
|
logEvent.CommonName = cert.Subject.CommonName
|
|
beeline.AddFieldToTrace(ctx, "cert.common_name", cert.Subject.CommonName)
|
|
logEvent.Names = cert.DNSNames
|
|
beeline.AddFieldToTrace(ctx, "cert.dns_names", cert.DNSNames)
|
|
logEvent.NotBefore = cert.NotBefore
|
|
beeline.AddFieldToTrace(ctx, "cert.not_before", cert.NotBefore)
|
|
logEvent.NotAfter = cert.NotAfter
|
|
beeline.AddFieldToTrace(ctx, "cert.not_after", cert.NotAfter)
|
|
|
|
result = "successful"
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
logEvent.ResponseTime = ra.clk.Now()
|
|
ra.log.AuditObject(fmt.Sprintf("Certificate request - %s", result), logEvent)
|
|
|
|
// Return both the order and the error: if issueCertificateInner worked, then
|
|
// err will be nil; if it didn't, then we'll propagate that error upwards.
|
|
return order, err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// validateFinalizeRequest checks that a FinalizeOrder request is fully correct
|
|
// and ready for issuance.
|
|
func (ra *RegistrationAuthorityImpl) validateFinalizeRequest(
|
|
ctx context.Context,
|
|
req *rapb.FinalizeOrderRequest,
|
|
logEvent *certificateRequestEvent) (*x509.CertificateRequest, error) {
|
|
if req.Order.Id <= 0 {
|
|
return nil, berrors.MalformedError("invalid order ID: %d", req.Order.Id)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if req.Order.RegistrationID <= 0 {
|
|
return nil, berrors.MalformedError("invalid account ID: %d", req.Order.RegistrationID)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if core.AcmeStatus(req.Order.Status) != core.StatusReady {
|
|
return nil, berrors.OrderNotReadyError(
|
|
"Order's status (%q) is not acceptable for finalization",
|
|
req.Order.Status)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// There should never be an order with 0 names at the stage, but we check to
|
|
// be on the safe side, throwing an internal server error if this assumption
|
|
// is ever violated.
|
|
if len(req.Order.Names) == 0 {
|
|
return nil, berrors.InternalServerError("Order has no associated names")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Parse the CSR from the request
|
|
csr, err := x509.ParseCertificateRequest(req.Csr)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, berrors.BadCSRError("unable to parse CSR: %s", err.Error())
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
err = csrlib.VerifyCSR(ctx, csr, ra.maxNames, &ra.keyPolicy, ra.PA)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
// VerifyCSR returns berror instances that can be passed through as-is
|
|
// without wrapping.
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
beeline.AddFieldToTrace(ctx, "csr.cn", csr.Subject.CommonName)
|
|
beeline.AddFieldToTrace(ctx, "csr.dnsnames", csr.DNSNames)
|
|
|
|
// Dedupe, lowercase and sort both the names from the CSR and the names in the
|
|
// order.
|
|
csrNames := core.UniqueLowerNames(csr.DNSNames)
|
|
orderNames := core.UniqueLowerNames(req.Order.Names)
|
|
|
|
// Immediately reject the request if the number of names differ
|
|
if len(orderNames) != len(csrNames) {
|
|
return nil, berrors.UnauthorizedError("Order includes different number of names than CSR specifies")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Check that the order names and the CSR names are an exact match
|
|
for i, name := range orderNames {
|
|
if name != csrNames[i] {
|
|
return nil, berrors.UnauthorizedError("CSR is missing Order domain %q", name)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Get the originating account for use in the next check.
|
|
regPB, err := ra.SA.GetRegistration(ctx, &sapb.RegistrationID{Id: req.Order.RegistrationID})
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
account, err := bgrpc.PbToRegistration(regPB)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Make sure they're not using their account key as the certificate key too.
|
|
if core.KeyDigestEquals(csr.PublicKey, account.Key) {
|
|
return nil, berrors.MalformedError("certificate public key must be different than account key")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Double-check that all authorizations on this order are also associated with
|
|
// the same account as the order itself.
|
|
authzs, err := ra.checkOrderAuthorizations(ctx, csrNames, accountID(req.Order.RegistrationID), orderID(req.Order.Id))
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
// Pass through the error without wrapping it because the called functions
|
|
// return BoulderError and we don't want to lose the type.
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Collect up a certificateRequestAuthz that stores the ID and challenge type
|
|
// of each of the valid authorizations we used for this issuance.
|
|
logEventAuthzs := make(map[string]certificateRequestAuthz, len(csrNames))
|
|
for name, authz := range authzs {
|
|
// No need to check for error here because we know this same call just
|
|
// succeeded inside ra.checkOrderAuthorizations
|
|
solvedByChallengeType, _ := authz.SolvedBy()
|
|
logEventAuthzs[name] = certificateRequestAuthz{
|
|
ID: authz.ID,
|
|
ChallengeType: solvedByChallengeType,
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
logEvent.Authorizations = logEventAuthzs
|
|
|
|
// Mark that we verified the CN and SANs
|
|
logEvent.VerifiedFields = []string{"subject.commonName", "subjectAltName"}
|
|
|
|
return csr, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// issueCertificateInner handles the heavy lifting aspects of certificate
|
|
// issuance.
|
|
//
|
|
// This function is responsible for ensuring that we never try to issue a final
|
|
// certificate twice for the same precertificate, because that has the potential
|
|
// to create certificates with duplicate serials. For instance, this could
|
|
// happen if final certificates were created with different sets of SCTs. This
|
|
// function accomplishes that by bailing on issuance if there is any error in
|
|
// IssueCertificateForPrecertificate; there are no retries, and serials are
|
|
// generated in IssuePrecertificate, so serials with errors are dropped and
|
|
// never have final certificates issued for them (because there is a possibility
|
|
// that the certificate was actually issued but there was an error returning
|
|
// it).
|
|
func (ra *RegistrationAuthorityImpl) issueCertificateInner(
|
|
ctx context.Context,
|
|
csr *x509.CertificateRequest,
|
|
acctID accountID,
|
|
oID orderID) (*x509.Certificate, error) {
|
|
// wrapError adds a prefix to an error. If the error is a boulder error then
|
|
// the problem detail is updated with the prefix. Otherwise a new error is
|
|
// returned with the message prefixed using `fmt.Errorf`
|
|
wrapError := func(e error, prefix string) error {
|
|
if berr, ok := e.(*berrors.BoulderError); ok {
|
|
berr.Detail = fmt.Sprintf("%s: %s", prefix, berr.Detail)
|
|
return berr
|
|
}
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("%s: %s", prefix, e)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
issueReq := &capb.IssueCertificateRequest{
|
|
Csr: csr.Raw,
|
|
RegistrationID: int64(acctID),
|
|
OrderID: int64(oID),
|
|
}
|
|
precert, err := ra.CA.IssuePrecertificate(ctx, issueReq)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, wrapError(err, "issuing precertificate")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
parsedPrecert, err := x509.ParseCertificate(precert.DER)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, wrapError(err, "parsing precertificate")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
scts, err := ra.getSCTs(ctx, precert.DER, parsedPrecert.NotAfter)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, wrapError(err, "getting SCTs")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
cert, err := ra.CA.IssueCertificateForPrecertificate(ctx, &capb.IssueCertificateForPrecertificateRequest{
|
|
DER: precert.DER,
|
|
SCTs: scts,
|
|
RegistrationID: int64(acctID),
|
|
OrderID: int64(oID),
|
|
})
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, wrapError(err, "issuing certificate for precertificate")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
parsedCertificate, err := x509.ParseCertificate(cert.Der)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, wrapError(err, "parsing final certificate")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Asynchronously submit the final certificate to any configured logs
|
|
go ra.ctpolicy.SubmitFinalCert(cert.Der, parsedCertificate.NotAfter)
|
|
|
|
// TODO(#6587): Make this error case Very Alarming
|
|
err = ra.matchesCSR(parsedCertificate, csr)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
_, err = ra.SA.FinalizeOrder(ctx, &sapb.FinalizeOrderRequest{
|
|
Id: int64(oID),
|
|
CertificateSerial: core.SerialToString(parsedCertificate.SerialNumber),
|
|
})
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, wrapError(err, "persisting finalized order")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return parsedCertificate, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (ra *RegistrationAuthorityImpl) getSCTs(ctx context.Context, cert []byte, expiration time.Time) (core.SCTDERs, error) {
|
|
started := ra.clk.Now()
|
|
scts, err := ra.ctpolicy.GetSCTs(ctx, cert, expiration)
|
|
took := ra.clk.Since(started)
|
|
// The final cert has already been issued so actually return it to the
|
|
// user even if this fails since we aren't actually doing anything with
|
|
// the SCTs yet.
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
state := "failure"
|
|
if err == context.DeadlineExceeded {
|
|
state = "deadlineExceeded"
|
|
// Convert the error to a missingSCTsError to communicate the timeout,
|
|
// otherwise it will be a generic serverInternalError
|
|
err = berrors.MissingSCTsError(err.Error())
|
|
}
|
|
ra.log.Warningf("ctpolicy.GetSCTs failed: %s", err)
|
|
ra.ctpolicyResults.With(prometheus.Labels{"result": state}).Observe(took.Seconds())
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
ra.ctpolicyResults.With(prometheus.Labels{"result": "success"}).Observe(took.Seconds())
|
|
return scts, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// domainsForRateLimiting transforms a list of FQDNs into a list of eTLD+1's
|
|
// for the purpose of rate limiting. It also de-duplicates the output
|
|
// domains. Exact public suffix matches are included.
|
|
func domainsForRateLimiting(names []string) []string {
|
|
var domains []string
|
|
for _, name := range names {
|
|
domain, err := publicsuffix.Domain(name)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
// The only possible errors are:
|
|
// (1) publicsuffix.Domain is giving garbage values
|
|
// (2) the public suffix is the domain itself
|
|
// We assume 2 and include the original name in the result.
|
|
domains = append(domains, name)
|
|
} else {
|
|
domains = append(domains, domain)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return core.UniqueLowerNames(domains)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// enforceNameCounts uses the provided count RPC to find a count of certificates
|
|
// for each of the names. If the count for any of the names exceeds the limit
|
|
// for the given registration then the names out of policy are returned to be
|
|
// used for a rate limit error.
|
|
func (ra *RegistrationAuthorityImpl) enforceNameCounts(ctx context.Context, names []string, limit ratelimit.RateLimitPolicy, regID int64) ([]string, time.Time, error) {
|
|
now := ra.clk.Now()
|
|
req := &sapb.CountCertificatesByNamesRequest{
|
|
Names: names,
|
|
Range: &sapb.Range{
|
|
Earliest: limit.WindowBegin(now).UnixNano(),
|
|
Latest: now.UnixNano(),
|
|
},
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
response, err := ra.SA.CountCertificatesByNames(ctx, req)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, time.Time{}, err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if len(response.Counts) == 0 {
|
|
return nil, time.Time{}, errIncompleteGRPCResponse
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
var badNames []string
|
|
// Find the names that have counts at or over the threshold. Range
|
|
// over the names slice input to ensure the order of badNames will
|
|
// return the badNames in the same order they were input.
|
|
for _, name := range names {
|
|
if response.Counts[name] >= limit.GetThreshold(name, regID) {
|
|
badNames = append(badNames, name)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return badNames, response.Earliest.AsTime(), nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (ra *RegistrationAuthorityImpl) checkCertificatesPerNameLimit(ctx context.Context, names []string, limit ratelimit.RateLimitPolicy, regID int64) error {
|
|
// check if there is already an existing certificate for
|
|
// the exact name set we are issuing for. If so bypass the
|
|
// the certificatesPerName limit.
|
|
exists, err := ra.SA.FQDNSetExists(ctx, &sapb.FQDNSetExistsRequest{Domains: names})
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("checking renewal exemption for %q: %s", names, err)
|
|
}
|
|
if exists.Exists {
|
|
ra.rateLimitCounter.WithLabelValues("certificates_for_domain", "FQDN set bypass").Inc()
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
tldNames := domainsForRateLimiting(names)
|
|
namesOutOfLimit, earliest, err := ra.enforceNameCounts(ctx, tldNames, limit, regID)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("checking certificates per name limit for %q: %s",
|
|
names, err)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if len(namesOutOfLimit) > 0 {
|
|
// check if there is already an existing certificate for
|
|
// the exact name set we are issuing for. If so bypass the
|
|
// the certificatesPerName limit.
|
|
exists, err := ra.SA.FQDNSetExists(ctx, &sapb.FQDNSetExistsRequest{Domains: names})
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("checking renewal exemption for %q: %s", names, err)
|
|
}
|
|
if exists.Exists {
|
|
ra.rateLimitCounter.WithLabelValues("certificates_for_domain", "FQDN set bypass").Inc()
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Determine the amount of time until the earliest event would fall out
|
|
// of the window.
|
|
retryAfter := earliest.Add(limit.Window.Duration).Sub(ra.clk.Now())
|
|
retryString := earliest.Add(limit.Window.Duration).Format(time.RFC3339)
|
|
|
|
ra.log.Infof("Rate limit exceeded, CertificatesForDomain, regID: %d, domains: %s", regID, strings.Join(namesOutOfLimit, ", "))
|
|
ra.rateLimitCounter.WithLabelValues("certificates_for_domain", "exceeded").Inc()
|
|
if len(namesOutOfLimit) > 1 {
|
|
var subErrors []berrors.SubBoulderError
|
|
for _, name := range namesOutOfLimit {
|
|
subErrors = append(subErrors, berrors.SubBoulderError{
|
|
Identifier: identifier.DNSIdentifier(name),
|
|
BoulderError: berrors.RateLimitError(retryAfter, "too many certificates already issued. Retry after %s", retryString).(*berrors.BoulderError),
|
|
})
|
|
}
|
|
return berrors.RateLimitError(retryAfter, "too many certificates already issued for multiple names (%q and %d others). Retry after %s", namesOutOfLimit[0], len(namesOutOfLimit), retryString).(*berrors.BoulderError).WithSubErrors(subErrors)
|
|
}
|
|
return berrors.RateLimitError(retryAfter, "too many certificates already issued for %q. Retry after %s", namesOutOfLimit[0], retryString)
|
|
}
|
|
ra.rateLimitCounter.WithLabelValues("certificates_for_domain", "pass").Inc()
|
|
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (ra *RegistrationAuthorityImpl) checkCertificatesPerFQDNSetLimit(ctx context.Context, names []string, limit ratelimit.RateLimitPolicy, regID int64) error {
|
|
names = core.UniqueLowerNames(names)
|
|
threshold := limit.GetThreshold(strings.Join(names, ","), regID)
|
|
if threshold <= 0 {
|
|
// No limit configured.
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
prevIssuances, err := ra.SA.FQDNSetTimestampsForWindow(ctx, &sapb.CountFQDNSetsRequest{
|
|
Domains: names,
|
|
Window: limit.Window.Duration.Nanoseconds(),
|
|
})
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("checking duplicate certificate limit for %q: %s", names, err)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if int64(len(prevIssuances.Timestamps)) < threshold {
|
|
// Issuance in window is below the threshold, no need to limit.
|
|
return nil
|
|
} else {
|
|
// Evaluate the rate limit using a leaky bucket algorithm. The bucket
|
|
// has a capacity of threshold and is refilled at a rate of 1 token per
|
|
// limit.Window/threshold from the time of each issuance timestamp.
|
|
now := ra.clk.Now()
|
|
nsPerToken := limit.Window.Nanoseconds() / threshold
|
|
for i, timestamp := range prevIssuances.Timestamps {
|
|
tokensGeneratedSince := now.Add(-time.Duration(int64(i+1) * nsPerToken))
|
|
if time.Unix(0, timestamp).Before(tokensGeneratedSince) {
|
|
// We know `i+1` tokens were generated since `tokenGeneratedSince`,
|
|
// and only `i` certificates were issued, so there's room to allow
|
|
// for an additional issuance.
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
retryTime := time.Unix(0, prevIssuances.Timestamps[0]).Add(time.Duration(nsPerToken))
|
|
retryAfter := retryTime.Sub(now)
|
|
return berrors.DuplicateCertificateError(
|
|
retryAfter,
|
|
"too many certificates (%d) already issued for this exact set of domains in the last %.0f hours: %s, retry after %s",
|
|
threshold, limit.Window.Duration.Hours(), strings.Join(names, ","), retryTime.Format(time.RFC3339),
|
|
)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (ra *RegistrationAuthorityImpl) checkLimits(ctx context.Context, names []string, regID int64) error {
|
|
certNameLimits := ra.rlPolicies.CertificatesPerName()
|
|
if certNameLimits.Enabled() {
|
|
err := ra.checkCertificatesPerNameLimit(ctx, names, certNameLimits, regID)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
fqdnFastLimits := ra.rlPolicies.CertificatesPerFQDNSetFast()
|
|
if fqdnFastLimits.Enabled() {
|
|
err := ra.checkCertificatesPerFQDNSetLimit(ctx, names, fqdnFastLimits, regID)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
fqdnLimits := ra.rlPolicies.CertificatesPerFQDNSet()
|
|
if fqdnLimits.Enabled() {
|
|
err := ra.checkCertificatesPerFQDNSetLimit(ctx, names, fqdnLimits, regID)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// UpdateRegistration updates an existing Registration with new values. Caller
|
|
// is responsible for making sure that update.Key is only different from base.Key
|
|
// if it is being called from the WFE key change endpoint.
|
|
// TODO(#5554): Split this into separate methods for updating Contacts vs Key.
|
|
func (ra *RegistrationAuthorityImpl) UpdateRegistration(ctx context.Context, req *rapb.UpdateRegistrationRequest) (*corepb.Registration, error) {
|
|
// Error if the request is nil, there is no account key or IP address
|
|
if req.Base == nil || len(req.Base.Key) == 0 || len(req.Base.InitialIP) == 0 || req.Base.Id == 0 {
|
|
return nil, errIncompleteGRPCRequest
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
err := validateContactsPresent(req.Base.Contact, req.Base.ContactsPresent)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
err = validateContactsPresent(req.Update.Contact, req.Update.ContactsPresent)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
err = ra.validateContacts(req.Update.Contact)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
update, changed := mergeUpdate(req.Base, req.Update)
|
|
if !changed {
|
|
// If merging the update didn't actually change the base then our work is
|
|
// done, we can return before calling ra.SA.UpdateRegistration since there's
|
|
// nothing for the SA to do
|
|
return req.Base, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
_, err = ra.SA.UpdateRegistration(ctx, update)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
// berrors.InternalServerError since the user-data was validated before being
|
|
// passed to the SA.
|
|
err = berrors.InternalServerError("Could not update registration: %s", err)
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return update, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func contactsEqual(a []string, b []string) bool {
|
|
if len(a) != len(b) {
|
|
return false
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// If there is an existing contact slice and it has the same length as the
|
|
// new contact slice we need to look at each contact to determine if there
|
|
// is a change being made. Use `sort.Strings` here to ensure a consistent
|
|
// comparison
|
|
sort.Strings(a)
|
|
sort.Strings(b)
|
|
for i := 0; i < len(b); i++ {
|
|
// If the contact's string representation differs at any index they aren't
|
|
// equal
|
|
if a[i] != b[i] {
|
|
return false
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// They are equal!
|
|
return true
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// MergeUpdate returns a new corepb.Registration with the majority of its fields
|
|
// copies from the base Registration, and a subset (Contact, Agreement, and Key)
|
|
// copied from the update Registration. It also returns a boolean indicating
|
|
// whether or not this operation resulted in a Registration which differs from
|
|
// the base.
|
|
func mergeUpdate(base *corepb.Registration, update *corepb.Registration) (*corepb.Registration, bool) {
|
|
var changed bool
|
|
|
|
// Start by copying all of the fields.
|
|
res := &corepb.Registration{
|
|
Id: base.Id,
|
|
Key: base.Key,
|
|
Contact: base.Contact,
|
|
ContactsPresent: base.ContactsPresent,
|
|
Agreement: base.Agreement,
|
|
InitialIP: base.InitialIP,
|
|
CreatedAt: base.CreatedAt,
|
|
Status: base.Status,
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Note: we allow update.Contact to overwrite base.Contact even if the former
|
|
// is empty in order to allow users to remove the contact associated with
|
|
// a registration. If the update has ContactsPresent set to false, then we
|
|
// know it is not attempting to update the contacts field.
|
|
if update.ContactsPresent && !contactsEqual(base.Contact, update.Contact) {
|
|
res.Contact = update.Contact
|
|
res.ContactsPresent = update.ContactsPresent
|
|
changed = true
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if len(update.Agreement) > 0 && update.Agreement != base.Agreement {
|
|
res.Agreement = update.Agreement
|
|
changed = true
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if len(update.Key) > 0 {
|
|
if len(update.Key) != len(base.Key) {
|
|
res.Key = update.Key
|
|
changed = true
|
|
} else {
|
|
for i := 0; i < len(base.Key); i++ {
|
|
if update.Key[i] != base.Key[i] {
|
|
res.Key = update.Key
|
|
changed = true
|
|
break
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return res, changed
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// recordValidation records an authorization validation event,
|
|
// it should only be used on v2 style authorizations.
|
|
func (ra *RegistrationAuthorityImpl) recordValidation(ctx context.Context, authID string, authExpires *time.Time, challenge *core.Challenge) error {
|
|
authzID, err := strconv.ParseInt(authID, 10, 64)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
var expires int64
|
|
if challenge.Status == core.StatusInvalid {
|
|
expires = authExpires.UnixNano()
|
|
} else {
|
|
expires = ra.clk.Now().Add(ra.authorizationLifetime).UnixNano()
|
|
}
|
|
vr, err := bgrpc.ValidationResultToPB(challenge.ValidationRecord, challenge.Error)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
var validated int64
|
|
if challenge.Validated != nil {
|
|
validated = challenge.Validated.UTC().UnixNano()
|
|
}
|
|
_, err = ra.SA.FinalizeAuthorization2(ctx, &sapb.FinalizeAuthorizationRequest{
|
|
Id: authzID,
|
|
Status: string(challenge.Status),
|
|
Expires: expires,
|
|
Attempted: string(challenge.Type),
|
|
AttemptedAt: validated,
|
|
ValidationRecords: vr.Records,
|
|
ValidationError: vr.Problems,
|
|
})
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// PerformValidation initiates validation for a specific challenge associated
|
|
// with the given base authorization. The authorization and challenge are
|
|
// updated based on the results.
|
|
func (ra *RegistrationAuthorityImpl) PerformValidation(
|
|
ctx context.Context,
|
|
req *rapb.PerformValidationRequest) (*corepb.Authorization, error) {
|
|
|
|
// Clock for start of PerformValidation.
|
|
vStart := ra.clk.Now()
|
|
|
|
if req.Authz == nil || req.Authz.Id == "" || req.Authz.Identifier == "" || req.Authz.Status == "" || req.Authz.Expires == 0 {
|
|
return nil, errIncompleteGRPCRequest
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
authz, err := bgrpc.PBToAuthz(req.Authz)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Refuse to update expired authorizations
|
|
if authz.Expires == nil || authz.Expires.Before(ra.clk.Now()) {
|
|
return nil, berrors.MalformedError("expired authorization")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
challIndex := int(req.ChallengeIndex)
|
|
if challIndex >= len(authz.Challenges) {
|
|
return nil,
|
|
berrors.MalformedError("invalid challenge index '%d'", challIndex)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ch := &authz.Challenges[challIndex]
|
|
|
|
// This challenge type may have been disabled since the challenge was created.
|
|
if !ra.PA.ChallengeTypeEnabled(ch.Type) {
|
|
return nil, berrors.MalformedError("challenge type %q no longer allowed", ch.Type)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// When configured with `reuseValidAuthz` we can expect some clients to try
|
|
// and update a challenge for an authorization that is already valid. In this
|
|
// case we don't need to process the challenge update. It wouldn't be helpful,
|
|
// the overall authorization is already good! We increment a stat for this
|
|
// case and return early.
|
|
if ra.reuseValidAuthz && authz.Status == core.StatusValid {
|
|
return req.Authz, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if authz.Status != core.StatusPending {
|
|
return nil, berrors.MalformedError("authorization must be pending")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Look up the account key for this authorization
|
|
regPB, err := ra.SA.GetRegistration(ctx, &sapb.RegistrationID{Id: authz.RegistrationID})
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, berrors.InternalServerError(err.Error())
|
|
}
|
|
reg, err := bgrpc.PbToRegistration(regPB)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, berrors.InternalServerError(err.Error())
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Compute the key authorization field based on the registration key
|
|
expectedKeyAuthorization, err := ch.ExpectedKeyAuthorization(reg.Key)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, berrors.InternalServerError("could not compute expected key authorization value")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Populate the ProvidedKeyAuthorization such that the VA can confirm the
|
|
// expected vs actual without needing the registration key. Historically this
|
|
// was done with the value from the challenge response and so the field name
|
|
// is called "ProvidedKeyAuthorization", in reality this is just
|
|
// "KeyAuthorization".
|
|
// TODO(@cpu): Rename ProvidedKeyAuthorization to KeyAuthorization
|
|
ch.ProvidedKeyAuthorization = expectedKeyAuthorization
|
|
|
|
// Double check before sending to VA
|
|
if cErr := ch.CheckConsistencyForValidation(); cErr != nil {
|
|
return nil, berrors.MalformedError(cErr.Error())
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Dispatch to the VA for service
|
|
vaCtx := context.Background()
|
|
go func(authz core.Authorization) {
|
|
// We will mutate challenges later in this goroutine to change status and
|
|
// add error, but we also return a copy of authz immediately. To avoid a
|
|
// data race, make a copy of the challenges slice here for mutation.
|
|
challenges := make([]core.Challenge, len(authz.Challenges))
|
|
copy(challenges, authz.Challenges)
|
|
authz.Challenges = challenges
|
|
chall, _ := bgrpc.ChallengeToPB(authz.Challenges[challIndex])
|
|
|
|
req := vapb.PerformValidationRequest{
|
|
Domain: authz.Identifier.Value,
|
|
Challenge: chall,
|
|
Authz: &vapb.AuthzMeta{
|
|
Id: authz.ID,
|
|
RegID: authz.RegistrationID,
|
|
},
|
|
}
|
|
res, err := ra.VA.PerformValidation(vaCtx, &req)
|
|
|
|
challenge := &authz.Challenges[challIndex]
|
|
var prob *probs.ProblemDetails
|
|
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
prob = probs.ServerInternal("Could not communicate with VA")
|
|
ra.log.AuditErrf("Could not communicate with VA: %s", err)
|
|
} else {
|
|
if res.Problems != nil {
|
|
prob, err = bgrpc.PBToProblemDetails(res.Problems)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
prob = probs.ServerInternal("Could not communicate with VA")
|
|
ra.log.AuditErrf("Could not communicate with VA: %s", err)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Save the updated records
|
|
records := make([]core.ValidationRecord, len(res.Records))
|
|
for i, r := range res.Records {
|
|
records[i], err = bgrpc.PBToValidationRecord(r)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
prob = probs.ServerInternal("Records for validation corrupt")
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
challenge.ValidationRecord = records
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if !challenge.RecordsSane() && prob == nil {
|
|
prob = probs.ServerInternal("Records for validation failed sanity check")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if prob != nil {
|
|
challenge.Status = core.StatusInvalid
|
|
challenge.Error = prob
|
|
} else {
|
|
challenge.Status = core.StatusValid
|
|
}
|
|
challenge.Validated = &vStart
|
|
authz.Challenges[challIndex] = *challenge
|
|
|
|
err = ra.recordValidation(vaCtx, authz.ID, authz.Expires, challenge)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
ra.log.AuditErrf("Could not record updated validation: regID=[%d] authzID=[%s] err=[%s]",
|
|
authz.RegistrationID, authz.ID, err)
|
|
}
|
|
}(authz)
|
|
return bgrpc.AuthzToPB(authz)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// revokeCertificate generates a revoked OCSP response for the certificate with
|
|
// the given serial and issuer and stores that response in the database.
|
|
// TODO(#5152) make the issuerID argument an issuance.IssuerNameID
|
|
func (ra *RegistrationAuthorityImpl) revokeCertificate(ctx context.Context, serial *big.Int, issuerID int64, reason revocation.Reason) error {
|
|
serialString := core.SerialToString(serial)
|
|
revokedAt := ra.clk.Now().UnixNano()
|
|
|
|
var ocspResponse []byte
|
|
if !features.Enabled(features.ROCSPStage7) {
|
|
ocspResponsePB, err := ra.OCSP.GenerateOCSP(ctx, &capb.GenerateOCSPRequest{
|
|
Serial: serialString,
|
|
IssuerID: issuerID,
|
|
Status: string(core.OCSPStatusRevoked),
|
|
Reason: int32(reason),
|
|
RevokedAt: revokedAt,
|
|
})
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
ocspResponse = ocspResponsePB.Response
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
_, err := ra.SA.RevokeCertificate(ctx, &sapb.RevokeCertificateRequest{
|
|
Serial: serialString,
|
|
Reason: int64(reason),
|
|
Date: revokedAt,
|
|
Response: ocspResponse,
|
|
IssuerID: issuerID,
|
|
})
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ra.revocationReasonCounter.WithLabelValues(revocation.ReasonToString[reason]).Inc()
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// updateRevocationForKeyCompromise generates a revoked OCSP response for the
|
|
// already-revoked certificate with the given serial and issuer, and stores that
|
|
// response in the database. This only works for certificates that were
|
|
// previously revoked for a reason other than keyCompromise, and which are now
|
|
// being updated to keyCompromise instead.
|
|
// TODO(#5152) make the issuerID argument an issuance.IssuerNameID
|
|
func (ra *RegistrationAuthorityImpl) updateRevocationForKeyCompromise(ctx context.Context, serial *big.Int, issuerID int64) error {
|
|
serialString := core.SerialToString(serial)
|
|
thisUpdate := ra.clk.Now().UnixNano()
|
|
|
|
status, err := ra.SA.GetCertificateStatus(ctx, &sapb.Serial{Serial: serialString})
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return berrors.NotFoundError("unable to confirm that serial %q was ever issued: %s", serialString, err)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if status.Status != string(core.OCSPStatusRevoked) {
|
|
// Internal server error, because we shouldn't be in the function at all
|
|
// unless the cert was already revoked.
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("unable to re-revoke serial %q which is not currently revoked", serialString)
|
|
}
|
|
if status.RevokedReason == ocsp.KeyCompromise {
|
|
return berrors.AlreadyRevokedError("unable to re-revoke serial %q which is already revoked for keyCompromise", serialString)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// The new OCSP response has to be back-dated to the original date.
|
|
var ocspResponse []byte
|
|
if !features.Enabled(features.ROCSPStage7) {
|
|
ocspResponsePB, err := ra.OCSP.GenerateOCSP(ctx, &capb.GenerateOCSPRequest{
|
|
Serial: serialString,
|
|
IssuerID: issuerID,
|
|
Status: string(core.OCSPStatusRevoked),
|
|
Reason: int32(ocsp.KeyCompromise),
|
|
RevokedAt: status.RevokedDate,
|
|
})
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
ocspResponse = ocspResponsePB.Response
|
|
}
|
|
_, err = ra.SA.UpdateRevokedCertificate(ctx, &sapb.RevokeCertificateRequest{
|
|
Serial: serialString,
|
|
Reason: int64(ocsp.KeyCompromise),
|
|
Date: thisUpdate,
|
|
Backdate: status.RevokedDate,
|
|
Response: ocspResponse,
|
|
IssuerID: issuerID,
|
|
})
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ra.revocationReasonCounter.WithLabelValues(revocation.ReasonToString[ocsp.KeyCompromise]).Inc()
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// purgeOCSPCache makes a request to akamai-purger to purge the cache entries
|
|
// for the given certificate.
|
|
// TODO(#5152) make the issuerID argument an issuance.IssuerNameID
|
|
func (ra *RegistrationAuthorityImpl) purgeOCSPCache(ctx context.Context, cert *x509.Certificate, issuerID int64) error {
|
|
issuer, ok := ra.issuersByNameID[issuance.IssuerNameID(issuerID)]
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
// TODO(#5152): Remove this fallback (which only gets used when revoking by
|
|
// serial, so the issuer ID had to be read from the db).
|
|
issuer, ok = ra.issuersByID[issuance.IssuerID(issuerID)]
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("unable to identify issuer of cert with serial %q", core.SerialToString(cert.SerialNumber))
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
purgeURLs, err := akamai.GeneratePurgeURLs(cert, issuer.Certificate)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
_, err = ra.purger.Purge(ctx, &akamaipb.PurgeRequest{Urls: purgeURLs})
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// RevokeCertByApplicant revokes the certificate in question. It allows any
|
|
// revocation reason from (0, 1, 3, 4, 5, 9), because Subscribers are allowed to
|
|
// request any revocation reason for their own certificates. However, if the
|
|
// requesting RegID is an account which has authorizations for all names in the
|
|
// cert but is *not* the original subscriber, it overrides the revocation reason
|
|
// to be 5 (cessationOfOperation), because that code is used to cover instances
|
|
// where "the certificate subscriber no longer owns the domain names in the
|
|
// certificate". It does not add the key to the blocked keys list, even if
|
|
// reason 1 (keyCompromise) is requested, as it does not demonstrate said
|
|
// compromise. It attempts to purge the certificate from the Akamai cache, but
|
|
// it does not hard-fail if doing so is not successful, because the cache will
|
|
// drop the old OCSP response in less than 24 hours anyway.
|
|
func (ra *RegistrationAuthorityImpl) RevokeCertByApplicant(ctx context.Context, req *rapb.RevokeCertByApplicantRequest) (*emptypb.Empty, error) {
|
|
if req == nil || req.Cert == nil || req.RegID == 0 {
|
|
return nil, errIncompleteGRPCRequest
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if _, present := revocation.UserAllowedReasons[revocation.Reason(req.Code)]; !present {
|
|
return nil, berrors.BadRevocationReasonError(req.Code)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
cert, err := x509.ParseCertificate(req.Cert)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
serialString := core.SerialToString(cert.SerialNumber)
|
|
|
|
logEvent := certificateRevocationEvent{
|
|
ID: core.NewToken(),
|
|
SerialNumber: serialString,
|
|
Reason: req.Code,
|
|
Method: "applicant",
|
|
RequesterID: req.RegID,
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Below this point, do not re-declare `err` (i.e. type `err :=`) in a
|
|
// nested scope. Doing so will create a new `err` variable that is not
|
|
// captured by this closure.
|
|
defer func() {
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
logEvent.Error = err.Error()
|
|
}
|
|
ra.log.AuditObject("Revocation request:", logEvent)
|
|
}()
|
|
|
|
metadata, err := ra.SA.GetSerialMetadata(ctx, &sapb.Serial{Serial: serialString})
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if req.RegID == metadata.RegistrationID {
|
|
// The requester is the original subscriber. They can revoke for any reason.
|
|
logEvent.Method = "subscriber"
|
|
} else {
|
|
// The requester is a different account. We need to confirm that they have
|
|
// authorizations for all names in the cert.
|
|
logEvent.Method = "control"
|
|
|
|
var authzMapPB *sapb.Authorizations
|
|
authzMapPB, err = ra.SA.GetValidAuthorizations2(ctx, &sapb.GetValidAuthorizationsRequest{
|
|
RegistrationID: req.RegID,
|
|
Domains: cert.DNSNames,
|
|
Now: ra.clk.Now().UnixNano(),
|
|
})
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
m := make(map[string]struct{})
|
|
for _, authz := range authzMapPB.Authz {
|
|
m[authz.Domain] = struct{}{}
|
|
}
|
|
for _, name := range cert.DNSNames {
|
|
if _, present := m[name]; !present {
|
|
return nil, berrors.UnauthorizedError("requester does not control all names in cert with serial %q", serialString)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Applicants who are not the original Subscriber are not allowed to
|
|
// revoke for any reason other than cessationOfOperation, which covers
|
|
// circumstances where "the certificate subscriber no longer owns the
|
|
// domain names in the certificate". Override the reason code to match.
|
|
req.Code = ocsp.CessationOfOperation
|
|
logEvent.Reason = req.Code
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
issuerID := issuance.GetIssuerNameID(cert)
|
|
err = ra.revokeCertificate(
|
|
ctx,
|
|
cert.SerialNumber,
|
|
int64(issuerID),
|
|
revocation.Reason(req.Code),
|
|
)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// TODO(#5979): Check this error when it can't simply be due to a full queue.
|
|
_ = ra.purgeOCSPCache(ctx, cert, int64(issuerID))
|
|
|
|
return &emptypb.Empty{}, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// RevokeCertByKey revokes the certificate in question. It always uses
|
|
// reason code 1 (keyCompromise). It ensures that they public key is added to
|
|
// the blocked keys list, even if revocation otherwise fails. It attempts to
|
|
// purge the certificate from the Akamai cache, but it does not hard-fail if
|
|
// doing so is not successful, because the cache will drop the old OCSP response
|
|
// in less than 24 hours anyway.
|
|
func (ra *RegistrationAuthorityImpl) RevokeCertByKey(ctx context.Context, req *rapb.RevokeCertByKeyRequest) (*emptypb.Empty, error) {
|
|
if req == nil || req.Cert == nil {
|
|
return nil, errIncompleteGRPCRequest
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
cert, err := x509.ParseCertificate(req.Cert)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
issuerID := issuance.GetIssuerNameID(cert)
|
|
|
|
logEvent := certificateRevocationEvent{
|
|
ID: core.NewToken(),
|
|
SerialNumber: core.SerialToString(cert.SerialNumber),
|
|
Reason: ocsp.KeyCompromise,
|
|
Method: "key",
|
|
RequesterID: 0,
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Below this point, do not re-declare `err` (i.e. type `err :=`) in a
|
|
// nested scope. Doing so will create a new `err` variable that is not
|
|
// captured by this closure.
|
|
defer func() {
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
logEvent.Error = err.Error()
|
|
}
|
|
ra.log.AuditObject("Revocation request:", logEvent)
|
|
}()
|
|
|
|
// We revoke the cert before adding it to the blocked keys list, to avoid a
|
|
// race between this and the bad-key-revoker. But we don't check the error on
|
|
// from this operation until after we add to the blocked keys list, since that
|
|
// add needs to happen no matter what.
|
|
revokeErr := ra.revokeCertificate(
|
|
ctx,
|
|
cert.SerialNumber,
|
|
int64(issuerID),
|
|
revocation.Reason(ocsp.KeyCompromise),
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
// Now add the public key to the blocked keys list, and report the error if
|
|
// there is one. It's okay to error out here because failing to add the key
|
|
// to the blocked keys list is a worse failure than failing to revoke in the
|
|
// first place, because it means that bad-key-revoker won't revoke the cert
|
|
// anyway.
|
|
var digest core.Sha256Digest
|
|
digest, err = core.KeyDigest(cert.PublicKey)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
_, err = ra.SA.AddBlockedKey(ctx, &sapb.AddBlockedKeyRequest{
|
|
KeyHash: digest[:],
|
|
Added: ra.clk.Now().UnixNano(),
|
|
Source: "API",
|
|
})
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Finally check the error from revocation itself. If it was an AlreadyRevoked
|
|
// error, try to re-revoke the cert, in case it is revoked for a reason other
|
|
// than keyCompromise.
|
|
err = revokeErr
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
// Error out if the error was anything other than AlreadyRevoked. Otherwise
|
|
// try re-revocation.
|
|
if !errors.Is(err, berrors.AlreadyRevoked) {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
err = ra.updateRevocationForKeyCompromise(ctx, cert.SerialNumber, int64(issuerID))
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// TODO(#5979): Check this error when it can't simply be due to a full queue.
|
|
_ = ra.purgeOCSPCache(ctx, cert, int64(issuerID))
|
|
|
|
return &emptypb.Empty{}, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// AdministrativelyRevokeCertificate terminates trust in the certificate
|
|
// provided and does not require the registration ID of the requester since this
|
|
// method is only called from the admin-revoker tool. It trusts that the admin
|
|
// is doing the right thing, so if the requested reason is keyCompromise, it
|
|
// blocks the key from future issuance even though compromise has not been
|
|
// demonstrated here. It purges the certificate from the Akamai cache, and
|
|
// returns an error if that purge fails, since this method may be called late
|
|
// in the BRs-mandated revocation timeframe.
|
|
func (ra *RegistrationAuthorityImpl) AdministrativelyRevokeCertificate(ctx context.Context, req *rapb.AdministrativelyRevokeCertificateRequest) (*emptypb.Empty, error) {
|
|
if req == nil || req.AdminName == "" {
|
|
return nil, errIncompleteGRPCRequest
|
|
}
|
|
if req.Cert == nil && req.Serial == "" {
|
|
return nil, errIncompleteGRPCRequest
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
reasonCode := revocation.Reason(req.Code)
|
|
if reasonCode == ocsp.KeyCompromise && req.Cert == nil && !req.SkipBlockKey {
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("cannot revoke and block for KeyCompromise by serial alone")
|
|
}
|
|
if req.SkipBlockKey && reasonCode != ocsp.KeyCompromise {
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("cannot skip key blocking for reasons other than KeyCompromise")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if _, present := revocation.AdminAllowedReasons[reasonCode]; !present {
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("cannot revoke for reason %d", reasonCode)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// If we don't have a real cert, we create a fake cert (containing just the
|
|
// serial number, which is all we need) and look up the IssuerID from the db.
|
|
// We could instead look up and parse the certificate itself, but we avoid
|
|
// that in case we are administratively revoking the certificate because it is
|
|
// so badly malformed that it can't be parsed.
|
|
var cert *x509.Certificate
|
|
var issuerID int64 // TODO(#5152) make this an issuance.IssuerNameID
|
|
var err error
|
|
if req.Cert == nil {
|
|
serial, err := core.StringToSerial(req.Serial)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
cert = &x509.Certificate{
|
|
SerialNumber: serial,
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
status, err := ra.SA.GetCertificateStatus(ctx, &sapb.Serial{Serial: req.Serial})
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("unable to confirm that serial %q was ever issued: %w", serial, err)
|
|
}
|
|
issuerID = status.IssuerID
|
|
} else {
|
|
cert, err = x509.ParseCertificate(req.Cert)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
issuerID = int64(issuance.GetIssuerNameID(cert))
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
logEvent := certificateRevocationEvent{
|
|
ID: core.NewToken(),
|
|
Method: "key",
|
|
AdminName: req.AdminName,
|
|
SerialNumber: core.SerialToString(cert.SerialNumber),
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Below this point, do not re-declare `err` (i.e. type `err :=`) in a
|
|
// nested scope. Doing so will create a new `err` variable that is not
|
|
// captured by this closure.
|
|
defer func() {
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
logEvent.Error = err.Error()
|
|
}
|
|
ra.log.AuditObject("Revocation request:", logEvent)
|
|
}()
|
|
|
|
err = ra.revokeCertificate(ctx, cert.SerialNumber, issuerID, revocation.Reason(req.Code))
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
if req.Code == ocsp.KeyCompromise && errors.Is(err, berrors.AlreadyRevoked) {
|
|
err = ra.updateRevocationForKeyCompromise(ctx, cert.SerialNumber, issuerID)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if req.Code == ocsp.KeyCompromise && !req.SkipBlockKey {
|
|
var digest core.Sha256Digest
|
|
digest, err = core.KeyDigest(cert.PublicKey)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
_, err = ra.SA.AddBlockedKey(ctx, &sapb.AddBlockedKeyRequest{
|
|
KeyHash: digest[:],
|
|
Added: ra.clk.Now().UnixNano(),
|
|
Source: "admin-revoker",
|
|
Comment: fmt.Sprintf("revoked by %s", req.AdminName),
|
|
})
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
err = ra.purgeOCSPCache(ctx, cert, issuerID)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return &emptypb.Empty{}, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// DeactivateRegistration deactivates a valid registration
|
|
func (ra *RegistrationAuthorityImpl) DeactivateRegistration(ctx context.Context, reg *corepb.Registration) (*emptypb.Empty, error) {
|
|
if reg == nil || reg.Id == 0 {
|
|
return nil, errIncompleteGRPCRequest
|
|
}
|
|
if reg.Status != string(core.StatusValid) {
|
|
return nil, berrors.MalformedError("only valid registrations can be deactivated")
|
|
}
|
|
_, err := ra.SA.DeactivateRegistration(ctx, &sapb.RegistrationID{Id: reg.Id})
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, berrors.InternalServerError(err.Error())
|
|
}
|
|
return &emptypb.Empty{}, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// DeactivateAuthorization deactivates a currently valid authorization
|
|
func (ra *RegistrationAuthorityImpl) DeactivateAuthorization(ctx context.Context, req *corepb.Authorization) (*emptypb.Empty, error) {
|
|
if req == nil || req.Id == "" || req.Status == "" {
|
|
return nil, errIncompleteGRPCRequest
|
|
}
|
|
authzID, err := strconv.ParseInt(req.Id, 10, 64)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
if _, err := ra.SA.DeactivateAuthorization2(ctx, &sapb.AuthorizationID2{Id: authzID}); err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
return &emptypb.Empty{}, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// checkOrderNames validates that the RA's policy authority allows issuing for
|
|
// each of the names in an order. If any of the names are unacceptable a
|
|
// malformed or rejectedIdentifier error with suberrors for each rejected
|
|
// identifier is returned.
|
|
func (ra *RegistrationAuthorityImpl) checkOrderNames(names []string) error {
|
|
idents := make([]identifier.ACMEIdentifier, len(names))
|
|
for i, name := range names {
|
|
idents[i] = identifier.DNSIdentifier(name)
|
|
}
|
|
err := ra.PA.WillingToIssueWildcards(idents)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// GenerateOCSP looks up a certificate's status, then requests a signed OCSP
|
|
// response for it from the CA. If the certificate status is not available
|
|
// or the certificate is expired, it returns berrors.NotFoundError.
|
|
// This does not write back the result to the SA or any other storage.
|
|
func (ra *RegistrationAuthorityImpl) GenerateOCSP(ctx context.Context, req *rapb.GenerateOCSPRequest) (*capb.OCSPResponse, error) {
|
|
status, err := ra.SA.GetCertificateStatus(ctx, &sapb.Serial{Serial: req.Serial})
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
notAfter := time.Unix(0, status.NotAfter).UTC()
|
|
if ra.clk.Now().After(notAfter) {
|
|
return nil, berrors.NotFoundError("certificate is expired")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return ra.OCSP.GenerateOCSP(ctx, &capb.GenerateOCSPRequest{
|
|
Serial: req.Serial,
|
|
Status: status.Status,
|
|
Reason: int32(status.RevokedReason),
|
|
RevokedAt: status.RevokedDate,
|
|
IssuerID: status.IssuerID,
|
|
})
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// NewOrder creates a new order object
|
|
func (ra *RegistrationAuthorityImpl) NewOrder(ctx context.Context, req *rapb.NewOrderRequest) (*corepb.Order, error) {
|
|
if req == nil || req.RegistrationID == 0 {
|
|
return nil, errIncompleteGRPCRequest
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
newOrder := &sapb.NewOrderRequest{
|
|
RegistrationID: req.RegistrationID,
|
|
Names: core.UniqueLowerNames(req.Names),
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if len(newOrder.Names) > ra.maxNames {
|
|
return nil, berrors.MalformedError(
|
|
"Order cannot contain more than %d DNS names", ra.maxNames)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Validate that our policy allows issuing for each of the names in the order
|
|
err := ra.checkOrderNames(newOrder.Names)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
err = wildcardOverlap(newOrder.Names)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// See if there is an existing unexpired pending (or ready) order that can be reused
|
|
// for this account
|
|
existingOrder, err := ra.SA.GetOrderForNames(ctx, &sapb.GetOrderForNamesRequest{
|
|
AcctID: newOrder.RegistrationID,
|
|
Names: newOrder.Names,
|
|
})
|
|
// If there was an error and it wasn't an acceptable "NotFound" error, return
|
|
// immediately
|
|
if err != nil && !errors.Is(err, berrors.NotFound) {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// If there was an order, make sure it has expected fields and return it
|
|
// Error if an incomplete order is returned.
|
|
if existingOrder != nil {
|
|
// Check to see if the expected fields of the existing order are set.
|
|
if existingOrder.Id == 0 || existingOrder.Created == 0 || existingOrder.Status == "" || existingOrder.RegistrationID == 0 || existingOrder.Expires == 0 || len(existingOrder.Names) == 0 {
|
|
return nil, errIncompleteGRPCResponse
|
|
}
|
|
return existingOrder, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Check if there is rate limit space for a new order within the current window
|
|
err = ra.checkNewOrdersPerAccountLimit(ctx, newOrder.RegistrationID)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
// Check if there is rate limit space for issuing a certificate for the new
|
|
// order's names. If there isn't then it doesn't make sense to allow creating
|
|
// an order - it will just fail when finalization checks the same limits.
|
|
err = ra.checkLimits(ctx, newOrder.Names, newOrder.RegistrationID)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
err = ra.checkInvalidAuthorizationLimits(ctx, newOrder.RegistrationID, newOrder.Names)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// An order's lifetime is effectively bound by the shortest remaining lifetime
|
|
// of its associated authorizations. For that reason it would be Uncool if
|
|
// `sa.GetAuthorizations` returned an authorization that was very close to
|
|
// expiry. The resulting pending order that references it would itself end up
|
|
// expiring very soon.
|
|
// To prevent this we only return authorizations that are at least 1 day away
|
|
// from expiring.
|
|
authzExpiryCutoff := ra.clk.Now().AddDate(0, 0, 1).UnixNano()
|
|
|
|
getAuthReq := &sapb.GetAuthorizationsRequest{
|
|
RegistrationID: newOrder.RegistrationID,
|
|
Now: authzExpiryCutoff,
|
|
Domains: newOrder.Names,
|
|
}
|
|
existingAuthz, err := ra.SA.GetAuthorizations2(ctx, getAuthReq)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Collect up the authorizations we found into a map keyed by the domains the
|
|
// authorizations correspond to
|
|
nameToExistingAuthz := make(map[string]*corepb.Authorization, len(newOrder.Names))
|
|
for _, v := range existingAuthz.Authz {
|
|
// Don't reuse a valid authorization if the reuseValidAuthz flag is
|
|
// disabled.
|
|
if v.Authz.Status == string(core.StatusValid) && !ra.reuseValidAuthz {
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
nameToExistingAuthz[v.Domain] = v.Authz
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// For each of the names in the order, if there is an acceptable
|
|
// existing authz, append it to the order to reuse it. Otherwise track
|
|
// that there is a missing authz for that name.
|
|
var missingAuthzNames []string
|
|
for _, name := range newOrder.Names {
|
|
// If there isn't an existing authz, note that its missing and continue
|
|
if _, exists := nameToExistingAuthz[name]; !exists {
|
|
missingAuthzNames = append(missingAuthzNames, name)
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
authz := nameToExistingAuthz[name]
|
|
// If the identifier is a wildcard and the existing authz only has one
|
|
// DNS-01 type challenge we can reuse it. In theory we will
|
|
// never get back an authorization for a domain with a wildcard prefix
|
|
// that doesn't meet this criteria from SA.GetAuthorizations but we verify
|
|
// again to be safe.
|
|
if strings.HasPrefix(name, "*.") &&
|
|
len(authz.Challenges) == 1 && core.AcmeChallenge(authz.Challenges[0].Type) == core.ChallengeTypeDNS01 {
|
|
authzID, err := strconv.ParseInt(authz.Id, 10, 64)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
newOrder.V2Authorizations = append(newOrder.V2Authorizations, authzID)
|
|
ra.authzAges.Observe((time.Unix(0, authz.Expires).Sub(ra.clk.Now()) - ra.authorizationLifetime).Seconds())
|
|
continue
|
|
} else if !strings.HasPrefix(name, "*.") {
|
|
// If the identifier isn't a wildcard, we can reuse any authz
|
|
authzID, err := strconv.ParseInt(authz.Id, 10, 64)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
newOrder.V2Authorizations = append(newOrder.V2Authorizations, authzID)
|
|
ra.authzAges.Observe((time.Unix(0, authz.Expires).Sub(ra.clk.Now()) - ra.authorizationLifetime).Seconds())
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Delete the authz from the nameToExistingAuthz map since we are not reusing it.
|
|
delete(nameToExistingAuthz, name)
|
|
// If we reached this point then the existing authz was not acceptable for
|
|
// reuse and we need to mark the name as requiring a new pending authz
|
|
missingAuthzNames = append(missingAuthzNames, name)
|
|
}
|
|
ra.reusedValidAuthzCounter.Add(float64(len(newOrder.V2Authorizations)))
|
|
|
|
// If the order isn't fully authorized we need to check that the client has
|
|
// rate limit room for more pending authorizations
|
|
if len(missingAuthzNames) > 0 {
|
|
err := ra.checkPendingAuthorizationLimit(ctx, newOrder.RegistrationID)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Loop through each of the names missing authzs and create a new pending
|
|
// authorization for each.
|
|
var newAuthzs []*corepb.Authorization
|
|
for _, name := range missingAuthzNames {
|
|
pb, err := ra.createPendingAuthz(newOrder.RegistrationID, identifier.ACMEIdentifier{
|
|
Type: identifier.DNS,
|
|
Value: name,
|
|
})
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
newAuthzs = append(newAuthzs, pb)
|
|
ra.authzAges.Observe(0)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Start with the order's own expiry as the minExpiry. We only care
|
|
// about authz expiries that are sooner than the order's expiry
|
|
minExpiry := ra.clk.Now().Add(ra.orderLifetime)
|
|
|
|
// Check the reused authorizations to see if any have an expiry before the
|
|
// minExpiry (the order's lifetime)
|
|
for _, authz := range nameToExistingAuthz {
|
|
// An authz without an expiry is an unexpected internal server event
|
|
if authz.Expires == 0 {
|
|
return nil, berrors.InternalServerError(
|
|
"SA.GetAuthorizations returned an authz (%s) with zero expiry",
|
|
authz.Id)
|
|
}
|
|
// If the reused authorization expires before the minExpiry, it's expiry
|
|
// is the new minExpiry.
|
|
authzExpiry := time.Unix(0, authz.Expires)
|
|
if authzExpiry.Before(minExpiry) {
|
|
minExpiry = authzExpiry
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
// If the newly created pending authz's have an expiry closer than the
|
|
// minExpiry the minExpiry is the pending authz expiry.
|
|
if len(newAuthzs) > 0 {
|
|
newPendingAuthzExpires := ra.clk.Now().Add(ra.pendingAuthorizationLifetime)
|
|
if newPendingAuthzExpires.Before(minExpiry) {
|
|
minExpiry = newPendingAuthzExpires
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
// Set the order's expiry to the minimum expiry. The db doesn't store
|
|
// sub-second values, so truncate here.
|
|
newOrder.Expires = minExpiry.Truncate(time.Second).UnixNano()
|
|
|
|
newOrderAndAuthzsReq := &sapb.NewOrderAndAuthzsRequest{
|
|
NewOrder: newOrder,
|
|
NewAuthzs: newAuthzs,
|
|
}
|
|
storedOrder, err := ra.SA.NewOrderAndAuthzs(ctx, newOrderAndAuthzsReq)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
if storedOrder.Id == 0 || storedOrder.Created == 0 || storedOrder.Status == "" || storedOrder.RegistrationID == 0 || storedOrder.Expires == 0 || len(storedOrder.Names) == 0 {
|
|
return nil, errIncompleteGRPCResponse
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Note how many names are being requested in this certificate order.
|
|
ra.namesPerCert.With(prometheus.Labels{"type": "requested"}).Observe(float64(len(storedOrder.Names)))
|
|
|
|
return storedOrder, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// createPendingAuthz checks that a name is allowed for issuance and creates the
|
|
// necessary challenges for it and puts this and all of the relevant information
|
|
// into a corepb.Authorization for transmission to the SA to be stored
|
|
func (ra *RegistrationAuthorityImpl) createPendingAuthz(reg int64, identifier identifier.ACMEIdentifier) (*corepb.Authorization, error) {
|
|
authz := &corepb.Authorization{
|
|
Identifier: identifier.Value,
|
|
RegistrationID: reg,
|
|
Status: string(core.StatusPending),
|
|
Expires: ra.clk.Now().Add(ra.pendingAuthorizationLifetime).Truncate(time.Second).UnixNano(),
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Create challenges. The WFE will update them with URIs before sending them out.
|
|
challenges, err := ra.PA.ChallengesFor(identifier)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
// The only time ChallengesFor errors it is a fatal configuration error
|
|
// where challenges required by policy for an identifier are not enabled. We
|
|
// want to treat this as an internal server error.
|
|
return nil, berrors.InternalServerError(err.Error())
|
|
}
|
|
// Check each challenge for sanity.
|
|
for _, challenge := range challenges {
|
|
err := challenge.CheckConsistencyForClientOffer()
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
// berrors.InternalServerError because we generated these challenges, they should
|
|
// be OK.
|
|
err = berrors.InternalServerError("challenge didn't pass sanity check: %+v", challenge)
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
challPB, err := bgrpc.ChallengeToPB(challenge)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
authz.Challenges = append(authz.Challenges, challPB)
|
|
}
|
|
return authz, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// wildcardOverlap takes a slice of domain names and returns an error if any of
|
|
// them is a non-wildcard FQDN that overlaps with a wildcard domain in the map.
|
|
func wildcardOverlap(dnsNames []string) error {
|
|
nameMap := make(map[string]bool, len(dnsNames))
|
|
for _, v := range dnsNames {
|
|
nameMap[v] = true
|
|
}
|
|
for name := range nameMap {
|
|
if name[0] == '*' {
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
labels := strings.Split(name, ".")
|
|
labels[0] = "*"
|
|
if nameMap[strings.Join(labels, ".")] {
|
|
return berrors.MalformedError(
|
|
"Domain name %q is redundant with a wildcard domain in the same request. Remove one or the other from the certificate request.", name)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// validateContactsPresent will return an error if the contacts []string
|
|
// len is greater than zero and the contactsPresent bool is false. We
|
|
// don't care about any other cases. If the length of the contacts is zero
|
|
// and contactsPresent is true, it seems like a mismatch but we have to
|
|
// assume that the client is requesting to update the contacts field with
|
|
// by removing the existing contacts value so we don't want to return an
|
|
// error here.
|
|
func validateContactsPresent(contacts []string, contactsPresent bool) error {
|
|
if len(contacts) > 0 && !contactsPresent {
|
|
return berrors.InternalServerError("account contacts present but contactsPresent false")
|
|
}
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|